Four Cases from Danish Monetary History by Ravn Sørensen, Anders
Anders Ravn Sørensen
PhD Series 22.2014
PhD
 Series 22.2014
S
tudies in central bank legitim
acy, currency and national identity
copenhagen business school
handelshøjskolen
solbjerg plads 3
dk-2000 frederiksberg
danmark
www.cbs.dk
ISSN 0906-6934
Print ISBN:  978-87-93155-44-2
Online ISBN: 978-87-93155-45-9
Doctoral School of Organisation  
and Management Studies
Studies in central bank legitimacy, 
currency and national identity  
Four cases from Danish monetary history
Studies in central bank legitimacy, currency 
and national identity 
Four cases from Danish monetary history 
Anders Ravn Sørensen 
Supervisors: 
Professor, Per H. Hansen, Copenhagen Business School 
Associate Professor, Mads Mordhorst 
Doctoral School of Organisation 
and Management Studies, Copenhagen Business School 
Anders Ravn Sørensen
Studies in central bank legitimacy, currency and national identity
Four cases from Danish monetary history
1st edition 2014
PhD Series 22.2014
© The Author 
ISSN 0906-6934
Print ISBN:  978-87-93155-44-2
Online ISBN: 978-87-93155-45-9
The Doctoral School of Organisation and Management Studies (OMS) is an  
interdisciplinary research environment at Copenhagen Business School for  
PhD students working on theoretical and empirical themes related to the  
organisation and management of private, public and voluntary organizations.
All rights reserved.
No parts of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means,
electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information
storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.
 3 
 
PREFACE 
This dissertation is about the historical connection between the Danish central bank 
(Nationalbanken), the Danish currency (kronen) and Danish national identity. The 
above theme was conceived by researchers at the Center for Business History at 
Copenhagen Business School, who managed to convince Nationalbanken about the 
relevance of such a research theme. Not only was Nationalbanken persuaded that the 
topic was worth exploring, Nationalbanken also agreed to finance a Ph.D. project. 
While the research theme was conceived in advance no concrete research questions 
were developed. My task as a Ph.D. student on this project has been to compose a 
dissertation that, in some way or another, deals with the historical relation between the 
Danish currency, Nationalbanken, and Danish national identity. This means that I have 
been free to chose an approach and that it has been up to me to define a research 
framework and to develop appropriate research questions.  
 
The dissertation is structured as an article-based dissertation. It comprises four 
individual articles written for publication in four separate journals. The four articles are 
accompanied by a ‘frame’ that sets the scene of the study and binds the articles 
together in a shared conclusion. In the frame I also offer some theoretical definitions 
and reflect on the commonalities that run through the different articles. The frame is 
meant to serve as a background structure that connects the findings in the articles and 
integrates the different elements into a meaningful whole.  
 Two of the articles have been published. In these articles “Monetary Romanticism” 
and “The Danish Euro”, I have retained the original layouts, the British spelling, and 
the original reference styles required by the two journals.  
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The four articles are in turn: 
1. “Monetary Romanticism: Nationalist Rhetoric and Monetary Organisation in 
Nineteenth-Century Denmark”: 
 
2. “The Danish Euro: Constructing a Monetary Oxymoron in the Danish Euro 
Debate”: 
 
3. “‘Too weird for banknotes’: Legitimacy and Identity in the Production of Danish 
Banknotes 1947-2007”; and 
 
4. “Banking on the Nation: A Cultural History of Central Bank Legitimacy and the 
Narratives of Four Danish Central Bank Governors.”  
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ABSTRACT 
In this dissertation I examine the historical relationship between Danish national 
identity and monetary organization, defined as the Danish currency kronen and the 
Danish central bank Nationalbanken. The ambition of my analysis is twofold: firstly, I 
aim to understand the role of national identity in legitimating Danish monetary 
organization. Secondly, I analyze the importance of the Danish currency and 
Nationalbanken in the construction of national identity. As such, the dissertation 
focuses on the mutually configuring relationship between monetary legitimacy and 
national identity.  
Following ideas from organizational institutionalism, one of the basic 
assumptions in the dissertation is that all organizations, including central banks, must 
be aligned with, or at least not contradict, the values, norms and symbols of the 
surrounding national culture. To analyze this potential alignment historically in a 
Danish context, national identity is applied as an analytical concept that conditions the 
actions and decisions of organizations placed in a national setting. In the dissertation, 
national identity is understood as the continuous reproduction and interpretations of the 
cultural elements of the nation as well as individual identification with these elements. 
This definition of national identity allows for an analysis that involves 
more than how monetary organization become legitimate. Every attempt to align 
kronen and Nationalbanken with national identity constitutes, concurrently, a 
reproduction of national identity. Thus, while a central bank and national currency 
might require alignment with national identity to be perceived as legitimate, monetary 
organization also reproduces and bolsters national identity.  
To examine this reciprocal relationship, I have selected four cases/themes 
from Danish monetary history where the legitimacy of monetary organization and 
issues of national identity have been particularly pertinent. These four themes are in 
turn:  
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1) The monetary and national conflict between Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein in 
the mid-nineteenth century;  
2) The Danish euro-debate of 2000; 
3) The design process of Danish banknotes through history; and 
4) The narratives of and about Danish central bank governors during periods of 
transitions or legitimacy crises.  
 
These themes have been analyzed in four individual articles that comprise four 
chapters in the dissertation. Overall, the findings in the different articles can be 
summarized in three main conclusions. Firstly, the different analyses show that the 
legitimacy of monetary organization, in the Danish context, has been conditioned by 
ideas of national community and national identity. In particular, proposed changes in 
existing monetary organization, as demonstrated in the Schleswig-Holstein and euro 
articles, were influenced by national identity: rather, monetary organization that failed 
to reflect national identity risked being deemed as illegitimate.  
 Secondly, taken together, the different articles underline the reciprocal 
relationship between legitimacy and national identity. In this dissertation I have 
demonstrated how this relationship has developed historically. The Danish currency 
and Nationalbanken were not merely feeding on the nation to become legitimate. When 
either the currency or the central bank were articulated in connection with national 
identity, the monetary organization simultaneously reinforced national identity.  
 Thirdly, I suggest that we must conceive the embeddedness of monetary 
organization in national identity as a result of a historical development. As 
Nationalbanken and the Danish currency were gradually consolidated, the alignment 
with national culture achieved a ‘taken-for-granted’ quality. Gradually, monetary 
organization became ‘national’ as Nationalbanken, the central bank governor, and the 
Danish currency were integrated in national identity. Instead of actively having to refer 
to national identity in the search for legitimacy, Nationalbanken and kronen were 
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configuring national identity in a process that reflects Billig’s idea of banal 
nationalism. As such, I suggest that we must perceive the reciprocal relationship 
between national identity and monetary legitimacy as shifting in emphasis from the 
nineteenth century until today. Danish monetary organization transitioned from being 
dependent on national identity to banally reproducing national identity.  
In the conclusion of this dissertation I propose an analytical middle ground, 
so to speak, between the focus on identity-construction and legitimacy-seeking. 
Finally, following this dissertation’s focus on the mutually configuring relationship 
between national identity and legitimacy I suggest that scholars of nationalism should 
orient themselves towards and benefit from organizational institutionalism that could 
further our understanding of the process in which national identity is institutionalized 
through the banal nationalism of domestic organizations.  
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DANSK RESUME  
I denne afhandling undersøger jeg den historiske sammenhæng mellem dansk national 
identitet, den danske valuta, kronen, og den danske centralbank Nationalbanken. 
Afhandlingen har to overordnede analytiske målsætninger: For det første ønsker jeg at 
forstå betydningen af national identitet i forhold til valutaens og Nationalbankens 
legitimitet. For det andet analyserer jeg betydningen af den danske valuta og 
Nationalbanken i opbygningen af dansk national identitet. Således fokuserer 
afhandlingen på den gensidige konfiguration mellem monetære systemers legitimitet 
og national identitet. 
Et centralt udgangspunkt for afhandlingens forskellige artikler er, at 
organisationer, for at blive opfattet som legitime, skal være i overensstemmelse med, 
eller i hvert fald ikke modsige, de værdier, normer og symboler der udgør den 
omgivende nationale kultur. Centralbanker er ingen undtagelse. For at analysere denne 
potentielle kobling mellem national kultur, Nationalbanken og den danske valuta 
betragter jeg i afhandlingen national identitet som et kulturelt system, der sætter 
rammerne for legitime handlinger og beslutninger for organisationer placeret i en 
national kontekst. I afhandlingen defineres national identitet som den kontinuerlige 
reproduktion og fortolkning af nationens kulturelle elementer samt individuel personlig 
identifikation med disse elementer. Denne definition af national identitet giver 
mulighed for en analyse, der ikke kun fokuserer på hvordan den monetære organisering 
opnår legitimitet. Fordi national identitet forstås som løbende reproduktion af den 
nationale kultur, udgør ethvert forsøg på at tilpasse kronen og Nationalbanken til disse 
kulturelle mønstre samtidig en reproduktion af den nationale identitet. På den måde 
både bruger og bidrager nationale monetære systemer til den løbende reproduktion af 
national identitet.  
For at undersøge dette gensidige forhold mellem identitet og monetær 
legitimitet har jeg udvalgt fire episoder/temaer fra dansk pengehistorie, hvor 
pengemæssige anliggender er blevet artikuleret i forbindelse med national identitet. 
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Disse fire udvalgte temaer er:  
 
1) Den monetære og nationale konflikt mellem Danmark og Slesvig-Holsten i midten 
af det nittende århundrede. 
2) Den danske euro-debat i 2000 
3) Dansk pengeseddeldesign i historisk perspektiv 
4) Fortællinger om danske nationalbankdirektører i overgangsperioder og perioder med 
udfordret legitimitet. 
 
Disse temaer er blevet analyseret i fire individuelle artikler, der udgør afhandlingens 
fire analytiske kapitler. Samlet set kan resultaterne i de forskellige artikler 
sammenfattes i tre hovedkonklusioner: For det første viser de forskellige analyser, at 
legitimiteten af den danske monetære organisering har været betinget af ideer om 
nationalt fællesskab og national identitet. Især i forbindelse med foreslåede ændringer i 
det eksisterende monetære system, har national identitet været af afgørende betydning. 
Som eksemplificeret i artiklerne om Schleswig-Holsten og den danske euro-debat, 
risikerede valutaer, der af den ene eller anden grund ikke afspejlede den nationale 
identitet at blive opfattet som illegitime. 
For det andet, sætter de fire artikler en streg under det dialektiske forhold 
mellem legitimitet og national identitet. I afhandlingen har jeg empirisk demonstreret 
hvordan dette forhold er blevet konfigureret historisk i en dansk sammenhæng. Den 
danske valuta og Nationalbanken har ikke blot trukket på og refereret til national 
identitet for at opnå legitimitet. Når Nationalbanken og kronen er blevet artikuleret i 
forbindelse med nationale identitet, har de samtidig reproduceret dansk national 
identitet. Denne gensidige konfiguration udgør et tilbagevendende tema i de forskellige 
artikler, men er dog mest udtalt i forbindelse med design af danske pengesedler, hvor 
forestillinger om nationen er blevet materialiseret og formidlet visuelt gennem 
pengenes design,  
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For det tredje foreslår jeg, at vi skal forstå indlejringen af den danske valuta 
og nationalbank som elementer i den nationale identitet og som produktet af en 
historisk udvikling. Gradvist som Nationalbanken og den danske valuta blev 
konsolideret, opnåede pengesystemets indlejring i den nationale kultur en naturlig 
selvfølgelighed. Efterhånden som kronen og Nationalbanken blev selvfølgeligt 
"nationale", blev selve den monetære organisering og nationalbankdirektørerne 
integreret i dansk nationale identitet. I stedet for aktivt at skulle henvise til den 
nationale identitet i søgen efter legitimitet kom Nationalbanken og kronen til at 
konfigurere national identitet i en proces der afspejler Billig’s ide om den banale 
nationalisme. Således foreslår jeg, at vi skal opfatte det gensidige forhold mellem 
national identitet og monetær legitimitet som have skiftet fokus fra det nittende 
århundrede til i dag. Nationalbanken og valutaen gik fra at være afhængig af national 
identitet til gennem en banal nationalisme at forstærke den nationale identitet. 
Konklusionerne af denne afhandling bidrager til den eksisterende forskning 
i penge og national identitet ved at foreslå en mellemvej, så at sige, mellem et ensidigt 
fokus på konstruktionen af identitet og forsøgene på at opnå legitimitet. For eksempel 
hviler opfattelsen af det ønskværdige i lav inflation på den antagelse, at 
inflationsbekæmpede politik er til gavn for det fælles bedste; det nationale kollektive. 
Samtidig er inflationsdæmpende politik, f.eks. en national rentestigning, med til at 
styrke forestillingen om et nationalt fællesskab fordi befolkningen bliver knyttet 
sammen i monetært skæbnefællesskab. 
Endelig foreslår jeg, jævnfør afhandlings fokus på den gensidige 
konfiguration mellem national identitet og legitimitet, at nationalismestudier i højere 
grad bør orientere sig mod og drage fordel af nyinstitutionel teori. En sådan teoretisk 
kobling vil kunne bidrage til forståelsen af den proces hvori national identitet bliver 
institutionaliseret og bliver et element af den banale nationalisme der udgår fra 
organisationer som f.eks. centralbanker. 
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INTRODUCTION 
THE NATION’S BANK 
During the Napoleonic Wars, Denmark was on the losing side. After a heavy 
bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807, the nation’s pride, the Dano-Norwegian fleet, 
was seized and confiscated by the British. In 1814, as a result of the war, Denmark had 
to cede Norway, which had previously been a part of the Danish Kingdom. The loss of 
Norway proved a formative episode in the development of Danish national identity, as 
Denmark was transformed from an empire to a small nation-state (Glenthøj, 2012).   
The war not only resulted in a bitter military defeat and a forced 
redefinition of the national community: during the war, state finances had become 
increasingly unsustainable. The Danish King had used the bank of issue, 
Kurantbanken, to bankroll the Danish war efforts, which were primarily financed 
through excessive issue of inconvertible kurant notes. During the war, the amount of 
kurant in circulation increased by some 900% (Märcher, 2010) and by 1812 the rate 
had dropped to less than one-twelfth of silver parity value (Hansen & Svendsen, 
1968:110). Kurantbanken’s inflationary policy prompted outspoken distrust of the 
monetary authorities and the circulating banknotes.  
In January 1813, an extensive monetary reform was devised to remedy the 
situation. The reform (which was, in effect, a state bankruptcy) included the 
establishment of a new bank of issue, Rigsbanken (meaning ‘Bank of the Realm’) and 
the introduction of new banknotes; the rigsbankdaler. To back the new notes, 
Rigsbanken was to hold a 6% priority liability on every property within the Danish 
state. Also, the reform set a maximum on the amounts of circulating notes, and the old 
kurant-notes were converted into new rigsbankdaler at a 6:1 ratio. As it turned out, 
Rigsbanken failed to sustain the silver value of the new notes, which hit a low of 9% in 
September 1813. In the following years, the value of the rigsbankdaler fluctuated 
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dramatically and, in 1818, yet another bank of issue was established in an effort to 
stabilize the monetary system. 
The bank of 1818 was organized as a privately owned joint-stock company, 
outside government and state control but with a legally defined obligation to uphold a 
stable monetary system and to ensure that the rigsbankdaler reached silver parity. But 
what should be the name of this new bank? The commission overseeing the monetary 
reform decided to name it Nationalbanken i Kjøbenhavn, meaning the ‘national bank in 
Copenhagen’. From being a bank of the realm, the King, and the state, the bank was 
now symbolically linked to the nation – which, although the concept had a variety of 
different meanings in early 1800s Denmark – was used by the majority of the 
population to refer to a ‘people’ or a ‘people within a Fatherland’ (Glenthøj, 
2010:137). Why this symbolic shift from state to nation?  
I want to suggest, here, one potential explanation: the incorporation of the 
nation in the new bank name appealed to the commission members because they were 
in dire need of a new source of legitimacy. The state, headed by the absolutist Danish 
King, had exhausted its legitimacy in monetary affairs. To regain legitimacy and 
trustworthiness, the bank, after the period of hyperinflation, had to be associated with 
another symbol. To this end, the national community held more promise than the state. 
The monetary commission that devised this symbolic linkage consisted of personalities 
such as Minister of State Ernst Schimmelmann, Minister of Finance Johan Sigismund 
von Møsting, and former governor of Rigsbanken Ove Malling. These were bourgeois, 
educated civil servants loyal to the King and state, but were also inspired by the ideas 
of the German romanticist movement. 1  These individuals clearly realized that the 
concept of nation proved a potential source of legitimacy and, as such, it seems as no 
coincidence that the commission chose to associate the new bank with the nation rather 
than the state. 
                                                                
1 See e.g. Mordhorst (2001) 
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I must confess that this interpretation remains an educated guess. Although 
I have searched in the archives of the monetary commission and the private archives of 
Schimmelmann as well as Malling, I have failed to find the kind of document 
contemplating the new name, nor any other semantic considerations regarding 
Nationalbanken. Nonetheless, I want to use this stipulation as a hypothetical take-off to 
set the scene of this dissertation. The very naming of Nationalbanken in 1818 serves as 
an intriguing point of departure that highlights the key theme, i.e., the potential 
relationship between monetary legitimacy and national identity. However, this is not 
only a story of how central banks become legitimate; it is also a story of how monetary 
organization contributes to the continuous reproduction of national identity. When 
Schimmelmann, Malling and von Møsting turned to the nation as a source of 
legitimacy, they were not only drawing meaning from it. They were also well under 
way to constructing the very same nation. 
 
As have most central banks, the Danish central bank has gone through a series of 
different stages.2 From its beginning as a state bank, it became a privately owned bank 
in 1818 with the responsibility of securing a stable monetary system. In addition, 
throughout the nineteenth century, Nationalbanken occasionally assumed the role as a 
lender of last resort. In 1936, the statutes were changed once again, and the bank was 
granted formal autonomy to pursue price stability. Today, the Danish central bank has 
an autonomous status within the government structure. It has an advisory role to the 
Danish government in monetary matters; it acts in the international money market and 
sets discount rates. As such, Nationalbanken has historically changed organizational 
structure and raison d'être.  
In each of these stages, however, Nationalbanken was made to answer to a 
range of different interest groups. Whether in relation to the bank’s own private 
shareholders, the political establishment, professional economists, society’s creditors 
                                                                
2 For an overview of the global historical trends in central banking, see, e.g., Fischer (1994) and Marcussen (2009). 
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and debtors, or different national communities within the Danish state, the actions and 
decisions of the central bank were required to be considered proper and appropriate by 
its constituency. Like all other organizations, the central bank must be perceived as 
legitimate to function and to survive.  
What then, makes a central bank legitimate? Surely, this question has more 
than one answer. As I will detail in the below sections, issues such as formal 
independence, democratic oversight, and the scientific authority of central bankers 
constitute potential sources for central bank legitimacy. In this dissertation, with the 
above story of the founding of Nationalbanken in 1818 in mind, I set out to investigate 
yet another legitimacy source: the alignment of the national currency and central bank 
with national identity. I will do this through four historical case-studies of how the 
Danish central bank and the Danish currency has been entwined in, aligned with, and 
sometimes distanced from ideas about the Danish nation.  
As such, the dissertation is not a traditional history of Danish identity, nor 
is it a contribution to the more technical aspects of central banking. I consider it a 
cultural history of the Danish central bank and the Danish currency with the aim of 
elucidating the cultural components of the legitimacy of monetary organization.  
 
WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MONETARY 
ORGANIZATION, LEGITIMACY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY? 
What is the status of the research on money, central banks, and national identity? In 
this section, I discuss the existing literature on central banks, currencies, national 
identity, and legitimacy. I review the existing work in a fairly detailed fashion to 
situate my own research theme and to sketch a framework that will allow the 
development of some relevant research questions. The review will start out by focusing 
on the literature on money and national identity more broadly. In the second part of the 
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review, I turn to the somewhat underdeveloped theme of national identity and central 
banking.   
Today, the connection between monetary organization—a term that I have 
adapted from Gilbert (2007)—by which I understand the arrangement and organization 
of a currency system and central bank, nationalism, and national identity is well 
researched. The past two decades have seen an increasing interest in this connection. 
New studies on money, identity, and nationalism are published each year as the gradual 
incorporation of newcomers to the euro zone, the recent euro-crisis, and the ongoing 
discussions over a potential North American currency union have continuously fuelled 
the debate. Scholars have taken advantage of the statistical data generated by the euro-
barometer or various euro-referenda to design quantitative studies to test the relation 
between currency and identity (Kaltenthaler & Anderson, 2001; Carey, 2002; Christin 
& Trechsel, 2002; Meier-Pesti & Kirchler, 2003; C. J. Anderson, 2006; Jupille & 
Leblang, 2007; Binzer Hobolt & Leblond, 2009) 
Methodologically, the existing literature on currencies and national identity 
is defined by two strands of research: one that is quantitative, often based on statistical 
data relating to euro-referendums, and a qualitative strand focusing on the visual 
symbols on currencies. In terms of geographical and temporal variation, studies tend to 
focus either on modern monetary unions, such as the euro or the debate about the 
potential North American Monetary Union, while another analytical strand investigates 
money as nation-building tools, either in the context of the process of nation-state 
consolidations in the nineteenth century or in other types of emerging or otherwise 
contested nation-states, where state-elites have had an obvious interest in consolidating 
state legitimacy and national identity.  
 
THE WAYS CURRENCIES CULTIVATE NATIONAL IDENTITY 
In his 1998 article “National Currencies and National Identity” Eric Helleiner 
developed a theoretical framework to conceptualize the relationship between currency 
 20 
 
and identity. Pointing to empirical examples primarily from the nation-state 
consolidations in the nineteenth century, Helleiner put forth a range of hypotheses and 
laid out a conceptual framework for understanding the ways in which currencies 
potentially contribute to a sense of national identity. Helleiner began by 
acknowledging the importance of currency iconography, but then went on to argue that 
the imagery emblazoned on notes and coins only constitutes one of several ways in 
which money functions to create identity. A national currency also functions as a 
medium of social communication, it creates collective monetary experiences such as 
inflation or devaluation that affect society as a whole and bind the population together, 
it plays to the quasi-religious cult of nationalism, and fosters a sense of popular 
sovereignty offered by the possibility of conducting independent monetary policy 
(Helleiner, 1998). Echoing Helleiners first point about the importance of currency 
iconography as a way for emerging nation-states to disseminate their symbolic 
repertories, Pointon (1998) underscored that the use of national currencies and their 
aggressive visualizations of the nation-state was a pervasive and potent way to build 
nations. 
The very same year, in 1998, the currency-identity relationship was 
simultaneously addressed by the Journal of Economic Psychology (volume 19, issue 
6). Prompted by the forthcoming implementation of the common European currency, 
the journal published a special issue devoted to the importance of national identity to 
public attitudes towards the euro. The volume featured a variety of social-
psychological case-studies and international comparisons. On the whole, the articles in 
Economic Psychology demonstrated that national identity could account for opposition 
to the common European currency. Most telling was Müller-Peters’ (1998) article on 
the significance of national pride and national identity to attitudes toward the common 
currency. This analysis, which was based on a survey of more than 15,000 individuals 
from 15 European countries on their attitudes toward the EMU, showed that national 
identity—and the prevalence of nationalistic feelings and efforts to demarcate the 
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national community—could explain public reservation towards the common European 
currency (Müller-Peters, 1998). Viewed in retrospect, Helleiner’s (1998) article, 
Pointon’s (1998) book chapter, and the above mentioned issue of Economic 
Psychology defined the contours of two different approaches within the currency-
identity literature. One genre pursued the quantitatively oriented approach laid out in 
Economic Psychology, while another focused on the visual imagery of national 
banknotes and coins.  
 
SYMBOLS ON CURRENCY 
The idea that symbols, visual and other, contribute to the formation of national identity 
and a sense of nationhood is a recurring theme within nationalism studies and has been 
repeatedly accented by scholars of nationalism (Hobsbawm, 1983; Cohen, 1985; 
Smith, 1991; Mach, 1993; Billig, 1995). It is, therefore, not particularly surprising that 
the symbols and motives on national currencies have become analytical objects for 
studies of nationalism and national identity. When Benedict Anderson (2006:36), used 
the term “print-capitalism” to describe the new technology, which allowed people to 
relate themselves to others in new ways and to partake in imagined national 
communities, he was referring more broadly to the developments in printing 
technologies. However, the concept of print-capitalism can be applied very fittingly to 
the state-sanctioned circulation of banknotes that gradually developed from the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and became common across European states in 
the last half of the nineteenth century. The printing presses within the nineteenth 
century proto-central banks constituted potent means of disseminating ideas about the 
nation-state and reproducing the idea of a distinct national community. Also, in terms 
of empirical availability, the study of currency iconography has the advantageous 
capability to use existing numismatic contributions on currency imagery.    
The iconographic focus has resulted in a range of intriguing studies with a 
great deal of geographical and temporal variation. One type of iconographic study 
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focuses on the role of currency iconography in the formation of nation-states in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. These studies include the work of Gilbert 
(1998, 1999) who sheds light on the deliberate attempts by Canadian policymakers to 
use the new national currency, and particularly its iconography, as a nation- and state-
building tool. The same theme was accentuated by Galloy (2000) in a comparative 
analysis of Mexican and Central American currencies around the turn of the nineteenth 
century. Along these lines, Blaazer (1999) analyzed the words and pictures on British 
paper notes to show how British national currency became a symbol of national 
identity.  
While these studies analyzed currency iconography in the context of 
Western nation-state formation, a parallel trend investigated the currency iconography 
of various colonial authorities. In a colonial setting, currencies were often used to 
convey the values of the imperial powers and tended to write out any references to the 
indigenous population (Hewitt, 1999). Mwangi (2000) has detailed how the banknote 
iconography of colonial Kenya reflected prevailing self-conceptualizations by the 
dominant classes, as well as shifting technological development and aesthetic trends. 
Studying the deliberate use of currency and stamps in British-ruled Palestine, Wallach 
(2011:1) argues that these symbolic artefacts played “a crucial role in shaping the very 
framework of nationhood”.  
Similarly, although in a more modern context, a range of scholars have 
shown that policymakers still think of national currencies as potent tools to cultivate 
and reinforce national identity and community. Unwin and Hewitt (2001, 2004) have 
shown how the new national currencies of Eastern Europe, established in the wake of 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union, portrayed national identity by evoking 
references to a shared and romanticised national past. A similar conclusion can be 
found in a 2010 study on the self-perception that is portrayed through the most recent 
Danish banknotes series. In their article “Circulating Monuments”, Danish art 
historians Leth-Espensen and Kofoed Hansen investigated how national identity was 
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expressed through the different design proposals of the most recent Danish banknotes. 
Leth-Espensen and Hansen conclude that the banknote designs selected by 
Nationalbanken’s governors expressed a timeless national romantic view of Danish 
national identity (2009).  
Hawkins (2010) demonstrates the success of the now defunct Tunisian 
regime in using currency imagery to instill in the population a distinct and regime-
positive perception of Tunisian history. Berezin (2006) has described the deliberate 
attempts by the European Commission to use the design of the euro banknotes and 
coins to cultivate a new supranational European identity. I have highlighted the 
attempts of Danish and Greenlandic policymakers to reinforce Greenlandic national 
identity by reintroducing Greenlandic banknotes, vividly illustrated with a range of 
ancient Inuit myths, as a direct attempt to evoke a common history and myth of origin. 
In the case of Greenland, the use of banknotes and coins as nation-building tools was 
challenged by different meanings ascribed to money by Danish authorities, 
Greenlandic policymakers, and the Inuit communities (Sørensen, 2012). 
In line with the ideas of Pointon (1998) and Hobsbawm (1983), most of the 
above studies on currency iconography focus on the use of banknotes and coins as, 
more or less, deliberate means to cultivate national sentiments. The relationship 
between currencies and national identity becomes somewhat unidirectional, as it is the 
vague notion of ‘state elites’ that act as supreme pedagogues and use money to instill 
ideas of national community in the population.  
Indeed, homogenous and territorial currencies are primarily modern 
phenomena (Helleiner, 2003). This may explain why most studies on currency 
iconography and nationalism follow a perception of national identity formation as 
bolstered by the development of modern state institutions and bureaucracies. The 
underlying assumptions that inform these analyses tend to follow the notion that 
industrialized society and modernity constitute the roots of nationalism (Gellner, 
1984:35). National identity, in this account, is the collective sense of community that 
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results from structural transformations of agrarian society. As such, most of the above 
studies emphasize the identity-crafting element and downplay the process in which 
existing myths, collective memory, and symbols of community have primed the 
deliberate use of currency imagery as a nation-building tool. As Smith has argued, 
national elites who seek to promote the nation must carefully develop their symbolic 
repertoire. National symbols cannot be readily invented without possessing some 
degree of existing legitimacy and resonance within the population for which they are 
meant to induce national sentiments (Smith, 2009:21).  
 
NATIONAL IDENTITY AND MONETARY LEGITIMACY  
Although the intentional efforts to cultivate national identity have indeed been 
convincingly detailed in the above studies, recent empirical research has indicated that 
this view has to be nuanced. Risse (2006), echoing Müller-Peters (1998), describes 
how geographical variations in public attitudes towards the euro may be explained by 
differences in collective ideas about the nation and in patterns of identifying with 
Europe and/or the nation-state. According to Risse, “the causal arrows between the 
euro and collective identities flow in both directions” (2006:65). As such, the euro may 
work to cultivate collective European identity, but the acceptance of the euro also 
depends on existing national identities in different euro-zone countries. Kaelberer 
accentuated this reciprocal relationship between money and national identity by 
arguing that, although money may have served as an identity-cultivating tool during 
the processes of national monetary unification in the late nineteenth century, money 
fundamentally requires some level of collective identity to be perceived as legitimate 
and to function properly (Kaelberer, 2004:177).  In the Danish case, this idea has been 
demonstrated by Marcussen & Zølner (2001, 2003) who show how a range of 
‘foundational myths’ framed public campaigns leading up to the Danish euro-
referendum in 2000. Because of these foundational myths, the pro-euro campaign to 
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legitimize the euro in a Danish context became very difficult (Marcussen & Zølner, 
2001:384).  
This notion of reciprocity between legitimacy and identity has translated 
even into the literature on currency-iconography; a body of literature in which the 
identity-cultivating perspective has been most apparent. Lauer (2008) shows how early 
United States (US) paper notes were applied as a medium of mass communication, 
conveying an iconography of nationalism. According to Lauer, however, the 
nationalistic iconography was just as much an attempt to legitimize the notes 
themselves as to cultivate national identity. The new money, as it were, drew 
sustenance from existing conceptualizations of the national community (Lauer, 2008).  
In a large, historic, comparative analysis of banknotes from 15 European 
countries, Jacques Hymans challenges what he labels as the “state-as-pedagogue 
perspective” which he attributes, in particular, to Helleiner and Gilbert (Hymans, 
2004:17). According to Hymans (2004), European currency iconography should not be 
considered an attempt to indoctrinate the public with a specific national identity. On 
the contrary, nationalistic symbols on money are to be understood as an attempt by the 
issuing authorities to legitimize themselves by drawing on symbols already fashioned 
by a Pan-European society. These symbols are, in fact, not national but trans-national 
in character and represent a certain European zeitgeist. The European issuing 
authorities thus seek to exploit the preexisting meaning of these symbols in an effort to 
promote legitimacy internally and externally.  
Hymans’s (2004) analysis builds on a database of more than 1400 different 
banknotes from 15 European countries. Comparing the development in iconography 
across countries, Hymans finds that although banknote iconography of the respective 
countries has evolved substantially across time, remarkable similarities in iconographic 
choices exist in specific historic periods. Based on these findings, Hymans concludes 
that European states, historically, have incorporated pan-European symbols in their 
note-iconography attempting to capitalize on their already established meanings 
 26 
 
(2004). The trends of banknote iconography must be understood as a form of symbolic 
isomorphism, in which note-issuing authorities, in the words of Meyer and Rowan, 
adheres to the prescriptions of myth in the institutional environment, and “demonstrate 
that it is acting on collectively valued purpose in a proper and adequate manner.” 
(1977:349). 
Hymans’s suggestions have lately been substantiated by Penrose and 
Cumming (Penrose & Cumming, 2011; Penrose, 2011) who question the idea of 
powerful and deliberate state elites contemplating to construct national identity. 
Penrose and Cumming question why Scottish banknotes are emblazoned with 
nationalist iconography—even though, in the case of Scotland no state exists to support 
it? (2011:823). The answer is that issuing authorities tend to rely on already fashioned 
and widely accepted symbolism in an effort to promote their own legitimacy.  
 
CENTRAL BANKS AND LEGITIMACY 
Until now, most of the literature review has focused on national currencies. In the 
following section I widen the discussion to include the organizations that are 
responsible for the production and circulation of national currencies: the central banks. 
Although the importance of central banks as elements in modern nation-building has 
long been acknowledged (Giddens, 1996:155-158; Glasner, 1998; Greskovits, 
2009:211), and despite the fact that Polanyi’s explicitly mentions that national identity 
is “vested in the central bank” (1957:205), scholars have turned attention only very 
recently to the cultural significance and symbolic practices of central banks and their 
organization. 
As already mentioned, central banks’ organizational structures and 
prerogatives have changed and developed over time. Today, most central banks have 
formal independence; they secure price stability and act as lenders of last resort. 
Central banks have historically engaged in two interrelated levels of regulations. At the 
macro level central banks have had the responsibility of regulating the general 
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monetary conditions of the national economy. At the micro level central banks have 
overseen the regulations of individual banks within the financial system (Goodhart, 
1988:5-7). In Denmark these two functions have, since the banking act of 1919, been 
divided between Nationalbanken and Banktilsynet. Nationalbanken was responsible for 
the macro regulation while Banktilsynet (later Finanstilsynet) has monitored the 
banking sector (Hansen, 1996: 13).    
The point about central banks having gained independence from 
governments is an important one. Central bank independence is, today, an important 
precondition for legitimacy and credibility (Blinder, 1997). The basic rationale behind 
this organizational structure is an attempt to prevent politicians from using these 
monetary institutions to serve short term political ends. In fact, central bank 
independence has achieved a taken-for-granted quality in political life (Marcussen, 
2005). Central bank independence has become, in the words of McNamara, a feature 
with important legitimizing and symbolic properties rather than an actual functional 
benefit (2002:48).  
Also, central bank independence is not necessarily a ‘one fits all’ method to 
secure organizational legitimacy. This has been demonstrated by Johnson (2006) in the 
case of post-communist central banks. In Eastern Europe, central bankers lost 
legitimacy in the eyes of their national constituents upon convergence into western-
style of central bank independence. Johnson ascribes this animosity towards the new 
central bank structure to the problem of embeddeness, arguing that the institutional 
transformation was not “pulled in” by the social actors (2006:366). Even if Eastern 
European central bankers became ideationally connected to a transnational community 
of central bankers (Johnson, 2006:366), their constituents rejected these new ideas. So, 
the backing of the change by national central bankers was insufficient. The changing of 
central bank organizational structure required a more broad and public appeal to 
become legitimate.  
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THE LANGUAGE OF SCIENCE OR THE LANGUAGE OF NATION? 
Independence is not the only feature that potentially secures central bank legitimacy. 
Abolafia (2010) has shown how central bankers in the Federal Reserve from 1979-
1993 constructed a range of narratives that guided their actions. These narratives fit 
with existing ideas or “plots” about monetary policies and were designed to control the 
supply of money and, ultimately, to maintain the legitimacy of the central bank 
(Abolafia, 2010:365). Also, recent studies have pointed to the epistemic authority that 
enables central banks to make legitimate claims about monetary phenomena. Rosenhek 
(2013) has, for example, demonstrated the importance of central bankers’ epistemic 
authority in diagnosing and explaining the 2008 financial crisis. Both the Federal 
Reserve and the European Central Bank offered a range of powerful interpretative 
plots that defined the frame for how the financial crisis could be understood. These 
studies parallel the earlier work of Marcussen (2000) who argues that elite ideas about 
the European Monetary Union, i.e. the ideas of central bankers, gradually diffused and 
eventually became institutionalized as the common European currency.     
One of the elements that sustains the epistemic authority of central bankers 
is the perception that central banking is somehow beyond the political sphere. Central 
bankers have managed to occupy a distinct semiotic space of “independence” and 
neutrality that renders a self-evident legitimacy to these institutions as “guardians of 
money” (Lebaron, 2000:209). Central bankers are increasingly seen as apolitical 
technocrats who diagnose monetary phenomena and conduct monetary policies based 
on the logics of scientific rationality. Today, central bankers exert power and maintain 
legitimacy because they master the discourse of scientific economics. “When ideology 
is being replaced by science”, Marcussen argues, “central bankers gain legitimacy and 
authority by basing their views on, and applying, the language of science” (2009:375-
376).  
The notion that central bank legitimacy and authority rest on the apolitical 
language of science is starkly contrasted by a recent work by Tognato, who argues that 
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scholars must focus their attention to the dramatization of monetary affairs, i.e., the 
process in which monetary issues, in public discourse, are elevated from the economic 
realm and transformed into “a morality play about collective identity” (2012:3). 
Tognato suggests that studies of central bank stability cultures should follow a three-
step analysis and, firstly, define what characterizes collective identity in a given 
society and, secondly, analyze how the symbolic embeddedness of monetary affairs 
connects money and central banks to the basic assumptions about the national 
collective. Thirdly, studies must address the “monetary affairs from a dramaturgic 
perspective” to elucidate the performative process in which money and central banking 
become linked to the symbolic center of society (Tognato, 2012:25-40). This may be 
accomplished by analyzing the language of central bankers, because “whenever 
independent central banks start to speak the languages that define the collective 
identities of their own societies, and when they manage to recast their own institutional 
identity into national identity, their basis for support within society becomes much 
broader, and it gets easier for them to deliver monetary stability” (Tognato, 2012:9). In 
his recent book, Central Bank Independence. Cultural Codes and Symbolic 
Performances (2012), Tognato applies this analytical framework to the cases of the 
Bundesbank stability culture and to the language of the FED during the 2008 financial 
turmoil.  
Tognato’s suggestion partly echoes that of anthropologist Douglas Holmes, 
who argues that central banks must master their storytelling in order to enroll their 
constituents in obtaining monetary targets. To this end, “the public broadly must be 
recruited to collaborate with central banks in achieving the ends of monetary policy” 
(Holmes, 2013:1). Indeed, central bankers, today, have assumed a symbolic role, as 
“their spoken and written communications are obliged to model linguistically credible 
relationships with the public” (Holmes, 2013:4).  
An obvious contrast exists between the suggestions that central bank 
legitimacy either stems from the apolitical “language of science” or the “language that 
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defines the collective identities of their own societies”. The answer probably lies 
somewhere in the middle and is dependent upon the specific historical and social 
context. The ECB, for example, has no one collective identity to evoke rhetorically and 
thus relies more on scientific speech. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In the literature review I detailed some general trends and assumptions within the 
literature on monetary organization, legitimacy and national identity. I will use these 
trends and assumptions to position my own research and research questions. Firstly, 
most of the existing literature on monetary issues and national identity focus on 
national currencies (and, in particular, the image content of these currencies). Few 
studies focus on the note-issuing authorities, the central banks, to ask how the 
legitimacy of these organizations more broadly relates to issues of national community 
and identity. This will be one of the explicit aims in the dissertation: to bring the 
central bank, its practices, its governors, and its symbolic importance back into the 
analysis of monetary organization and national identity. 
Secondly, following the literature review, I suggest an analysis sensitive to 
the relationship between issues of legitimacy and national identity. As the literature 
review has detailed, the reciprocal relationship between monetary organization and 
national identity is key to understanding the perceived legitimacy of currencies and 
central banks. To paraphrase Risse (2006:65), the causal arrows between central 
banking and national identities appear to point in both directions. This reciprocal 
relationship will be the central theme of this dissertation, in which I set out to examine 
the processes in which national identity come to condition the legitimacy of central 
banks and currencies. How does national identity affect the legitimacy of monetary 
organization, and to what extent is monetary organization feeding back into these 
conceptualizations and reinforcing the idea of a distinct national community? 
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Finally, the existing literature on monetary organization and national 
identity offers little insight into the historical relationship between central bank 
legitimacy and national identity. To be fair, many of the studies referred to above deal 
with the development (and especially the design) of national currencies in historical 
perspectives. In particular, the literature has focused on territorial currencies as a 
nation-building tool in the consolidation of nation-states in the late nineteenth century. 
These studies display an emphasis on deliberate and elitist attempts to use national 
monetary organization to inculcate the masses with certain perceptions of the national 
community. However, except for Tognato’s recent study, no analysis applies a 
historical perspective to examine how central banks have developed alongside national 
identity. This will be one of the aims of the dissertation: to bring back history into the 
analysis and offer a contextualized historical examination of the legitimacy-identity 
relationship.    
 
To reiterate, the literature review has revealed three themes that are somewhat 
understudied in the existing literature. Overall, the review has pointed to the need for 
1) an increased focus on central banks in the analysis of monetary organization and 
national identity; 2) analyses sensitive to the interrelation between central bank 
legitimacy and national identity; and 3) more studies focused on the historical 
development in which central banks evolved in concert with ideas of the national 
identity.  
I perceive these themes as more than lacunas or knowledge gaps that must 
be filled. An increased focus on these three themes will further our understanding of 
the historical and cultural sources of the perceived legitimacy of monetary 
organization. Surely, modern central banks have become powerful ‘apolitical’ 
organizations; however, central bank power and authority have limitations as well. 
Some, but not all, of these limitations arise from formal rules and regulations. Central 
banks are, and have historically been, constrained by more informal rules that relate 
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very closely to their different cultural settings. A historical analysis focused on the co-
construction of legitimacy and national identity will not only explain how things came 
to be, but will also be of interest to scholars and central bankers interested in the 
potential possibilities and constraints of future monetary organization.   
 
With these themes in mind, my aim in this dissertation is to examine how 
Nationalbanken historically has used and drawn upon existing perceptions of national 
identity to legitimize its policies and decisions. Also, the dissertation examines how 
Nationalbanken and the Danish currency historically contributed to construction and 
reconstruction of Danish national identity. Finally, I set out to investigate how and to 
what extent Danish monetary organization has historically been constrained or enabled 
by national identity.  
 
A REFLECTION ON THE RESEARCH PROCESS  
At this point, I want to provide a short reflection on the research questions and on the 
process of writing an article base-PhD. Originally, as I initiated this project, I 
envisaged it very much as a contribution to the field of nationalism studies. My 
tentative working questions focused on how the Danish currency and Nationalbanken 
contributed to Danish national identity. As such, I perceived the project as focused on 
the nationalism of Danish monetary organization. Here, I would have been in good 
company with many of the above mentioned studies dealing with the identity-crafting 
aspect of national currencies.  
However, as I began working on the different articles, submitting them for 
reviews, having them rejected or suggested revised, I gradually realized that the 
concept of legitimacy was of paramount importance for understanding the relationship 
between monetary organization and national identity.  
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The four papers were finalized in the order that they appear in this 
dissertation. Once I finished the article on the Danish euro-debate, which is the second 
article, it was clear that I was not only telling a story of how the Danish currency 
potentially reinforced national identity: I was also examining how national identity 
defined the limits for legitimate statements and ideas about monetary organization.  
 As such, following the analysis in the euro-debate article, I shifted the 
emphasis in the next articles, which examined banknote designs and Danish central 
bank governors. Instead of focusing on the identity cultivating elements, legitimacy 
now became a central theme. Although legitimacy had implicitly been an issue in the 
case-studies of Schleswig-Holstein and the Danish euro-debate, I brought the concept 
to the forefront of the analysis and let it guide the research questions in the two latter 
articles.   
 I mention this shift in emphasis for two reasons. Firstly, although an overall 
research question, such as the one above, is most commonly presented as a fait 
accompli, it is, of course, often the result of a gradual process of realization and the 
result of many revisions. By describing my gradual realization and continuously 
reflecting on the research process throughout the different chapters of this ‘frame’, I 
hope to increase the transparency of the choices and reflections that underlie the 
different articles and their focus. Secondly, I aim to explain the two stranded focus in 
the general research question, i.e. both legitimacy and national identity. Surely, the 
above research questions do indeed spring out of the literature review. I genuinely 
believe that the existing literature would benefit from an increased focus on central 
banks’ legitimacy in historical perspective. But of course, I did not selected and 
designate these three areas during the first couple of months of working on this project. 
In fact, I only gradually realised the fruitfulness of these themes as I engaged further in 
the literature and worked with the empirical material.    
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THEORIES AND DEFINITIONS 
In the research overview, I discussed the existing literature on monetary organization 
and issues of national identity and legitimacy. In this chapter, I define legitimacy, 
national identity, and nationalism, and explain how these concepts relate to the 
different analyses. I outline a conceptual framework that combines ideas from 
organizational institutionalism, as well as theoretical developments within nationalism 
studies. I call it a ‘conceptual framework’ because it is meant to support the analytical 
focus in the different articles. It is not a stringent theoretical frame that is applied in an 
identical way in every case study, and it is not an attempt to make a theoretical 
contribution to institutional theory. My ambition is more modest and must be 
considered a pragmatic exercise to develop a framework that ground the different 
analyses and lend a common frame of reference to the articles. In the dissertation’s 
four articles, I apply different analytical strategies to analyze the symbolic components 
of central bank legitimacy. The combination of nationalism studies and insights from 
organizational institutionalism that I suggest below is meant as a background 
framework in which each article is theoretically situated. 
Because the concept of legitimacy is central to this dissertation, a working 
definition is required to answer the research questions. In developing such a working 
definition, I have been inspired by ideas from organizational institutionalism. By 
organizational institutionalism, I mean the part of institutional theory that developed 
from the late 1970s and early 1980s with, amongst others, the works of Meyer & 
Rowan (1977), DiMaggio & Powel (1983), and Meyer & Scott (1983). I realize that a 
wide range of different ‘institutionalisms’ exist. These varying institutional approaches 
apply different ideas about the concept of institutions and include different ideas of 
how institutions develop and change. However, I perceive the above works as 
providing a conceptual foundation that will enable me to pose and answer questions of 
how central banks acquire, manage, and use legitimacy.  
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Having defined the concept of organizational legitimacy, I go on to discuss 
the concepts of nationalism, nations and national identity. Here I draw in particular on 
the work of Michael Billig and Anthony D. Smith and use insights from the ethno-
symbolic approach to nationalism. I then suggest how theories of national identity and 
legitimacy can be reconciled and applied in a historical analysis of Danish monetary 
organization. As such, the chapter’s last section constitutes a theoretical synthesis of 
elements from nationalism studies and organizational theory.  
 
LEGITIMACY 
Every organization must be perceived as legitimate or risk efficacy and basic survival. 
But how is legitimacy defined, and how do organizations become legitimate? For the 
purpose of this dissertation, I apply Suchman’s broad definition of legitimacy as “a 
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, 
or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and 
definitions.” (Suchman, 1995:574). This is a very open definition, which also hints at 
the degree of cultural support necessary for organizational legitimacy—or as Scott has 
formulated it, “a condition, reflecting cultural alignment, normative support, or 
consonance with relevant rules or law” (1995:45). 
 To gain this perceived appropriateness and to reflect cultural alignment, 
organizations can engage in a range of practices to become legitimate. Organizations 
may emulate the formal structures of other organizations within their environment as a 
ceremonial practice that renders legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), and they may 
identify with other actors and symbols already perceived as proper and appropriate in 
an attempt to capitalize on existing legitimacy (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). This type of 
symbolic isomorphism has, for example, been detailed by Glynn and Abzug (2002), 
who demonstrate the evolving patterns of organizational names from 1800—2000. The 
study shows, not unlike Hymans’s banknote study, that organizations historically have 
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aligned their names with symbols and values perceived to confer legitimacy in 
different historical periods.  
In a later study from 2006, Glynn and Marquis examined specifically the 
names of American savings banks and argued that bank names underwent an evolution 
from more idiosyncratic names to names that reflected an alignment with broadly 
recognizable and legitimate symbols, such as First National Bank (Glynn & Marquis, 
2006). This conclusion further lends credibility to my introductory hypothesis about 
Nationalbanken’s naming.  
 
LEGITIMATE TO WHOM? 
The question remains as to who constitutes the actors for whom the organizations must 
be legitimate. Legitimacy is often assessed within a field of similar organizations that, 
taken together, constitute an organizational field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983:148). The 
organizational field in which central banks operate is inherently complex, and central 
banks relate to a wide range of interest groups such as politicians, the transnational 
community of central bankers, employer organizations, unions, the banking industry, 
and, more broadly, the population. Central banks must come across as legitimate to this 
diversity of interest groups that do not necessarily share a homogenous perception of 
what is desirable and proper. Therefore, central banks face a heterogeneous 
constituency with diverging and sometimes conflicting ideas of legitimacy. 
Organizations that face such a complex legitimacy context may engage in a range of 
strategies to cope with conflicting demands. These include decoupling strategies, in 
which the organization displays a ceremonial adherence to symbols or practices that 
are broadly conceived as legitimate, but internally continues to function according to 
its own prescriptions of efficacy (Brunsson, 2003).  
I want to suggest another option for central banks operating in a complex 
legitimacy context, i.e., to align with a range of deep seated cultural values and 
symbols that are perceived as legitimate in a wider cultural context. The nation is one 
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such larger sociocultrual norm-producing system that potentially subordinates a range 
of diverging legitimacy prescriptions. This idea is, of course, inspired by the recent 
proposal of Tognato that central banks must align themselves with deep-seated cultural 
narratives and ideas of collective identity to become legitimate.3 I will elaborate on this 
idea in the final section of this chapter, in which I combine nationalism studies and 
theories of legitimacy.  
 Before I proceed to discuss the connection between elements from 
nationalism studies and theories of organizational legitimacy, we must examine the 
concepts of nation, nationalism, and national identity. 
 
NATION AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 
The meaning of the concept of nation is unstable and has changed over time. It is 
comprised of different components, and the emphasis on these components has varied 
and developed according to social and historical context (Glenthøj, 2010). As Hylland 
Eriksen (1998) noted, nations draw on a wide selection of cultural resources in an 
effort to construct common cultural denominators. According to Smith (2009:24-33), 
nations are not modern phenomena but must be understood as identity assemblages of 
myths, traditions, stories, and values that precede the emergence of modernity. In this 
ethno-symbolic perspective, scholars who wish to analyze nations must focus on the 
ethnic base and historicity of such communities, rather than consider nations as 
something that can readily be invented impromptu.4  However, according to Smith 
(2001), the concept of nation does have some fundamental characteristics that have 
been recurring across time and space. According to Smith, the nation can be defined as 
“a named human community occupying a homeland, and having common myths and a 
shared history, a common public culture, a single economy and common rights and 
                                                                
3 Here, Tognato is inspired by the analytical framework of ‘cultural pragmatics’ and its focus on how cultural texts are 
enacted in social life. See e.g., Alexander (2004, 2006).  
4 See, e.g., Hutchinson & Smith (1996); Smith (1998, 2009); Özkirimli (2003). 
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duties for all members” (2001:13). Smith defines national identity as “the continuous 
reproduction and reinterpretation of the pattern of values, symbols, memories, myths 
and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of nations, and the identifications 
of individuals with that pattern and heritage and with its cultural elements” (Smith, 
2001:18).  
Here, Smith sketches national identity as a concept that relates both to the 
cognitive system of individuals and to the continuous reproduction of a pattern of 
cultural elements. In this definition, national identity is understood as individual 
identification with the cultural patterns of nations. Hence, national identity is not 
inaccessible to analysis. Although it is a matter of individual identification, the concept 
also has a collective dimension, as it can be studied empirically through the concrete 
interpretation and reproduction of its cultural components: values, symbols, memories, 
myths, and traditions. As such, the definition outlines two different conceptual levels: a 
collective level in which national identity is continuously maintained but also 
reconfigured, and an individual level that involves personal identification with these 
contingent cultural patterns.   
I want to use Smith’s definition of national identity as a working definition 
for two reasons. Firstly, the definition implies that national identity can be studied 
empirically through the concrete representations of the nation’s cultural elements. The 
definition allows for an empirical and historical examination of national identity. 
Secondly, the definition connects to Suchman’s (1995:574) notion of the value 
systems, in which entities become legitimate. As such, Smith’s definition also sketches 
a value system that defines the frames for legitimate and illegitimate actions and 
statements and invites a theoretical synthesis that view these cultural patterns (national 
identity) as comprising the value system that outline the legitimate actions of 
individuals and organizations.  
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NATIONALISM 
Another important consideration that relates to the second part of the research question 
concerns the process in which national identity is created. Can national identity be 
strategically invented to serve political a purpose? According to Smith, nationalism is 
understood as “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity 
and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an actual 
or potential ‘nation’” (2001:9). This ideology is based on a range of foundational 
assumptions regarding nations as the sole sources of political power, the natural 
categorization for humanity as a whole, the supreme object of loyalty, and the 
precondition for individual freedom and sovereignty. In this perspective, nationalism is 
the political side of national identity. Such a view on nationalism as a deliberate 
ideology is a recurring definition promoted by various nationalism scholars like, e.g., 
Hobsbawm and Hroch; the latter argues for a distinct three-phase development 
originating from an intellectual elite, later to be monopolized by conscious groups of 
bourgeois nationalist with their own economic and political agendas, disseminated and 
absorbed by the general population and transformed into a mass-movement rather than 
solely an elitist idea (Hroch, 1985).   
 
THE LIMITATIONS OF DELIBERATE NATIONALISM 
As Hall and Bruner have shown (Bruner, 2000, 2005; Hall, 1985), the limits of what 
may be considered legitimate statements about the nation are closely defined by the 
prevailing narratives and myths about the national community. Politicians, for 
example, who experiment with the hegemonic national narratives, are potentially 
punished if they transgress the legitimate rhetorical boundaries. This means that 
political elites who seek to redefine the idea of the nation are bound somewhat tightly 
by the limits of existing identity constructions. As Smith has put it in the context of 
elitist attempts to create transnational identities: 
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[The] national intelligentsia, have tried to reconstruct and reshape their 
heritages into ‘old-new’ national identities. This duality continues to 
inform recent visions and endeavors to reshape national identities into 
something ‘beyond the nation’. It means that serious attempts to move 
beyond the nation have to start from its principles and use them to go 
further. The principles of the nation are those of nationalism. Hence it may 
only be possible to transcend the nation through a form of nationalism, one 
that is paradoxically broader than the compact nation that has usually been 
the object of its endeavors (Smith, 1991:171) 
Smith’s idea becomes, as will be clarified from this dissertation’s article on the Danish 
euro-debate, particularly salient as the Danish political elite who promoted the 
common European currency was made to take the Danish nation as its ideational 
starting point. I suggest that political elites who seek to redefine and change monetary 
organization are, in a similar fashion, constrained by existing national identity and are 
bound to “the principles of nationalism”.  
But nationalism need not always be the result of a deliberate ideology. In 
his 1995 book Banal Nationalism, Michael Billig refines the notion of nationalist 
ideology not just to encompass the deliberate nationalism associated with political 
movements, but also to cover the symbolic performances of everyday practices and 
habitual sceneries. Billig creates the distinction between the hot and the banal 
nationalism as analytical categories to highlight the potency of banal nationalism, 
which works to situate people, although indeliberately, in a world of nations and also 
sustains national identity (1995:43). National identity, in this account, must not be 
understood as the result of deliberate political ideology tied to modernity or solely as a 
product of manipulatory strategies of conscious national elites. Instead, national 
identity is enmeshed in routine practices, the unnoticeable symbols of everyday life 
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and mundane national rhetoric that reinforces national identity. Every-day (economic) 
activities and popular culture are just as important in the formation of national identity 
as the occasional ‘hot’ nationalist expressions or official high culture (Déloye, 2013; 
Edensor, 2002). Consequently, an analysis of how monetary organization potentially 
reinforces national identity must be sensitive to both the banal and hot categories of 
nationalism. 
 
RECONCILING NATIONALISM STUDIES AND THEORIES OF LEGITIMACY 
In this chapter’s final section. I suggest a way to reconcile the rather self-contained 
paradigm of nationalism studies with the strand of organizational theory focused on the 
importance of national culture on organizational performance and structure. To do this, 
I will start out by contrasting two different views on the nation as expressed by two 
nineteenth-century commentators.  
DOES A ZOLLVEREIN MAKE A PATRIE? 
In his widely quoted essay from 1882, French historian Ernest Renan argued that a 
nation constitutes a spiritual principle and is made up of the sum of historical sacrifice 
reaffirmed in the present by a continuous and daily referendum (Renan, 2011:81-83). 
This entailed a much more voluntarist definition of the nation than that proposed by 
Renan’s contemporary colleagues, who favored more primordial explanation. Renan 
also dismissed instrumental and more modernist perceptions about the developments of 
nations. Renan argued that neither shared economic interest nor geographic 
particularities could account for the emergence of nations:  
 
A community of interest is assuredly a powerful bond between men. Do 
interests, however, suffice to make a nation? I do not think so. Community 
of interest brings about trade agreements, but nationality has a sentimental 
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side to it; it is both soul and body at once; a Zollverein is not a patrie 
(Renan, 2011:82).  
  
I want to dwell here on this particular quote by Renan, because it relates indirectly to 
the theme of legitimacy that underlines this dissertation. Renan clearly dismissed that 
common economic interests could cultivate national identity. Specifically, in this 
instance, he was talking about a customs union, but we could imagine other types of 
financial and economic interests such as homogenous territorial currencies managed by 
national banks of issue.  
To contrast Renan’s idea, let me quote, at length, a nineteenth-century 
Schleswig-Holstein nationalist who commented on the emergence of the Prussian 
customs union established in 1834 to create a free-trade area throughout most of 
present-day Germany. The bourgeois surveyor, Heinrich Tiedemann, is of particular 
interest for this dissertation, as he will reappear as a key figure in my article about the 
monetary and national controversies between Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein. 
Tiedemann, writing some forty years before Renan, in the separatist Schleswig-
Holstein newspaper Lyna, very explicitly framed the Prussian customs union as an 
instrument for creating national unity and identity.  
 
Mit seiner Entstehung ist für die Geschichte der Deutschen eine neue 
Epoche eingetreten, durch ihn werden alle in denselben aufgenommenen 
Staaten mit einem moralisch starken und segensreichen, in dieser Art noch 
nie gekannten Fürsten- und Volksfamilien-Bande umschlungen, daß die 
Theilnehmer zu einer großen Deutschen Familie vereinigt, deren Wohl und 
Wehe an gemeinsame, tief in einander greifende, aufs Innigste mit einander 
verschmelzte, Geld- und Gesellschaftsinteressen gefesselt ist; ja der 
Deutsche Zollverein wird über kurz oder lang bewirken, was weder der 
Deutsche Bund, noch ein sogenanntes junges Deutschland, noch irgend 
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einesonstige Assoziation herzustellen und zu schaffen vermag: die 
Nationaleinheit und die Wiedergeburt Deutschlands.  (Tiedemann, 1842:1)5 
 
In the words of Tiedemann, the Zollverein would act as a catalyst for national unity 
and forge the new German nation. As I explain in the article ‘Monetary Romanticism’, 
Tiedemann might have had his own personal and economic interest in tying the 
German Zollverein to the question of national unity. However, the difference in 
outlook between Renan and Tiedemann is worth some attention. To Renan, national 
identity emerged by individual commitment to a spiritual principle with a specific view 
about the nation. Tiedmann’s suggestion, on the other hand, was inherently 
instrumental, as he argued that the modern institution of a customs union would act as 
a catalyst for national unity and that shared economic interests would propel the 
emergence of a spiritually unified German Volksfamilie. The question here is whether a 
Zollverein is indeed not a Patrie, or if the Zollverein, as argued by Tiedemann, would 
gradually merge into a nation and, in the words of Eugen Weber, implicate citizens 
into a national community (Weber, 1977).  
 I have included these conflicting views on the nation because, taken 
together, they allow me to promote yet a third proposition that reconciles the two: 
undoubtedly, nationality has “a sentimental side to it”—as Renan formulated it—
sentiments that stem from some kind of emotional investment and identification with 
the nation. Renan did not believe economic interests and institutions were sufficient to 
foster such emotions. Although Tiedemann wished to forge and cultivate a German 
nation by the means of a customs union, it is indeed worth noting that the proposed 
Zollverein antecedently included a specific group in this union. In fact, the German 
                                                                
5 My own translation of German into English: "With its creation, an entirely new era has arisen in the history of the 
Germans, in which all states and their inhabitants are bound together by morally strong and beneficial ties into one large 
German family. This family´s fate will be determined by its shared and most intricately linked monetary and societal 
interests. Yes, the German customs union will eventually accomplish that which neither the German federal government, 
nor a so-called young Germany, nor any other, has accomplished: to usher in the national unity and the rebirth of 
Germany". (Tiedemann, 1842:1) 
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Volksfamilie was invited to join the union, not the people of France or Denmark. As 
such, Tiedemann’s suggestion had a specific ethnic and national base as its 
prerequisite.  He did not propose to cultivate the German nation completely anew. The 
German nation was envisaged before the customs union, and this imagined community 
of Germans legitimized the idea of a Zollverein.     
 So, I suggest that, instead of focusing on whether economic interests are 
sufficient to forge national community, the question should be turned around. The 
question would then be whether an ethnic and national base legitimizes (or perhaps 
renders illegitimate) economic, monetary, and financial interests and organizations?   
 
MONETARY ORGANIZATION AS EMBEDDED IN NATIONAL IDENTITY 
This leads us to the chapter’s final section, in which I propose a way to theoretically 
conceptualize the connection between the legitimacy of monetary organization and 
national identity. I will do this by connecting ideas from organizational legitimacy with 
insights from nationalism studies. 
Within organizational institutionalism, the social creation of meaning is a 
central theme as groups and individuals in different social contexts are perceived to 
construct concepts and representations of each other’s actions, which potentially 
becomes institutionalized. When ideas and concepts are institutionalized, they 
prescribe templates and roles that are enacted and played out by actors, individuals, 
groups, and organizations (Højgaard Christiansen, 2012:28). 6  To be perceived as 
legitimate, actors and organizations must adhere to these templates and roles. Or, as 
phrased by Suchman, they are confined by “a socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs” (1995:574). Legitimacy becomes jeopardized if the limits of this 
system, whatever its institutional context, are transgressed.  
 Whereas earlier studies of organizational institutionalism focused on 
organizational fields, as in for example Powel & DiMaggio (1983), more recent 
                                                                
6 Following the ideas of Berger & Luckmann’s (1989)[1966] influential work “The social construction of reality”.  
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theoretical developments point to the idea that the logics of organizational fields are 
“nested within higher-order societal institutional logics” (Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin, 
& Suddaby, 2008:21). As such, theorists from the institutional logics perspective have 
argued that community constitutes an important institutional order that provides actors 
and organizations with identities and sources of legitimacy (Thornton, Lounsbury, & 
Ocasio, 2012:68-75). The nation, I argue, constitutes such a socially constructed 
system that confines organizational actions.  
Within organizational studies, some scholars have turned to the issue of 
national culture and investigated how such culture structures organizational and 
governance forms. For example, Licht et al. (2007:660-661) have operationalized what 
they labeled as “the cultural profiles of nations” to demonstrate how informal 
institutions of governance have their root in different national cultures. Generally, 
organizational scholars have come to acknowledge that national culture interface with 
organizational legitimacy. In the 2011 Handbook on Organizational Cultures and 
Climate, Sagiv et al. summarized this growing awareness in a quote that epitomizes an 
idea central to this dissertation: 
 
Organizations are nested within societies. To function effectively, 
organizations must gain and maintain some public legitimacy […] They 
must justify their activity as expressing (or at least not contradicting) the 
values that are important in their society. Organizations that fail to do so 
face criticism, pressure to change, an even denial of resources […] 
Consequently, organizational cultures tend to develop and evolve in ways 
that are compatible with the surrounding national culture. (Sagiv et al., 
2011:519-520) 
 
As such, we must expect central banks to have evolved in a manner that 
signals compatibility with the broader cultural and institutional environment. So, the 
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central bank and its currency, in order to be perceived legitimate, must be considered 
desirable, proper, and appropriate within the system of norms, values, and beliefs that 
constitute the nation. Such an argument resonates partly with the ideas of Gilbert 
(2007), who argues that reformers of monetary organization must be sensitive to the 
constitutive relationship between currencies and citizenship and the latter’s social, 
cultural, and political elements (Gilbert, 2007:142).  Because the cultures of monetary 
organization over time have become “compatible” with national cultures they have also 
become more difficult to change for monetary reformers who, for some reason or 
another, envisage an alternative monetary organization.    
When central banks are aligned and compatible with national cultures, they 
reinforce and reproduce the national system of norms and values through what Crane 
defines as “the symbolic embeddedness of economy in nation” (1998:64). In this 
fashion central banks become both the consumers and producers of national culture. 
Interestingly enough, nationalism studies and the part of organizational institutionalism 
that is focused on the importance of national cultures are very seldom combined. 
Organizational theorists rarely investigate the emergence of so-called national cultures. 
The nation-state is most often perceived as an “independent variable” that influences 
the choices and structure of organizations (Glynn & Abzug, 2002:278). Scholars of 
nationalism are, more often than not, content with investigating how national culture 
has been produced and reproduced historically. Fewer studies investigate how ideas of 
the nation legitimize organizational choices.7  
My analytical emphasis in this dissertation will deal with the legitimacy of 
monetary organization as embedded in national identity. By this I mean the way that 
the desirability and appropriateness of monetary organization is potentially confined 
and defined by interpretations of the nation’s cultural patterns. This being said, I will 
not neglect the other side of the coin, so to speak, that relates to the question of how 
                                                                
7 One recent exception is Egan (2014), who analyzes how national identity provides social movements with a discursive 
resource that may be invoked to reach political objectives.  
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central banks and national currencies potentially reinforce national culture. The nation-
state is indeed not an independent variable: it is evolving, contingent in meaning. and 
reinforced by a range of different cultural and organizational practices. 
 
REPRESENTATIONS OF LEGITIMACY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY: SKETCHING 
AN ANALYTICAL STRATEGY 
AN ANALYSIS OF SYMBOLS 
Having defined the theoretical concepts of legitimacy and national identity, the 
following questions remain: how does one actually study the connection between the 
two concepts to answer the general research questions? What should we look for, and 
where should we look? 
Symbols, I argue, are the common analytical objects that connect the 
concepts of legitimacy and national identity. With its most basic definition, a symbol is 
a sign that stands for something else (de Saussure, 1983:66). Meanings and identities 
do not only exist inside one’s head as mental phenomena; they “arise and develop by 
the mediation of material tokens or signs of some kind: words, images, sounds or other 
perceptible external marks organised into various forms of artefacts, texts, works, 
genres or discourses” (Fornäs, 2012:43). In this manner, symbols not only entail the 
visual, but must be understood in a broader sense to encompass both speech, 
ceremonies, and practices that are invested with meanings and convey meanings that 
exceed their immediate appearances through a process of signification.  
As mentioned in a previous section, symbols are potential sources of 
organizational legitimacy. Organizational institutionalism had as its genesis the 
analysis of organizational myth and ceremony (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). To be sure, 
the observation that symbolic isomorphism legitimates was one of Meyer and Rowan’s 
most important insights. However, symbols are not central only to the analysis of 
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organizational legitimacy. As noted by Cohen, no social or political order is 
sustainable without the “mystification of symbolism” (1985:219). Communities 
employ symbols as bonds of affiliation: “people construct community symbolically, 
making it a resource and repository of meaning, and a referent of their identity” 
(Cohen, 1985:219). Hence, symbols are emblems and identifiers of a specific 
community or groups.  The continuous representation of the national symbolic 
repertoire reinforces the identification of individuals with the nation’s cultural patterns 
(Smith, 2001:18). Thus symbols both delineate social and national communities and 
are sources of organizational legitimacy. 
Consequently, as the aim of this dissertation is to investigate how monetary 
organization draw legitimacy from and configure national identity, such an 
examination must highlight instances where the representations of monetary 
organization become symbols of the Danish national community and national identity 
and vice verca. By representations, I refer to the concrete instances where historical 
actors have described or portrayed the connection between national identity and 
monetary legitimacy. This connection, I argue, can be studied empirically and 
historically. But where should one look for such representations? 
 
WHERE TO LOOK FOR SYMBOLS?  
The above discussion, regarding symbols as the common analytical denominators, 
pointed toward representations as central to the analysis. Now, we must think about 
where to search practically and empirically for such representations.  
As I mentioned in the introduction, this project started out as a study of how 
monetary organization potentially contributed to national identity. As such, I had the 
idea that I could designate episodes from Danish monetary history where debates 
about, or challenges to, national identity had been evident. In particular, the national 
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and monetary conflict between Denmark and the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein as 
well as the euro referendum of 2000 seemed to hold great promises as case studies. 
Also, Nationalbanken’s archival disclosure offered the opportunity to conduct an 
investigation into the presumed identity-crafting aspirations associated with Danish 
banknote designs. Thus, my original strategy was to investigate the symbolic 
construction of community in these three case-studies and then use the cases to confirm 
or reject existing ideas of how currencies and central banks create national identity.  
However, as I worked with the literature and empirical material related to these 
three cases, the issue of legitimacy became increasingly relevant. Whenever I found, 
what I thought to be, obvious examples of identity construction, it was always 
accompanied by some form a legitimacy seeking, or legitimacy dilemma.  
So, instead of investigating and testing the identity-crafting associated with these 
three cases I now use them to suggest some more general themes, in which the 
legitimacy of monetary affairs is potentially connected to issues of national identity. 
Below, I suggest three themes that wield potential for such analyses. This does not 
mean that I have discarded the original cases. By developing the below themes, I aim 
to show that the rationale behind the initial selection of cases has changed. Although 
the themes may very well be suited for analyses of identity-construction, I am now able 
to justify theoretically why the themes are useful for the study of the relationship 
between legitimacy and national identity. I argue that monetary organization 
potentially actualizes and feeds upon national identity in the following three instances:  
 
1) In the face of a fundamental restructuring of monetary organization 
2) When designing and circulating national currencies, and 
3) When central bankers engage in public debate to justify their actions and 
convince the national constituency of the appropriateness and desirability of 
such actions.   
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Some of these three themes are indeed overlapping and I claim no clear-cut boundary 
between them. Nor are they necessarily homogenous in terms of the level of analysis. 
However, the three themes all point to instances where the legitimacy of monetary 
organization and the decisions of the central bank are potentially challenged by ideas 
of the nation. In the sections below, I briefly explain the theoretical motivations for 
narrowing in on these specific themes.   
 
MONETARY REORGANIZATION 
Central banks’ activities relate to perceptions of popular sovereignty and accountability 
(Gilbert, 2007:151); both of which are themes pertaining to issues of legitimacy and 
nation. Also, as Peeples has argued, the existence of centralized national banks alludes 
to the promise of a shared national future:  
 
With the disappearance of the individual hoard in favor of banks, modern 
subjects and their futures are specifically tied to the well-being of a vast 
array of specific people, whereas the ‘cosmopolitan’ metal of the individual 
hoard had allowed individuals to maintain separation from these potential 
compatriots (Peeples, 2008:259).  
 
On an everyday basis, this idea of accountability, sovereignty and the prospect of a 
shared national future is not challenged severely. However, when monetary 
organization faces an extensive reconfiguration, these ideas and feelings are readily 
articulated. They might even be exploited and mobilized for political purpose by 
different groups in pursuit of certain political ends or economic goals.   
  These above ideas direct us to an area where we might look for 
representations of national identity and monetary legitimacy, i.e., when existing 
monetary organization is undergoing substantial changes and issues of sovereignty, 
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accountability and economic fate becomes particularly pertinent. So, I suggest that 
studying substantial changes in monetary organization could prove particular useful for 
understanding the symbolic linkage between money, central bank legitimacy, and the 
national identity.        
 
DESIGNING BANKNOTES 
One of the most direct ways in which people are exposed to the decisions and 
preferences of the central bank is through the physical money that we handle every 
day. In Denmark, as in most countries, the central bank has the final say in selecting 
appropriate symbols and designs for the national banknotes. As detailed in the 
literature review, banknote design cannot be considered solely a question of identity-
crafting, as it relates closely to the question of legitimacy of the issuing authority 
(Hymans, 2004; Penrose & Cumming, 2011; Penrose, 2011).  
Nonetheless, the legitimacy aspect of currency iconography has, by and 
large, been overlooked in existing studies. For this reason, Penrose calls for a more 
detailed analysis of the actual motivations and negotiations that are involved with new 
banknote designs (2011). In these processes of choosing specific motives and 
iconographies, appropriate banknotes are negotiated and discussed, and it is here that 
diverging opinions are expressed and eventually reconciled in the final banknote 
designs. Afterwards, when a new banknote series is eventually put into circulation, the 
new notes are evaluated by the constituents of the issuing authority. These domestic 
constituents include the general population, politicians, the media, and art reviewers. 
However, banknotes also have an international audience as the notes signal national 
values to an audience that is beyond the nation-state (Hymans, 2010).     
A potential conflict lies in these internal and external negotiations 
regarding appropriate banknote designs. In the Danish case, the issuing of a new 
banknote series has always sparked debate, which attests to the strong emotions 
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banknote designs may evoke. As one Danish newspaper remarked when a new 
banknote series was released back in 1954:  
 
The new 5 and 10 kroner notes have been received with extraordinary good 
will—and should we perhaps say something as unusual as goodwill. New 
banknotes are as new stamps, something that concerns us all. We are 
gripped by emotions, we tend to only have the first day with new wallpaper 
in the living room. (n/a, 1952:10)  
 
Here, in this short quote, we get a sense of the tensions and diverging prescriptions of 
legitimacy that relates to the issuing of new notes. Following this, I suggest that 
debates over banknote designs—both internally within the central bank and in public 
discourse—make out promising empirical entries to the connection between legitimacy 
and national identity.   
 
THE LANGUAGE OF CENTRAL BANKERS 
Juliet Johnson dubbed central bankers “the priests of prosperity” thereby pointing to 
their religious associations (2007). In an earlier paper, Tognato even referred to central 
banking as a kind of secular religion (Tognato, 2004). Such theological references 
underscore the point that a quasi-religious aura connects the central bankers. Indeed, 
the religious mysticism of central bankers was accented by William Greider in Secrets 
of the Temple, when he described how the immensely important yet unintelligible 
character of central banking worked to mystify the Federal Reserve: “the governors of 
the Federal Reserve decided the largest of questions of the political economy, 
including who shall prosper and who shall fail, yet their role remained opaque and 
mysterious” (Greider, 1987:12). In this framing, central bankers attained a role as 
semi-deities who, in Greider’s narrative, (almost) decided between life and death. 
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 I refer to these ideas because they hint at the great importance of the central 
bank governor persona. Central bank governors are the ones who allegedly decide who 
shall prosper and who shall fail, and they are also the ones who often incarnate the 
central bank organization and authoritatively speak on its behalf. Although the 
personality of the individual central bankers per se may not secure price stability, most 
scholars agree that the language of central bankers has become increasingly important 
for the legitimacy of the organization (Mehrling, Moss, Pixley, & Tavlas, 2007). As 
mentioned, a surge has been observed in the literature focused on the language of 
central bankers and central banks. I will follow and expand on these studies to analyze 
the language of and about central bankers, because such language constitutes 
representations of central bank legitimacy and its connection to national identity. 
     
THE DANISH CASES 
Now, instead of just selecting a series of cases in which I believed issues of identity 
and monetary organization were articulated in relation to each other, the research 
process and the introduction of the legitimacy concept has allowed me to theoretically 
justify why my original cases were indeed suitable for analyzing the connection 
between legitimacy and national identity. Following the three above suggestions I 
argue that, because my analytical focus has shifted toward legitimacy, the following 
four cases are suitable for such analyses. 
 
1) The national conflict between Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark in the 
nineteenth century: As I mentioned, substantial changes in existing monetary 
organization potentially highlights issues of popular sovereignty, accountability, 
and the sense of a shared economic fate. This is why debates over monetary 
reforms could prove particularly well-suited cases for analyses of legitimacy and 
national identity. Since the late eighteenth century, the Danish conglomerate 
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state, Helstaten, managed different currency systems. The duchies of Schleswig 
and Holstein had their own rather stable silver standard, whereas the paper-based 
kurant in the rest of the Kingdom was characterized by endemic instability. In 
the period from 1813 to 1864, Copenhagen legislators continuously sought to 
homogenize the Danish currency while, at the same time, reintegrating the 
separatist duchies into Helstaten. The explicit interrelation between issues of 
nationhood and monetary legitimacy makes the period between 1813 and 1864 a 
particularly promising case. Also, the monetary reform of 1854 can be seen as 
the first serious attempt to establish a single territorial currency within the 
Danish state. As such, the reform may be viewed as the creation of the Danish 
currency and, hence, makes an obvious starting point for my analysis.   
 
2) The Danish euro-debate of 2000: The Danish euro-referendum of 2000 marks 
what could have been the end of the Danish currency. In this respect, the euro-
referendum is very different from the Schleswig-Holstein case, where 
policymakers unsuccessfully tried to promote one single territorial currency. 
Some 150 years later, Danish politicians, at large, were ready to abandon the 
krone and implement the euro. The euro-debate preceded a referendum on 
whether or not to keep the national currency. Therefore, we must expect that, if 
any place, this would be the case to look for the connection between the 
legitimacy of monetary organization and representations of national identity. 
Taken together, the two articles on Schleswig-Holstein and the euro-referendum 
both relate to major monetary reforms and, therefore, offer the opportunity for 
comparative analysis. 
 
3) The design processes and public reception of Danish banknotes through history: 
As mentioned, I view the debates and decisions made about ‘suitable’ banknote 
iconography as promising entries to understanding the relationship between 
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central bank and national identity. In connection with my PhD project, 
Nationalbanken has granted me full access to their archives—which include 
internal memos, reports, and evaluations on banknote designs. These sources 
elucidate the negotiations over suitable banknote motives. Since 1908, 
Nationalbanken has hosted four design-competitions. The jury evaluations and 
internal communication relating to these competitions offer detailed insights into 
the often conflicting representations of the national identity. Also, Danish 
newspapers have continuously evaluated the different designs and reported on 
public attitudes toward new banknotes. Such public material as newspapers and 
magazines are valuable sources of public reception and interpretation of 
Nationalbanken’s attempt to become legitimate through banknote designs. This 
analysis is featured in this dissertation’s third article, titled: “‘Too weird for 
banknotes’”: Legitimacy and Identity In the Production of Danish Banknotes 
1947-2007” 
 
4) The narratives of and about Danish central bankers in a historical perspective: 
This fourth article was the last to be researched and written. Therefore I have 
been able to use the ideas and accumulated insights that I gained from the earlier 
studies to sharpen its focus on legitimacy. As such, “Banking on the Nation” 
represents the article with the clearest focus on the historical development 
between national identity and central bank legitimacy. But why would I focus on 
narratives of and about Danish central bankers? As argued by Tognato, central 
bankers are in a position that enables them to speak the language that connects 
monetary affairs to fundamental ideas of collective identity; however, the 
language of central bankers is not just accepted by their constituents without 
resistance. Therefore, the analysis of central bank language must be 
supplemented by an investigation of how this language is received in a broader 
public discourse to focus on the narratives of and about Danish central bank 
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governors. I apply a processional historical approach to this analysis to explain 
the temporal development of the narratives that connect central banking to 
national identity. I analyze four periods in Danish monetary history (and the 
language of four prominent Danish central bankers) to explain the development 
and resilience of these narratives. 
 
DIFFERENT CASES AND EMPIRICAL MATERIAL 
In terms of temporal focus and chronology, the four cases are very different from one 
another. Two of the cases demand longitudinal studies than span more than a century 
(the cases regarding banknote designs and the narratives of central bank governors). 
The articles on Schleswig-Holstein and the euro-debate have a narrower time frame, 
ranging from 50 years to 6 months, and are chronologically separated by more than 
150 years. These variations raise considerable challenges in terms of methodology and 
empirical data. What do these four articles have in common? How should one analyze 
these different cases to evaluate whether Nationalbanken did, in fact, draw on and 
reproduce the Danish nation?  
The articles on the euro and Schleswig-Holstein are connected by a 
common theme; the proposed restructuring of existing monetary organization. As such, 
they offer the possibility for comparison as two distinct configurations of national 
identity and monetary organization separated by 150 years. However, such punctual 
comparisons offer only a static picture of limited situations: they cannot explain the 
happenings between the two periods. Therefore, they are fittingly supplemented by the 
wider timeframe in the two additional articles on banker-narratives and banknote 
designs. These two studies potentially contribute to a more process-oriented 
understanding of the identity-legitimacy connection and should open up for an 
understanding of how the relationship changes over time. I briefly discuss, in the next 
section, the variations in the four articles, in terms of analytical objects and empirical 
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material, and highlight the overarching analytical commonality that exists in all four 
articles despite their differences.  
 
RHETORIC, NARRATIVES AND VISUAL SYMBOLS 
In the four articles below, I apply use of different theoretical concepts. In the articles 
on Schleswig-Holstein and the Danish euro-debate, I use the concept of rhetoric to 
analyze the arguments and debates over the potential restructuring of existing currency 
systems. Such a rhetorical analysis involves an examination of claims and the 
underlying assumptions and backings that sustain these claims. These rhetorical claims 
relate to the employment of symbols, visual and other, for translation and interpretation 
(Phillips, 2004:3; Bruner, 2011:404). As such, these two analyses investigate how the 
national symbolic repertoire was employed by political elites to legitimize, or render 
illegitimate, alternative monetary organization. 
Although I focus on the conscious use of symbols to promote defined 
policy aims, I also argue that existing identity constructions defined the frame and 
possibilities for the rhetorical actors, and that these actors were confined and enabled 
by the existing ideas about monetary organizations, as well as national identity. This 
idea resonates with the central argument in the article on Danish central bankers, in 
which I use the concept of narratives. Here, I define narratives as a symbolic 
representation, linked in time and framed by a certain theme (Mordhorst, 2013:4). 
Again, as with the definition of rhetoric, the employment of symbols is central to the 
concept of narratives. A narrative analysis, as laid out in the article “Banking on the 
nation”, is less focused on the structure of specific arguments. Instead, such an analysis 
is sensitive to the way that a narrative potentially conditions and frames the 
possibilities and decisions of actors and organizations. Finally, in the article “Too 
weird for banknotes”, I analyze the designs of Danish banknotes and Nationalbanken’s 
considerations of which visual symbols it should employ on its notes.    
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Although these different approaches may not be completely compatible 
they do indeed share one key commonality. Whether I analyze the narratives of central 
bankers, outline different rhetorical strategies or focus on banknote iconography as 
objects of analysis, the deliberate or unintentional employment of symbols in securing 
legitimacy and reinforcing national identity remain as parts of the recurring analytical 
focus. Visual images, rhetoric, and narratives are all symbolic representations from 
which legitimacy is sourced, and they are all three elements of the continuous 
reproduction and reinterpretation of the nation and the individual identification with it.  
The empirical material varies in the four articles. Each article will feature 
its own reflections on the quality and limitations of the material used. However, 
common to the four papers is the ambition to analyzes and interpret historical 
representations. As such, the only access to such representations is trough historical 
texts. Over the next four chapters, I engage in these analyses of representations in 
different historical texts. 
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The four Papers 
 
MONETARY ROMANTICISM: NATIONALIST RHETORIC AND MONETARY 
ORGANISATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY DENMARK 
 
Anders Ravn Sørensen 
This paper has been published in Scandinavian Economic History Review, Volume 
61, Issue 3, 2013, pages 209-232. 
 
Abstract 
Recurring debates on the common European currency illustrate that monetary 
organisation and issues of national identity and community are closely interlinked. 
National sentiments and ideas about the nation continuously inform public attitudes 
towards currencies. This article addresses the interrelation between monetary 
organisation and nationalism. In the conflict between the Danish state and the 
Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein in the nineteenth century, banks and currencies were 
mobilised as political symbols to promote an agenda of regional nationalism. The 
local Schleswig-Holstein currency and the local Schleswig-Holsteinische Landesbank 
became symbolic antagonists to the Danish central bank and to the official state-
sanctioned currency – which by Danish policy-makers were considered key elements 
in the attempt to consolidate the Danish state and curtail Hamburg’s economic 
influence. The analysis highlights the symbolic qualities of monetary institutions and 
points to the entwinement of economic motivations and nationalist ideology that 
consequently affected the possibilities for Danish monetary organisation and nation-
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building; it thus contributes to our understanding of currencies and banks as nation-
building tools and symbols of national community. 
 
1. Introduction 
Money has a funny way of winding people up; the symbolic qualities of national 
currencies can evoke strong feelings of collective identity and lingering popular 
nationalism. In later years, the intimate relationship between monetary institutions 
and national identity has been discussed in connection with the problems facing 
Europe’s single currency. Thus, Financial Times columnist Gideon Rachman recently 
argued that the euro’s ‘true and fatal flaw’ seems to be its lack of common identity.8 
This article deals with the connection between monetary institutions, 
nationalism and national communities. Focusing on the conflict between Denmark 
and the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein in the nineteenth century – during which an 
ideology of Schleswig-Holsteinian separatism gained momentum – my objective is to 
demonstrate how the regional currency and bank, i.e., the Schleswig-Holstein courant 
and the Schleswig-Holsteinische Landesbank, on the one hand, were 
juxtaposed with the currency sanctioned by the Danish state and the Danish central 
bank on the other. In this conflict, the monetary institutions were transformed into 
political symbols that buttressed ideas of nationalism and feelings of national 
identity. I argue that, as national tensions between the duchies and the Danish 
kingdom increased in middle of the nineteenth century, economic interests and 
nationalist agitation gradually merged into a distinct rhetorical form, which I refer to 
as ‘monetary romanticism’. I also highlight the fruitless efforts of Danish 
policymakers to enforce monetary unification and I demonstrate how monetary 
institutions not only co-configure territory and state but can also be hijacked as 
political symbols to promote an agenda of nationalism. 
                                                                
8 Rachman, ‘The Single Currency’s True and Fatal Flaw’ (2011). 
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As scholars of monetary history are aware, territorial currencies are a 
relatively new phenomenon tied to the process of modernisation and state-
consolidation in the nineteenth century.9 Two hundred years ago, commodity money 
was not formally linked to territorial borders and national monetary systems were 
often heterogeneous and fragmented. This was particularly true within the Danish 
kingdom, where policy-makers struggled in vain to enforce monetary uniformity 
and to displace competing currencies within the southern region comprised of the 
Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein. For this reason, Denmark offers an interesting case of 
the development of national currencies because of its historically heterogeneous 
monetary system, which policy-makers sought to reform, and because of its 
development from a heterogeneous composite state to a fairly homogeneous nation-
state. 
The process of nineteenth-century monetary unification is well studied, 
and much of the research has been informed by econometrics and currency-area 
calculations.10 The creation of the Latin Monetary Union in particular (and later the 
Scandinavian Monetary Union) has attracted significant academic attention because it 
offers insight into the economic and political considerations that motivate the desire 
for monetary unity.11 While some work has been done on the political economy of 
monetary unification in the early modern period, for example by Carl-Ludwig 
Holtfrerich, who shows that German monetary unification in the nineteenth century 
preceded political unification in 1871,12 little empirical work has been conducted to 
investigate the interrelation between nineteenth-century romanticist nationalism, on 
the one hand, and monetary and financial institutions such as currencies and central 
banks on the other hand. The goal of this article is to analyse currencies and banks as 
                                                                
9 See for example Dodd, Sociology (1994); Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital (1996); Spahn, Gold (2001); Helleiner, Making (2003). 
10 Flandreau/Maruel, ‘Monetary Union’ (2005) and Foreman-Peck, ‘Lessons’ (2006). 
11 Reis, Monetary Systems (1995); Einaudi, ‘Franc’ (2000); Einaudi, Money and Politics (2001); Øksendal, ‘Norwegian Debate’ 
(2006). 
12 Holtfrerich, ‘Monetary Unification’ (1993), 523. 
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national symbols, and to put these symbols in the context of Danish nation-state 
consolidation and monetary homogenisation. 
To do this, I use a wide range of source material related to the monetary 
issues in Schleswig-Holstein from around 1830 to 1864. The analysis builds on 
different archival sources such as parliamentary debates, monetary legislation, 
newspaper articles from Denmark and the duchies as well as a range of smaller 
debate publications. Additionally, I use the existing literature on the monetary history 
of Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark including the works of Carsten Rubow, Svend 
Aage Hansen,Werner Pfeiffer and Michael Märcher. 13  The connection between 
nationalism and monetary institutions in Schleswig-Holstein have already been 
acknowledged by Ove Hornby in his account of the Flensburg branch of the Danish 
central bank, by Hans Schultz Hansen in his work on national sentiments and 
ideologies and finally by Inge Adriansen in her study of Danish national symbols, in 
which a short section is devoted to the Danish currency.14 In these studies, however, 
the connection between monetary organisation and national sentiments is mentioned 
only briefly or as appendage to the history of either monetary developments or 
nationalist movements. In this article, in contrast, I focus specifically on this 
interrelation and combine primary and secondary literature on Danish monetary 
history to offer a semiotic analysis of hitherto unused material on the monetary 
disputes between Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein. 
The article is structured as follows: first I sketch a theoretical framework 
on the symbolic importance of money and banks. In section two, I provide a brief 
overview of the existing literature on monetary organisation and nationalism. I also 
reflect on the tension between issues of economic self-interest and expressions of 
                                                                
13  Rubow/Danmarks Nationalbank, Nationalbankens historie (1918); Hansen et al., Pengehistorie (1968); Pfeiffer, Geschichte 
(1977); Märcher, Møntsteder (2012). 
14 Hornby, Striden (1975); Schultz Hansen, Danskheden (1990); Schultz Hansen, Hjemmetyskheden (2005); Schultz Hansen, ‘Patria’ 
(2009); Adriansen, Symboler (2003). 
 63 
 
national romanticist ideology; and more specifically what this means in terms of 
interpreting the source material. In section three, I attempt to do justice to the 
fairly complex Danish monetary system from the early 1800s until 1864. Section four 
sheds light to the monetary elements that were resourced for the national romanticist 
movement in Schleswig-Holstein. In sections five and six, I analyse the political 
mobilisation of banks and currencies respectively to show how they were used to 
further a nationalist agenda or as tools to consolidate the Danish state. The analysis is 
thematically rather than chronologically structured into these 
two larger sections on banks and currencies. Finally, in section seven, I draw my 
conclusions. 
 
2. Currencies and banks as national symbols 
Historical research has already been conducted on the use of currencies as nation-
building 
tools, delineators of communities and symbols of national identity.15 Many of these 
studies stress that the collective understanding of boundaries between social 
communities is mediated and sustained by a repertoire of symbols. As Anthony P. 
Cohen has pointed out, the boundary that marks the beginning and the end of any 
community are rather symbolic than physical.16 Along these lines Zdzislav Mach 
argues that symbols comprise vehicles of meaning and cultural values, which are 
without material form and can only be conceived and communicated through the use 
of symbols.17 Because symbols potentially demarcate boundaries of community they 
have frequently been politicised as nation-building instruments. State and national 
                                                                
15 To mention but a fraction: O’Malley, ‘Species’ (1994); Pointon, ‘Money and Nationalism’ (1998); Gilbert, ‘Ornamenting’ (1998); 
Gilbert, ‘Forging’ (1999); Helleiner, ‘National Currencies’ (1998); Helleiner, Making (2003); Rowlinson, ‘The Scotch’ (1999); 
Hymans, ‘Color’ (2004); Colella, ‘Monetary Patriotism’ (2003); Lauer, ‘Money’ (2008). 
16 Cohen, Construction (1985), 13. 
17 Mach, Symbols (1993), 37. 
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elites continuously attempt to monopolise the use of powerful symbols in an effort to 
control how they are used.18 
The importance of cultural and symbolic components of communities has 
been accented by Anthony D. Smith’s ethno-symbolic approach to nationalism. 
According to Smith, ethnic myths and symbols of community are important elements 
in the construction of nations. These symbols, which include flags, hymns, anthems – 
and most notably coins 19 – can be invested with meaning and significance and serve 
as powerful motifs of nationalism that sustain a national community. Inspired by 
Smith’s approach I perceive monetary institutions as symbols that can serve to 
demarcate community boundaries and contribute to the configuration of a collective 
identity.20 Such symbols are not merely to be understood as unnoticeable, hibernating 
components of national communities. Symbols may be monopolized by ideological 
movements who draw sustenance from a repertoire of existing myths, traditions and 
symbols to promote an agenda of nationalism. However, Smith argues, powerful 
symbols and traditions cannot readily be ‘invented’ as Hobsbawm has proposed.21 
Even though socio-economic elites may try to alter or seriously 
distort existing myths and symbols in an attempt to engage in ‘top-down’ myth 
construction – these myths cannot be invented impromptu. Instead, political elites 
promoting a nation must carefully select and wield a range of symbols that have a 
degree of resonance in the population they seek to influence.22 
Gertude Stein once banteringly asked people to make up their minds; 
whether money is money or money isn’t money?23 Following the symbolic focus of 
the aforementioned studies I propose that money is both. Sometimes money is 
actually ‘just’ money in the traditional quantifiable economic sense – something we 
earn and spend every day – a means of exchange, a unit of account or a technology 
                                                                
18 Hobsbawm/Ranger, Invention (1983); Mach, Symbols (1993), 105. 
19 Smith, ‘Ethno-symbolism’ (2005), 28. 
20 Smith, ‘Ethno-symbolism’ (2005), 23. 
21 Hobsbawm/Ranger, Invention (1983). 
22 Smith, Ethno-Symbolism (2009), 21. 
23 Stein, ‘Money’ (1996), 236. 
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for storing wealth. At other times, money is a symbolic sign that stands for something 
else, something unrelated to economic value. It is a signifier, to use the vocabulary of 
Saussure,24 which denotes an arbitrary relationship between the real world and the 
sign. Thus, a central bank – like the Danish Nationalbanken – may be invested with 
meaning that has little to do with the monetary duties it performs. It may be the 
physical headquarter of a bank offering a range of financial services. But it may also 
be construed as a symbol of something intangible – e.g., as an embodiment of a 
certain political ideology. Symbols convey metaphysic abstractions through physical, 
tangible objects25 and as such, both currencies and headquarters of 
central banks can be understood as symbols with the ability to bolster the identity of 
regional or national communities because they embody ideas and are invested with 
meaning. 
 
Self interest versus romanticist ideology 
To be sure, the above focus on symbols does not imply that the monetary and 
financial disputes between Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein can be completely 
severed from the underlying economic interests that motivated different 
socioeconomic groups. Ethno-national mobilisation indeed often results from the 
conscious efforts of economic elites to consolidate control over certain political or 
economic resources.26  I recognise that national symbols alone might not explain 
collective action. As economic historian Carsten Hefeker has shown by analysing a 
series of nineteenth-century monetary unions, the economic policies leading to 
monetary unification depend on the influence of the potential ‘gainers’ and ‘losers’.27 
The restructuring of monetary organisations tends to favour some societal groups 
while others risk losing money, power and influence. As Schultz Hansen has recently 
                                                                
24 de Saussure, Course (1983), 66. 
25 Adriansen, Symboler (2003), 30. 
26 See for example Hroch, Preconditions (1985) or the Marxist-inspired analysis by Hobsbawm 
and Ranger, Invention (1983). 
27 Hefeker, ‘Interest Groups’ (1995). 
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argued, identification with national movements in Schleswig was largely defined by 
class, profession and economic influence. People simply tend to sympathise with the 
nationalist ideas that seem most economically rewarding. This accounts for a 
correlation between rational economic expectations and expressions of national 
identity.28 
Consequently, even though my analysis is most adequately described as a 
qualitative semiotic approach, in which I focus on the meanings attributed to the 
monetary institutions of Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein, a certain amount of 
background information is necessary. Because the nationalist discourse cannot be 
analysed independently of the economic and political structures within which it was 
articulated, I shall clarify Schleswig-Holstein’s economic interests. Moreover, 
although I provide examples of how the general population responded to these 
attempts in an effort to hint at their impact, my main analytical focus is the rhetoric of 
the elites. 
 
3. Monetary and financial issues in Schleswig-Holstein 
From the cession of Norway in 1814 until 1864, the Danish state was composed of 
the kingdom of Denmark, the southern duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, Lauenburg, as 
well as a range of overseas possessions. The term Helstaten is often used to describe 
this peculiar geopolitical arrangement that was characterised by immanent economic 
and political tensions. The duchies accounted for about half of the total land and two 
fifths of the total population. Due to political arrangements dating back to the late 
Middle Ages, the duchies had been under the formal rule of the Danish king, 
however, culturally, the duchies stood out from the rest of the Kingdom. Holstein was 
completely German speaking, and High German was the official language although 
almost half of the population in Schleswig spoke a Danish dialect.29 Moreover, the 
                                                                
28 Schultz Hansen, ‘Patria’ (2009). 
29 Carr, Origins (1991), 34. 
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duchies were economically and geographically removed from the Danish capital of 
Copenhagen on the eastern island of Zealand. Consequently Schleswig-Holstein 
agrarian commerce was oriented not north and east, towards the Danish kingdom, but 
towards the German cities south of the Holstein border – Hamburg in particular – 
which also opened the door to the English market.30 This agrarian export made the 
Schleswig-Holstein farmers and landowners interested in keeping close commercial 
connections with the German regions south of Holstein. On the other hand, merchants 
and grocers in the larger cities, such as Flensburg, turned to Helstaten as a bulwark 
against German competition, in hopes of 
retaining the prosperous trade routes with the Danish West Indies.31 
Various currencies circulated within Helstaten. Courant coins and 
banknotes were produced in the Copenhagen Kurantbanken. In addition, a range of 
foreign coins of varying silver content flowed in from the German cities south of the 
border (including Prussian thalers and Hamburg banco-daler). Within Schleswig-
Holstein, the silver-based Hamburg banco-daler was in fact often preferred as unit of 
account.32 Due to their relatively autonomous status within Helstaten, the duchies had 
acquired their own monetary privileges in 1788. 33  As a result, the Altona-based 
Schleswig-Holstein Specie Bank (located in the outskirts of present-day Hamburg) 
produced specie notes based on silver reserves and had strict rules for issuing notes.34 
The silver content of the Schleswig-Holstein specie equalled that of the Hamburg 
banco-daler and thus reduced transaction costs. The Specie Bank in Altona had a 
rather restrictive credit policy and a low impact on the credit supply to the regional 
business community.35 According to Danish banking historian Axel Nielsen, the bank 
played no role as a credit institution as its only lending was limited to discounting 
                                                                
30 Wilcke, Specie (1929), 22; Carr, Origins (1991), 36. 
31 Schultz Hansen et al., Sønderjyllands historie (2009), 88. 
32 Hornby, Striden (1975), 19. 
33 The intimate economic relationship between Hamburg and the duchies had prompted Danish politicians to accept a Schleswig-
Holsteinian silver standard, since future tax revenues from the duchies would be delivered in a stable currency in a fixed rate to the 
Hamburg banco. Hansen et al. Pengehistorie (1968), 81. 
34 Märcher, ‘Banking’ (2010), 135. 
35 Hornby, Striden (1975), 20. 
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short-term (three-month) bills of exchange.36 The mint in Altona also produced silver 
specie and courant coins. The exchange rate between courant and species was defined 
by a fixed ratio of 100 species to 125 courant.37  
These financial and monetary arrangements meant that Helstaten was 
forced to manage different monetary systems since the duchies de facto had a stable 
silver standard, whereas the Copenhagen Courant Bank issued notes with fluctuating 
values. Moreover, the economic and political structures of Helstaten also posed 
considerable barriers to the establishment of a homogeneous territorial currency. Eric 
Helleiner defines the nation-state and industrial technology as two structural 
preconditions for monetary homogenisation. 38  Although Helstaten’s minting 
technology was arguably quite evolved, it definitely lacked the first structural 
condition, namely a culturally homogeneous nation with strong links between state 
and society. Instead, existing monetary arrangement intensified national difference as 
one societal group (people in the duchies) relied on commodity money with intrinsic 
value while another group was left with a fiduciary currency, which depended largely 
on the state’s ability to cultivate the trust of the population in its ability to manage 
monetary policy in a responsible way.39 
During the Napoleonic Wars, in 1807, the English navy bombed the 
Danish capital heavily in order to prevent the Danish fleet from falling in the hands of 
the French. Large parts of Copenhagen were destroyed, and the British confiscated 
the fleet. The war also had severe economic ramifications as it lead to widespread 
monetary chaos and inflation within the Danish kingdom. Large-scale production of 
Copenhagen courant banknotes eventually resulted in a collapse of state finances. 
From 1800 to 1809 the amount of courant notes in circulation rose steadily. However, 
                                                                
36 Nielsen, Bankpolitik (1923), 287. 
37 Hornby, Striden (1975), 20. 
38 Helleiner, Making (2003), 42-43. 
39 As argued by Giddens, Nation-State (1996), 155-158. 
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the market was eventually swamped with debased paper money from 1810 to181240 
as the Danish war expenditure had been primarily funded with the use of the printing 
press. The number of circulating courant notes increased by almost 900% and in 1812 
the rate of the courant dropped to less than one-twelfth of its silver parity value.41 In 
1812, notes from the Schleswig-Holstein Specie Bank were declared inconvertible to 
prevent foreign speculation from causing a run on the silver reserve.42 
In 1813, a sweeping monetary reform was implemented in an effort to 
resolve the monetary situation, including among other measures, a new homogeneous 
currency and unit of account for the whole country (rigsbankdaler), a pledge to make 
these new notes reach parity by gradually withdrawing notes from circulation, and the 
establishment of a new note-issuing bank, Rigsbanken. The bank was founded as a 
private enterprise based on privately held shares. The Rigsbank notes were backed by 
a 6% compulsory priority silver mortgage on the property of the landowners of both 
the kingdom and Schleswig-Holstein. This mortgage was to be amortised at 6.5% per 
year until the notes reached parity, at which time the bank would begin to pay 
dividends to its shareholders. In all, a liability of 14 million rigsbankdaler was 
imposed on the duchies – with another 18.9 million on the kingdom. 
Throughout Schleswig-Holstein the monetary reform was considered 
inconvenient and extremely unfair, since during the period of Danish inflation they 
had managed to sustain a stable monetary system based on the silver specie. The use 
of inconvertible notes from the Copenhagen Courant Bank had not been compulsory 
in the duchies. Instead, silver coins had dominated circulation in Schleswig-Holstein 
and the number of notes issued by the Schleswig-Holstein Specie Bank had been 
relatively low; around two million rigsbankdaler.43 Despite this regional monetary 
prudence, the landowners of Schleswig-Holstein nonetheless paid a heavy price for 
                                                                
40 Wilcke, Specie (1929), 233. 
41 Hansen et al., Pengehistorie (1968), 110. 
42 Hornby, Striden (1975), 21. 
43 Märcher, ‘Banking’ (2010), 135. 
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the reconstruction of the Danish monetary system, through the compulsory priority 
mortgages. Furthermore, the planned introduction of a common currency throughout 
Helstaten was considered inconvenient since it would entail a withdrawal of the 
silver-based Schleswig-Holstein courant – a currency that also circulated in Hamburg 
and thus reduced trans-border transactions cost.44 
Officially a homogeneous currency had now been introduced for all 
regions of Helstaten, but in Schleswig-Holstein almost no daily transactions were 
accounted in rigsbankdaler; instead, the Schleswig-Holstein courant remained the 
preferred unit of account at an exchange rate of 1 courant to 1.6 rigsbankdaler.45 
Through repeated petitions to the Danish king, often referring to a statute from 1460 
stating that the duchies were allowed to partake in a currency union with Hamburg 
and Lübeck, the Schleswig-Holsteinians managed to reverse the introduction of the 
rigsbanksdaler.46 Instead the silver-based courant was reestablished as legal tender. 
Despite these accommodations, the turbulence of 1813 had severely undermined the 
credibility of Danish financial and monetary institutions in the eyes of the regional 
citizens. This animosity proved persistent when Rigsbanken was reorganised in 1818 
as a private company with a new name: Nationalbanken. 
In an attempt to accommodate critics in Schleswig-Holstein, landowners 
in the two duchies were in July 1818 presented with three alternative solutions 
devised by a special monetary commission. The landowners of Schleswig-Holstein 
could either (1) remain under the existing provisions and pay an annual interest if 
6.5% thereby keeping their right to convert the mortgage into shares. Four per cent of 
the liable debtors chose this solution. (2) Repay the total mortgage in notes or bonds 
– which at that time meant a 20% discount due to fluctuating rates – but at the same 
time renounce their right to subscribe. Seven per cent chose this solution. (3) Pay an 
annual interest of 6% until the accumulated payments equalled the proportion of 
                                                                
44 Hansen et al., Pengehistorie (1968), 159-161. 
45 Hansen et al., Pengehistorie (1968), 159. 
46 Hansen et al., Pengehistorie (1968), 134-135. 
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Nationalbanken’s decreasing note-debt that fell upon this particular landowner. The 
remaining 89% of the debtors who chose this latter option did not have to repay the 
mortgage in full, but they did have to renounce their right to convert their mortgage 
into Nationalbank shares. 47  Calculations made by Danish bank-historian Rubow 
indicate that the debtors most likely had been better off holding on to their 
subscription rights. 48  However, due to the rather complicated arrangement, the 
fluctuating interest rates, and the notes’ silver value, the advantage of choosing 
option number one might not have been completely clear to the Schleswig-
Holsteinian landowners. The apparent eagerness with which the Schleswig-Holsteins 
distanced themselves from Nationalbanken can be interpreted as a result of the 
aforementioned antipathy towards Danish financial and monetary authorities. Their 
motivations notwithstanding, the arrangement effectively alienated the majority of 
Schleswig-Holstein landowners from Nationalbanken. Instead of becoming 
stockholders, they had reduced themselves to mere bystanders – and sometimes even 
ardent critics of – Nationalbanken, which they now considered a purely Danish 
institution. 
 
4. The rise of nationalist sentiments 
Beginning in the early 1830s, an ideology of Schleswig-Holsteinian nationalism and 
independence gained momentum within the duchies. 49  The Schleswig-Holstein 
nationalist movement was inspired by the ideas of Johann Gottfried Herder, Friedrich 
Schlegel, and Johann Gottlieb Fichte and promoted the establishment of an 
independent Schleswig-Holstein state with German culture and language as the 
common denominators. Especially the population of Schleswig and its main city 
Flensburg was divided by language and culture into German-oriented and loyalist 
groupings. During the 1840s, regional nationalists and Danish royalists struggled to 
                                                                
47 Rubow/Danmarks Nationalbank, Nationalbankens historie (1918), 121. 
48 Rubow/Danmarks Nationalbank, Nationalbankens historie (1918), 24-26. 
49 Frandsen, ‘Breakup’ (2009), 13-16. 
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sway the population for their cause. Until the outbreak of the first Schleswigian war 
in 1848, they primarily fought on cultural grounds. The ideological differences 
between the two groups resulted in a quest for cultural supremacy and became 
expressed through a variety of activities. Public picnics, fairs, the establishment of 
national associations and the creation of new national songs and symbols became 
weapons in the attempt to consolidate and differentiate different national 
sympathies.50 When a war for independence finally broke out in 1848, as a part of the 
complex series of events that comprised the revolutions of 1848, Prussian forces 
prevented the Danish army from intervening as the new Schleswigian provisional 
government in Kiel began to create an independent state apparatus.51 However, due to 
international political pressure, Prussian forces eventually had to retreat from the 
region. In 1864, another Schleswigian war erupted and both duchies were finally 
annexed by Prussia in 1866.  
The national mobilisation in Schleswig-Holstein had a particular 
monetary and economic twist to it. The German-minded politician and historian, 
Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann, generally considered the ideological founder of 
Schleswig-Holsteinian nationalism, eagerly criticised the monetary reform of 1813, 
defended the monetary system of Schleswig-Holstein and defined economic and 
monetary issues as important elements in the establishment of a sovereign and 
culturally conscious nation.52 Such a combination of monetary issues and nationalist 
ideas was not new but had been invigorated by German romanticists Adam Müller 
and Johann Gottlieb Fichte some years earlier.53 Indeed, the measures following the 
Danish state bankruptcy had very much highlighted the economic tensions between 
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Denmark and the duchies – which agitators such as Dahlmann used as key elements 
in developing their nationalist ideology.54 
Dahlmann’s thoughts inspired a younger group of Schleswig-Holstein 
liberals, including surveyor Heinrich Tiedemann along with lawyers Wilhelm Beseler 
and Jakob Gülich, who were elected to Schleswig’s regional assembly in 1840/1841. 
As we will see in the section below both Beseler, Gülich and Tiedemann repeatedly 
used both currency and banks as part of their political rhetoric. Nationalbanken, they 
argued, was in direct opposition to the national character of Schleswig-Holstein, 
whereas the local courant represented its unique spirit. 
 
5. Filialbanken, loved and loathed 
In the beginning of the 1830s credit was scarce within Helstaten where 
Nationalbanken constituted the only major credit institution.55 Following the 1813 
financial collapse Nationalbanken had pursued a contractive monetary policy in an 
attempt to gradually make the new rigsdaler reach silver parity. This contractive 
policy led to shortage of money, both in the duchies and in Denmark. Even though 
private lenders and small savings banks accommodated some capital needs, 
merchants and industry often had to rely on financial connections in Hamburg.56 
More often than not, Nationalbanken favoured lending to people from Copenhagen 
and snubbed loan applications from other parts of Helstaten.57 
Nationalbanken’s focus on reaching parity made it economically 
unattractive for the bank to open regional branches in order to stimulate credit in 
northern and southern parts of Jutland, where credit needs were particularly 
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pronounced. Even as the bank was subject to considerable political pressure from the 
Danish king and his advisories, and although courant coins continued to dominate 
circulation in Jutland as a whole, it was not until 1837 that Nationalbanken used its 
statutes and opened a branch in the city of Århus.58 Even then, the bank ensured that 
the branch was defined as an ‘experimental scheme’ that could be closed down if 
operating costs proved too high. The bank also made sure that the branch name ‘det 
jyske Bank-Contoir I Aarhus’ bore no references to the Copenhagen mother-bank.59 
The new organisational structure of Nationalbanken from 1818 seemed to have 
curtailed political influence on its decision; the bank was now a profit maximising 
business rather than a political tool in the hands of a sovereign king. 
Local merchants and industrialists in Schleswig had long wished for a 
regional bank of their own to remedy the continued credit vacuum in the southern 
regions and to stimulate trade and investment. However, deep disagreements existed 
within the duchies as to the ownership structure and functions of such a commercial 
bank. In 1835, the Flensburg merchant and influential loyalist politician H.C. Jensen 
officially proposed to establish a local branch of Nationalbanken in the city of 
Flensburg.60 In the following years, Jensen actively lobbied for such an institution, 
commonly known as Filialbanken. From the point of view of the German-oriented 
landowners, the proposed branch opening was considered a means of indirect 
economic exploitation, since most of them had renounced their subscription rights. 
Potential Filialbanken profits would benefit the Copenhagen subscribers, not the 
people of Schleswig. Nationalbanken had originally dragged its feet in establishing 
regional branches out of fear that they would prove economically unprofitable. 
However, after the rigsbankdaler-notes reached silver parity in 1835 the Flensburg 
branch was eventually considered an opportunity to expand business and pre-empt 
the establishment of local note-issuing banks. From a political perspective, according 
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to the royal bank commissioner serving as adviser to the king, the branch could be 
considered an opportunity to limit Hamburg’s economic influence and to promote the 
proliferation of Danish rigsbankdaler.61 
The establishment of a Flensburg branch of Nationalbanken was widely 
discussed in the duchies from 1840 to 1845 in government offices, at political rallies, 
in newspapers and at public meetings. Proponents and opponents of the new bank 
promoted their arguments with posters, petitions, speeches and economic 
countermeasures. The separatist newspaper Lyna noted in an editorial from 1841 that 
the projected opening of Filialbanken would permit the stockholders of 
Nationalbanken to engage in a veritable conquest of the duchies.62  The regional 
Schleswigian assembly repeatedly petitioned the Danish king in an effort to foil or 
postpone its opening. A local politician remarked in a regional-assembly debate that 
Nationalbanken, situated far away in Copenhagen, was managed without any 
influence from either of the two duchies and that, as far as Schleswig-Holstein was 
concerned, it lacked ‘national character’.63 Monetary matters, he argued, were not just 
about money but were elements in an ongoing national struggle. 
In early 1843, Tiedemann, together with a group of like-minded 
compatriots, founded the Verein für die Errichtung einer schleswig-holsteinischen 
Landesbank [Society for the Creation of a Schleswig-Holsteinian Regional Bank] as a 
reaction against the projected Flensburg branch. Instead they proposed to establish a 
distinctly Schleswig-Holsteinian bank – a Landesbank – directly controlled by the 
regional assembly. The following years, Tiedemann continuously agitated for such an 
institution. In Tiedemann’s rhetoric Filialbanken was framed as a symbol of breached 
national integrity. ‘Would not the people of Schleswig-Holstein’, Tiedemann had 
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asked at the same assembly in 1842, ‘respond in a similarly unfavourable fashion as 
would the Belgians, if a London bank tried to establish a branch in their country?’64 
It must be clarified that Tiedemann, a key stakeholder in the potential 
Schleswig-Holsteinische Landesbank, had a personal economic interest in preventing 
Filialbanken from opening its doors. However, with this exact wording, Tiedemann 
framed the Filialbanken as a national (or anti-national) symbol, which drew 
sustenance from existing conceptualisations of the Schleswig-Holsteinian nation and 
its conflict with the Danish state. In doing so, even though Tiedemann might have 
been motivated by personal economic gain he simultaneously contributed to the 
symbolic construction of the Schleswig-Holstein community by supplying 
Nationalbanken with a specific anti-Schleswigian meaning. As such, economic 
interests and national rhetoric were intertwined and became mutually configuring. 
The plan for the Landesbank might have emerged out of economic interest, but as a 
national symbol the bank became an element in a broader discourse and helped 
sustain a nationalist ideology, from which entrepreneurial Schleswigian businessmen 
such as Tiedemann stood to gain. 
In the winter of 1843, Tiedemann, a gifted public orator, toured the region 
denouncing Nationalbanken and Danish economic and monetary policies in general 
while attempting to raise 1.25 million courant for the projected Landesbank. 
Speaking at more than 60 public meetings in a couple of months, Tiedemann 
successfully raised the required capital with subscriptions originating from all classes 
of society. 65  As Danish historian Schultz Hansen has shown, founding capital 
contributions to the Landesbank originated from all parts of Schleswig, not just from 
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the city of Flensburg.66 Based on this broad public interest it seems that Tiedemann 
had picked a symbol with a high degree of resonance within the general population. 
From an ethno-symbolic perspective, following the framework of Anthony D. Smith, 
the Landesbank project can be seen as an attempt to use existing antipathies against 
Nationalbanken to mobilise a new national symbol, the Landesbank, which could fill 
a financial void and at the same time serve as a powerful vehicle for cultural values. 
This mobilisation might have started out as an elitist project driven by economic gain, 
but the symbols seemed to invoke such a degree of popular resonance that they 
nourished a mass- movement rather than the mere rhetoric of a bourgeoisie 
Schleswig-Holstein elite. 
Tiedemann’s vision of the new Landesbank was that of a truly popular 
and national monetary institute with strong ties to the local community. In order to 
raise the necessary initial funds, Tiedemann originally proposed mandatory 
contributions from the population as a whole based on their proportional tax burden. 
The Landesbank-project had to gain popular support if it was to succeed. ‘It is my 
honest wish’, Tiedemann wrote: 
 
that the bank in question, which will carry the euphonious name, 
Landesbank, not only directly but also indirectly benefit the whole 
country [. . .] this will only be possible if every town, every hamlet, every 
manor and every village devotes itself to the above described foundation 
of the Landesbank.67 
 
The new Landesbank would serve two ends; as it satisfied the credit needs of the 
prudent businessman, it simultaneously illuminated the citizens’ Vaterlandsliebe – 
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patriotic love.68 In other words, the shareholders in the Landesbank would signal their 
love of country while meeting financial needs. 
There is a remarkable difference between the Landesbank project as 
envisioned by the Schleswigian nationalists and the way in which the landowners of 
Schleswig- Holstein were effectively alienated from Nationalbanken back in 1818. 
Tiedemann’s idea of enrolling every Schleswigian taxpayer in the Landesbank-
project contrasted with the foundation of Nationalbanken and the plan devised in 
1818 by the monetary commission. Whereas the somewhat opaque offer from the 
monetary commission in 1818 had de facto excluded the majority of the population in 
Schleswig-Holstein from becoming shareholders in Nationalbanken, the Landesbank-
project oriented itself – by offering a seemingly attractive economic alternative – 
towards an explicitly popular and integrating scope. Apparently, Tiedemann had 
learned the lesson from 1818 as he sought to tie his new bank to the national 
community, proposing that future dividends should be used to fund projects of local 
value such as road building and the regional assembly. 
In August 1843, another opponent of Filialbanken and member of the 
regional Schleswig assembly, Christian Rönnenkamp, published a strong critique of 
Filialbanken in the local newspaper, Flensburger Wochenblatt. 69  Rönnenkamp’s 
arguments were so popular that an anti branch parade was planned in his honour. 
Danishminded proponents quickly arranged a counter parade in favour of H.C. 
Jensen’s views. Accompanied by marching bands the crowd marched the streets and 
cheered for Jensen who ‘so bravely had defended the interest of the country and the 
city’.70 In the late afternoon, the two parades clashed in a veritable brawl resulting in 
several arrests. The debate, already heated and emotional, was intensified when 
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Wilhelm Beseler, at a public meeting accused Jensen of committing Vaterlandsverrat 
– treason – because of his pro-branch sentiments.71  
A local newspaper described in 1844 how new Landesbank shareholders 
did not subscribe to the bank because of the potential profits but ‘solely out of love 
for their country and to defend themselves from Rigsbank notes, which would flow to 
the region together with the new Flensburg branch’. 72  Even though the new 
shareholders were originally driven by economic incentives and the prospects of 
potential dividends, the Schleswig-Holstein Landesbank was framed as a symbol of 
patriotic love and defiance against the Danish currency and state. The notion that the 
people of Schleswig-Holstein had to ‘defend themselves against the Rigsbank notes’ 
designates the Landesbank and the Danish notes as the kind of boundary demarcating 
symbol described by Cohen. The new Landesbank shareholder did not merely buy 
into a private company, but was in fact at the same time subscribing to a distinct, 
national community, as the Landesbank came to symbolise the ‘love of country’. 
The Schleswig-Holstein nationalists under Tiedemann’s leadership were 
aware of the symbolic qualities of both the regional currency and bank, which were 
articulated as elements of a distinct Schleswig-Holstein nation. At a classical national 
sing-along,73 a so-called Liedertafel, in January 1843, with both Tiedemann, Beseler 
and G.F. Claussen attending, Schleswig politician Jacob Gülich defined the Danish 
monetary institutions as in direct opposition to the popular spirit of Schleswig-
Holstein: 
 
The strength of the people of Schleswig-Holstein [and the] determination 
and healthy 
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spirit that lives in our people has been defeated by the Danish currency, 
the Danish bank, and the Danish propaganda, together with certain anti-
national trends and inappropriate means.74 
 
Here, Gülich sought to use currency and bank to evoke the quasi-religious sentiments 
associated with nationalism. In doing so, he echoed Helleiner’s theoretical suggestion 
that currencies play into a national faith and spiritual unity of the nation.75 With these 
remarks Gülich articulated Nationalbanken and the Danish currency as symbols of an 
explicit anti-Schleswig-Holsteinism with the capacity to erode the popular spirit of 
the region, and delineating the borders between two opposite national communities. 
Gülich actively sought to redefine them as boundary symbols that marked both a 
cultural and political differentiation between the Danish kingdom and the duchies of 
Schleswig-Holstein. 
In May 1844, Filialbanken opened its doors for the first time. Just prior to 
the inauguration of the Flensburg branch, Tiedemann successfully established a 
private banking company as a predecessor to the projected Landesbank. The 
Flensburg branch bank became a contested symbol of Danish nationalism and the 
imperialistic efforts of the central government. It was really no wonder, as a group of 
Landesbank-proponents declared in 1845, that ‘Nationalbanken, its mockery of a 
paper currency and its unit of account gradually developed into  loathed objects 
within the duchies’. 76  The agitation against Filialbanken framed in romanticist 
rhetoric successfully established the branch as a contested symbol within Schleswig. 
The enmity was clear to the branch employees as well; in 1844 a local Filialbanken 
accountant reported back to headquarters in Copenhagen and described the ‘pure 
hatred and malice’ that has been mobilised against the new bank.77 
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6. A fictitious currency 
The Rigsbank formed in 1813 – and later Nationalbanken – controlled coinage 
through the mints in Copenhagen and Altona. Initially the Copenhagen mint 
produced rigsbankdaler tokens made of copper. These were only produced in  
Copenhagen since they were meant to circulate in the kingdom but not in the 
Duchies, while the Altona mint continued to supply coins for the silver based 
circulation in Schleswig-Holstein.78 However, ever since the state bankruptcy of 1813 
Danish politicians had pondered how to implement one homogeneous currency in all 
regions including the southern duchies.79 This drive towards monetary unification 
was by no means a unique Danish phenomenon. The goal was common to political 
elites all around Europe who were motivated by the prospects of trade integration, 
seigniorage, and controlling fiscal policies.80 In the case of Denmark, the government 
also considered monetary unification a strategic tool to reduce the economic and 
political influence of Hamburg and Lübeck. 
From 1833 the Department of Finance (Finansdeputationen) actively 
pursued a strategy of diminishing the courant circulation. In an attempt to promote 
the rigsbankdaler, authorities established a secret programme intended to displace the 
courant. Without attracting public attention, more than five million courant in large 
and smaller coins were successfully remelted in Altona and Copenhagen between 
1833 and 1848,81 and the withdrawal of the courant accelerated especially after the 
Rigsbank notes reached silver par in 1838. In comparison, the two mints produced 
between 18 and 20 million rigsbankdaler as main coin. The majority of these coins 
(around 12 million) were minted in Altona.82 The circulation of rigsdaler banknotes 
within the duchies remained limited until 1845, when it slowly started to increase.83 
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Schleswig-Holstein politicians argued strongly against the consolidation 
of Helstaten’s monetary system, contending that people generally accounted in 
courant and that a shift in the monetary regime would foster a widespread distrust of 
Danish representatives. In the duchies, they reasoned, the money of Nationalbanken 
was nothing but ‘eine fingierte Müntze’ – a fictitious currency – that overburdened 
the local population.84 In 1838, the Schleswigian regional council proposed that the 
Danish authorities declare the courant the official unit of account, but the government 
in Copenhagen government eventually denied the request due to ‘general state 
concerns’.85 
Gradually, as national tensions increased from the 1830s and onward the 
‘currency question’, as it was often labelled, became laden with nationalistic rhetoric. 
Adherence to one currency often defined and articulated national sympathies. Public 
interest in this question proved immense; in some towns, societies were formed for 
the sole purpose of preventing the circulation of Danish rigsbankdaler.86 In 1842, 
more than 70 local merchants in the city of Tønder signed a declaration denouncing 
Danish currency, pledging that they, from now on, would only do business in courant 
from Hamburg and Lübeck.87 
It is clear that the Schleswig-Holsteinian merchant elite had a paramount 
interest in preserving their distinct monetary system, which linked them to their main 
trading-partners in the German cities of Hamburg and Lübeck. These obvious 
economic interests were not understated by the Schleswig-Holsteinian elite but were 
overtly and repeatedly brought forth as an argument to resist Danish financial and 
monetary policies, by for example the aforementioned agitators Dahlmann in 1814 
and later by Johann C. Ravit in 1848.88 However, elitist myth-making efforts are 
bound up in existing conceptualisations of the nation and its symbolic repertoire. So, 
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even if the rhetoric of the Schleswig-Holsteinian bourgeoisie was – at least initially – 
motivated by economic interests, this rhetoric built on existing myths and then 
gradually entwined in a nationalist discourse to the point where the economic 
motivations and national sentiments became, if not undistinguishable, then at least 
configured into a mutual relationship. The currencies were rhetorically framed and 
juxtaposed to embody certain nationalist ideologies. 
In 1838 August Flor, a politician, professor of Danish literature in Kiel 
and a strong proponent of a unified Danish state, wrote an emotional pamphlet in 
defence of the rigsbankdaler as unit of account (Flor later became an influential 
figure in the development of Danish national romantic nationalism. He was part of 
the Danish constitutional assembly in 1848 and served at member of the Counsel of 
State from 1856). According to Flor, who realised that existing social tensions within 
the duchies could be used for national mobilisation,89 critics of the existing monetary 
order of dual currencies were often accused of being ‘servile and unpatriotic’; 
accordingly he claimed that his pamphlet was motivated by the ‘unjust and hateful’ 
statements made by local journalists and publicists against the rigsbankdaler.90 With a 
flair for the dramatic, Flor introduced his defence by quoting the sixth-century bishop 
of Seville, Isidorus, ‘Unus imperator, una lex, una moneta’ thereby setting the scene 
for a confrontation with the liberals of Schleswig-Holstein who  wished preserve their 
distinct currency. Flor’s final contribution was a strategy for eradicating all foreign 
currencies within the duchies and implementing a single homogeneous Danish 
currency; after one month’s notice, all foreign coins were to be confiscated ‘without 
the slightest compassion or mercy’ and remelted into Danish rigsbankdaler.91 These 
proposals were obviously not solely based on rational calculations and his 
suggestions and analysis must be viewed in the context of his ideal of a unified 
Danish state and his explicit agenda of Danish nationalism. Flor overtly promoted his 
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ideas as editor of the Danish-minded Schleswigian newspaper Dannevirke, founded 
in 1838, whose name referred to an ancient fortification in southern Schleswig 
constructed in 737 to defend Denmark against the Frankish Empire. 
In 1842, as a culmination of the gradual and secret elimination of the 
courant, the Danish Department of Finance presented the regional assemblies of the 
duchies with a proposal to abolish the dual-currency system once and for all. 
However, the gradually diminishing circulation of the courant had not mitigated 
attitudes towards the rigsbankdaler. Instead the regional assemblies approved a 
counter-proposal; that the rigsbankdaler be abolished in the duchies. One major 
concern cited by regional assembly members was the difficult calculations needed to 
convert courant into rigsbankdaler.92 One regional representative argued that ‘the 
new homogenisation only served as means to exploit the duchies through the 
Flensborg Filialbank’.93 Others remarked that the aspirations of the government in 
Copenhagen would prove futile since the resulting difficulties in calculating from 
courant to rigsbankdaler would result in a ‘hatred’ of the new monetary system.94 
 
6.1. Quell the rebellion with Danish money and language 
When civil a war for Schleswigian independence eventually erupted in March 1848, 
it took the newly established Schleswigian government only three days to abolish the 
currency issued by Nationalbanken.95 Not only did the new authorities abolish Danish 
rigsbankdaler, they made sure that even postage was accounted in courant instead of 
rigsbankdaler. This was done explicitly ‘in view of the existing aversion towards the 
Danish coins prevalent in Schleswig’, as articulated in the official decree.96 When 
they had defeated Schleswigian aspirations for independence in the First War of 
Schleswig (1848-1851), Danish politicians once again turned to the question of 
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monetary integration of the duchies. In November 1853, the Danish minister of 
finance, and later director of Nationalbanken, W.C.E. Sponneck, introduced to 
parliament a bill to homogenise the currency system of Schleswig, Holstein and the 
rest of the Danish kingdom. Sponneck introduced the bill as nothing more than a 
change of the name of the currency, in order to ‘pave the way for a solution on the 
crucial issue of establishing a true and genuine currency throughout the whole 
kingdom’, 97  Sponneck proposed to change the currency from ‘rigsbankdaler’ to 
‘rigsdaler’. By omitting the reference to the central bank he was most likely 
attempting to counter local resistance to the currency. However, as some members of 
parliament suggested during the debate, the law had implications that went beyond 
mere semantics.98 It was in fact a question of local sovereignty and of the territorial 
integrity of the Danish state. By leaving out the word ‘bank’ in the new name, 
semantically, the currency shifted from being a bourgeois symbol connected to a 
specific bank and was instead transformed into a state-oriented symbol that only 
referred to the kingdom (the word rigs meaning realm or kingdom). 
The monetary law was passed on 10 December 1854 and made the new 
Danish rigsdaler the only legal tender in both Schleswig and Holstein. The law went 
into effect on 1 April, but courant and various coins from Lübeck and Hamburg 
continued to circulate in Schleswig and Holstein. The Haderslev-based and loyalist 
newspaper Dannevirke remarked on 14 April that nothing seemed to have changed 
but a small depreciation of the existing courant and other foreign coins. According to 
Dannevirke, local inns, bakers, grocers and contractors gladly did business in courant 
without the slightest concern for the new legislation. If people did not voluntarily 
embrace the new currency, Dannevirke argued, the government would be forced to 
coerce the circulation of the rigsdaler: ‘As long as the government does not use its 
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stick, we will never learn [. . .] no one here is afraid of mere legislation – harsher 
methods are necessary’.99 
In the following years Danish politicians did in fact, with limited success, 
increase efforts to homogenise the currency system and suppress competing 
currencies. Following a proposal made by Moritz Levy (Department of finance envoy 
to the Altona mint and later governor of Nationalbanken), Danish troops on the 
Holstein border were paid part of their allowance in small coin. Soldiers were 
instructed to keep and hand over to the authorities any courant coins they received in 
change.100 A steady flow of legislation was devised by the central government in 
order to implement and naturalise the new currency and the government repeatedly 
stressed through decrees and legislation that any kind of goods or merchandise, 
throughout the kingdom, was to be listed in rigsdaler.101 Schools were instructed only 
to use rigsdaler as unit of account in calculus classes, and pupils were to be told that 
rigsdaler were the only official legal tender of the state.102  Police authorities in 
Holstein were instructed to confiscate any courant,103 and local government officials 
were threatened with suspension if they did not, with ‘due zealousness’ ensure the 
swift introduction of the new state-sanctioned currency.104 The monetary transition 
did not come about as smoothly as parliament might have hoped. Schleswigian 
courant continued to circulate in the duchies and the Danish Minister of Finance had 
to postpone the scheduled phase-out of the courant.105 
Danish officials considered the currency question crucial to the stability 
and integrity of the state. Even though the rigsdaler had not overtly been construed as 
a national symbol, as the courant was in the duchies, the implementation of the new 
rigsdaler was indeed important in consolidating the Danish state. In 1855, the 
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permanent secretary of the Ministry of Finance, Edvard Collin, wrote a staunch 
defence of the rigsdaler and of the policies of his superior, Sponneck. Collin blamed 
Schleswig-Holsteinian representatives for ‘defending a worn out currency with worn 
out phrases’.106 The new currency was in fact not, claimed Collin, an attempt on the 
part of the Danish government to conduct cultural policy and make the duchies more 
Danish.107 The currency law of 1854 should merely be considered an attempt by the 
state to assert its currency monopoly and reach ‘the natural state of any monetary 
system’, i.e., one country with only one circulating, legal currency.108 Collin argued 
that the inhabitants of Schleswig would soon enough come to appreciate the benefits 
of a single homogeneous currency. Eventually people in the duchies would ‘Come to 
cherish and uphold the currency. Then, eventually, the good cause will have 
prevailed. For [the currency] might be initiated and promoted by the executive 
branch, but it must be supported and protected by the people’.109 
The people of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein never really 
supported nor protected the Danish currency as Collin had imagined. On the contrary, 
the currency continued to serve as a symbol of Danish supremacy and cultural 
influence, while the local currency became a sign of defiance and patriotism. In 1856 
Moritz Levy, now commissioned to the Altona mint as a silver-trader, noted that the 
rigsdaler had become ‘a commodity in its own home – in relation to the Prussian 
thaler – while it should rightfully have been the other way around’.110 The rigsdaler, 
which was meant to circulate freely in its natural ‘home’ (Denmark and the duchies), 
had been stifled by the intruding Prussian thaler. 
In 1860 Fædrelandet, another loyalist newspaper, remarked regretfully 
that even though the legal tender was officially rigsdaler, nothing had really changed 
in southern Schleswig. In the cities, local merchants sometimes did business in 
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rigsdaler with Danish customers, but in the countryside the locals clung to the 
courant. The paper proposed that the Danish government mobilise all available 
resources to quell the nascent rebellion in Schleswig. To this end, government 
officials were to impose Danish language and the Danish rigsdaler on the duchy. 
Thus, the newspaper explicitly drew a parallel between language and money, both 
considered potent political tools with which to reintegrate Schleswig into the 
kingdom.111 
The reintegration of Schleswig-Holstein that Fædrelandet had hoped for 
never took place; neither did the creation of a homogeneous territorial currency. By 
the time the final war broke out in 1864, Prussian thaler had become the most 
commonly used currency in the German minded parts of the region.112 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
In this article, I have demonstrated how the state-sanctioned rigsbankdaler (later 
rigsdaler) vis-à-vis the regional courant of Schleswig-Holstein, became a signifier of 
national allegiance during the national conflict. Similarly, the Danish central bank, 
Nationalbanken, and its opposite the Landesbank of Schleswig-Holstein were 
mobilised as symbols of national community. These findings parallel and develop 
existing ideas within the literature on nations and money. In particular, the 
romanticist rhetoric invoked over courant and rigsdaler substantiates the suggestion 
that monetary organisation coalesces with the quasi-religious sentiments and 
perceptions of a shared national faith often associated with nationalism.113 Also, the 
article expands on the idea of rational calculations of economic gain as being 
important for individual identification with different national communities.114 
                                                                
111 Fædrelandet, ‘Hvad der kan’ (1860), 365-366. 
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I have shown how Schleswig-Holsteinian elites, who had a particular 
economic interest in preserving the monetary status quo, successfully fused monetary 
organisation with romanticist ideas of the nation as an eternal community, the 
presence of a unique national spirit, and an emotional faith in the nation. In so doing, 
they mobilised banks and currencies as national symbols. Instead of being a mere 
question of economic statism, the bank and currency debates were permeated by a 
distinct form of ‘monetary romanticism’. Love of country, the popular spirit and 
national character of Schleswig-Holstein were framed as elements directly connected 
to the regional monetary system. The romanticist rhetoric, which might originally 
have been motivated by economic interests, took on a form of its own and developed 
into a hybridisation of economy and nationalist ideology. Even though similar 
tendencies can be observed on the Danish side, most prominently in the work of 
August Flor, the rhetoric never really reached the same nationalist heights. As it 
turned out, in his attempt to frame the rigsbankdaler as Helstaten’s only rightful 
currency Flor seemed to have reinforced the currency dichotomy and strengthened 
the courant as a Schleswig-Holsteinian symbol. Indeed, it proved impossible for the 
Danish policy-makers to control the meaning of the different currencies. 
The Danish currency was actively applied as a measure to consolidate 
Helstaten and to reintegrate the separatist duchies of Schleswig-Holstein. Countering 
these aspirations, Schleswig- Holstein liberals successfully turned loyalty to local 
monetary institutions into a question of regional loyalty and a display of patriotism. 
Danish policy-makers’ attempt to impose the state currency in a territorially disputed 
region underlines how a currency can be used as an instrument to claim a certain 
region as part of the state. However, the highly emotional debate surrounding the 
implementation of Danish currency in Schleswig-Holstein illustrates how monetary 
institutions and nationalism are potentially interconnected. Instead of reintegrating 
Schleswig-Holstein in Helstaten the currency monopoly unintentionally contributed 
to positioning the existing local currency as a symbol of regional alliance. Similarly, 
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the regional branch of the Danish central bank became a highly controversial symbol 
of Danish supremacy. This case shows that although monetary policy can be used as 
a nation-building tool, its success depends on the specific meaning attributed to 
national and regional monetary institutions. 
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Abstract 
In this article, I analyse the political debate leading up to the Danish euro referendum 
in 2000. I show how the euro-positive government unintentionally reinforced the 
arguments of the euro-sceptics by framing the euro as something belonging to the 
nation-state. I argue that this paradoxical campaign strategy stems from the Danish 
conceptualisation of nation and state and from the close connection between national 
currencies and feelings of community and citizenship more general. The analysis 
confirms the suggestion made by Gilbert that new monetary organisation, such as 
European Monetary Union, potentially reconfigures the feelings of belonging, 
popular sovereignty and social welfare rights. 
 
1. Introduction 
On the evening of 28 September 2000, a 53.1 per cent majority of the Danish 
electorate rejected a proposal to introduce the European currency within Danish 
borders. The decision constituted a serious blow to members of the political 
establishment who had invested many resources and prestige in convincing the 
population to vote affirmatively. Prior to the referendum, Europhiles and 
Eurosceptics had campaigned intensely to sway the electorate to either embrace or 
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reject the euro. However, as it turned out, the Danish population, in general, did not 
share the euro-enthusiasm of the members of parliament and the political 
establishment. In the end, they turned down the common currency. 
Throughout the political debate which led to the Danish euro referendum 
of 2000, the close connection between the national Danish currency and ideas of 
national community became defining elements that framed the rhetorical possibilities 
of Europhiles and Eurosceptics. Both the political parties and grassroots organisations 
rejecting the common currency and the euro-positive parties in government framed 
the concept of currency as something belonging to the nation-state. The staunch 
Europhile Minister of Economic Affairs, Marianne Jelved, even planned and 
endorsed a small publication speaking of the ‘Danish euro coin’ thereby using the 
very same discursive strategy as the eurosceptic parties. The ministry actively sought 
to frame something, as intrinsically novel and supranational as the common currency, 
as nothing but a natural (and national) continuance of Danish monetary history. 
In this article, I examine the debate culminating in the euro referendum 
and show how identical rhetorical strategies in the Danish euro debate were adapted 
to diametrically opposed political purposes as the Danish Ministry of Economic 
Affairs sought to tie the euro to the Danish nation. I argue that this apparent paradox 
stems from the connection between national currencies and issues of national identity 
and community. I draw on the proposals of Gilbert (2007) in particular to 
conceptualise the currency–identity interrelation and use the Danish debate as an 
exemplary case of one whose rhetorical premise was defined by this relationship. The 
analysis shows that national belonging, political sovereignty and social welfare rights 
were key elements of the Danish euro debate, highlighted by the political elites in an 
effort to strike a chord within the population. The findings also underline Gilbert's 
point about the close relationship between citizenship and monetary organisation. In 
fact, in the Danish case, this relationship proved to be so strong that proponents of the 
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euro failed to articulate the euro as something that transcended the logics of the 
nation-state. 
The article is organised as follows: this introduction will be followed by 
an examination of the existing research on money and national identity in order to 
inform the forthcoming analysis. In Section 3, I reflect on empirical sources and 
outline an analytical strategy and in Section 4, I briefly contextualise the Danish euro 
referendum. Section 5 constitutes the empirical analysis of the different rhetorical 
strategies in the debate which tended to tie the Danish currency to issues of collective 
history and origin, sovereignty, and social rights. In the last section (Section 6), I 
conclude on the analysis and argue that the construction of the conceptual oxymoron, 
the Danish euro, can be explained by the connection between national currencies and 
issues of community and identity and by the specific Danish interpretation of nation 
and state that constrained the rhetorical options of the political elite who sought to 
change monetary organisation. 
 
2. Currencies, nations and identity 
In an increasingly globalised world, it still seems, as argued by Ingham (2004, p. 57), 
that monetary space is sovereign space and that currencies continue to co-configure 
territories and states, as well as to play a constitutive part in the formation of the 
national identity of the mass public within these states (Helleiner, 1998, 2003). As a 
consequence, the interrelation between national currencies and national identities has 
a substantial impact on the political aspirations of monetary unions. As Gilbert (2007) 
has argued, the restructuring of monetary organisation must take into account the 
constitutive relationship between currencies and citizenship. Monetary unions, 
whether North American or European, substantially reconfigure the three key 
elements of national citizenship. Specifically, they change the idea of political 
belonging and membership of a nation-state, alter the sense of political sovereignty 
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and accountability, and potentially weaken monetary organisation as an instrument to 
secure social citizens' rights (Gilbert, 2007, p. 155). 
The past two decades have seen an increasing volume of literature on 
currencies and nation-states. The identity-cultivating qualities of national currencies 
have been acknowledged by various scholars – most prominently Polanyi (1957, p. 
205), Hobsbawm (1983, p. 281), Billig (1995, p. 41) and Pointon (1998). Today, the 
idea of a co-configuration between national currencies and national identity appears 
academically uncontroversial. A broad range of studies have shown that currencies 
work in different ways to create identity and to co-configure national community. 
Some scholars have focused on the imagery displayed on notes and coins, including 
Gilbert (1998, 1999), Hewitt (1999), Mwangi (2002), Unwin and Hewitt (2001, 
2004), Raento, Hämäläinen, Ikonen, and Mikkonen (2004), Berezin (2006), Hymans 
(2006), Lauer (2008), Hawkins (2010), Wallach (2011) and Penrose (2011). Hymans 
(2006) and Berezin (2006), in particular, point to the careful considerations of the 
European Commission that went into the design and iconography of the new 
European currency. The European Commission explicitly viewed new euro 
banknotes as powerful symbols that would help cultivate a new European identity. In 
contrast, all European countries were given the opportunity to mint coins with 
national motives. This symbolic separation between coins and paper money, relates to 
a more general distinction between coins which were traditionally used as commodity 
money and banknotes, which are intrinsically worthless and hold value more on the 
perceived trust in the issuing authority. For more on this discussion, see Carruthers 
and Babb (1996), Davies (2002) and Lauer (2008). 
More quantitatively oriented studies have taken the advantage of 
Eurobarometer statistics and data from various euro referenda to test the relation 
between currency and identity. For example, Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knope, and 
Roscher (1999) and Risse (2006) describe how geographical variations in public 
attitudes towards the euro can be explained by differences in collective understanding 
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and in patterns of identifying with Europe and the nation-state. Studies based on 
Eurobarometer data show how national identity (or the fear of losing it) vis-à-vis 
European identity can account for public attitudes towards the common currency 
(Anderson, 2006; Carey, 2002; Christin & Trechsel, 2002; Kaltenthaler & Anderson, 
2001, p. 163). An example of such an analysis is Jupille and Leblang's study from 
2007. Here, the authors draw on the Danish euro referendum in 2000 and the Swedish 
referendum in 2002 to show how affiliation to community negatively correlates with 
support for the euro. While the Swedish decision to reject the euro was primarily 
based on rational calculation and the potential disadvantages of switching to a fixed 
exchange rate regime, Danish voters seemed to base their decision more on the 
prospect of weakening national community. 
Many scholars have acknowledged the symbolic importance of money, 
beyond considerations of iconography, and have sought to understand the currency–
identity relationship and the political economy of the monetary unions (Cohen, 1998; 
Marcussen & Zølner, 2001, 2003; Kaelberer, 2004; Gilbert, 2005; Marcussen, 2005; 
Helleiner, 2006; Anderson, 2006;). Kaelberer (2004, p. 11), for example, points to the 
institutionalised trust of modern societies that sustains a monetary system and 
contends that trust constitutes a far more important element than iconography in the 
currency–identity relationship. In a Danish context, Marcussen and Zølner have 
shown how Danish attitudes towards the euro were informed by certain foundational 
myths about what constituted the Danish nation. The protagonists in the Danish euro 
debate were constrained by a set of informal rules that restricted the rhetorical 
possibilities of Danish political elites (Marcussen & Zølner, 2003, p. 102). 
One of these fundamental myths relates to the concepts of ‘nation’ and 
‘state’ which, due to specific historical circumstances, are almost inseparable in the 
Danish context. In the period from the late eighteenth century until 1864, the Danish 
state underwent a transformation from constituting a large conglomerate state to a 
small and culturally heterogeneous nation-state. In the same period, most Danish 
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historians agree that the traditional state-centred patriotism developed into a 
nationalist ideology with Danish language and culture as common denominators (see 
for instance Damsholt, 2003; Lyngby, 2001; Rerup, 1991).115 In 1848, at the outbreak 
of the First War of Schleswig, Danish nationalism had morphed from an elitist idea to 
a mass phenomenon (Brincker, 2003, p. 419). Although disagreement exists about the 
transition from cosmopolitan patriotism to Danish nationalism most historians point 
to the loss of Norway and the Southern duchies of Schleswig and Holstein as 
formative events in the development of Danish nationalism. 
When Danish territory in 1814 and again in 1864 was significantly 
diminished, the Danish nation had to redefine itself. This reconfiguration was 
characterised by what is commonly known as the ‘inward turn’ (Adriansen, 2003, p. 
275). Danish politicians and writers advocated a kind of cultural nation in which the 
people were imagined to possess a natural bond to the true nature of the nation. 
Language, birth and Danish culture became key aspects of what constituted the 
national community. Since 1864, the Danish perception of ‘nation’ and ‘state’ has 
been influenced by this congenital cultural view (Hansen & Wæver, 2002, p. 58). 
Following the inward turn, ‘the people’ – understood as the ‘nation’ – 
became an influential linguistic category in the construction of the Danish national 
identity. Echoing Herder's perception of the Volk, both conservatives and liberals 
claimed that the true meaning of the nation was to be found in the common people, 
who were defined by opposition to the ruling elites. Hence, ‘the people’ was 
institutionalised as a meaningful categorisation which gained a privileged position 
over the political elite. As such, in the Danish context, the concepts of ‘nation’ and 
‘state’ are very much overlapping – but the idea of the ‘nation’ carries an inherent 
antielitist potential that can be readily articulated if the state-elite fails to appear 
legitimate (Hansen, 2001, pp. 118–119). Consequently, in a legitimising effort, many 
                                                                
115 Not all Danish historians agree on this temporal distinction between patriotism and nationalism. Feldbæk (1991, 1996) argues for the existence of 
a distinct Danish national identity that preceded the early modern period. For a comprehensive review of Danish historians' attempts to date the 
Danish nation, see Brincker (2009). 
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Danish institutions and organisations have semantically associated themselves with 
‘the people’, as have many political parties and, most relevantly in the context of this 
article, the People's Movement Against the European Union (PMAEU), an anti-EU 
umbrella organisation that coordinated the anti-euro campaign in 2000. 
The potential distance between ‘the elite’ and ‘the people’, in the Danish 
context, raises considerable challenges for Danish political elites trying to convince 
the electorate to support specific policies, especially regarding the common currency, 
which is closely related to conceptualisations about the nation. As Marcussen and 
Zølner (2003, p. 102-103) put it, ‘the challenge for the [European Monetary Union] 
EMU-supporting elites is that the EMU cannot be ‘sold’ in Denmark if it is framed as 
an elitist project based on elitist ideas'. 
 
3. Data and analytical strategy 
The goal of this article is to analyse how the EMU-supporting elites sought to 
overcome this dilemma and ‘sell’ the common currency to the Danish public, and to 
analyse how Eurosceptics tried to convince Danes to refrain from buying it. To do 
this, I analyse the different rhetorical strategies applied in the 2000 referendum. 
As Bruner (2011, p. 404) recently argued, in this journal, all human 
subjectivity is inherently rhetorical because it presupposes the translation of 
‘symbolic worlds’. 116  Public memory and our sense of collectivity do not reside 
within the individual. Instead, these phenomena arise through a process of 
interpreting symbols and signs, and the way such symbols are employed, either to 
foster cooperation, to achieve understanding, or to offer dissent (Phillips, 2004, p. 3). 
It is through this interpretive process of our symbolic environment that we are able to 
make sense of our surroundings and conduct ourselves accordingly. This 
interpretation needs rhetoric as mediator. According to Bruner (2011, p. 403), 
                                                                
116 See Bruner (2005, 2011) for a comprehensive review on rhetorical analysis and national identity construction, and the apparent gap between U.S. 
scholars of rhetoric and European studies of national identity. 
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perceptions of national community ‘come to life through the medium of rhetoric, or 
the incessant clash of relatively persuasive discourses’. 
Following these ideas, the below analysis of the Danish euro debate can 
be described as a rhetorical analysis. It constitutes an investigation of claims and the 
underlying assumptions and backings that sustain these claims (Toulmin, 2008). The 
analysis is inspired by the works of authors such as Blair, Jeppeson, and Pucci 
(1991), Carrier (2000) and Cionea (2007) that include both the analysis of semiotic 
elements and the different rhetorical negotiations, articulated in public and political 
spheres. I aim at an inclusive understanding of rhetoric that encompasses a larger 
symbolic environment that is understood as a conglomerate of both speech and 
symbols. Lately, studies of the banal nationalism of visual culture have accented the 
importance of symbols in the configuration of ‘state’ and ‘nation’ Raento & Brunn, 
(2005, 2008). In particular, Cionea's (2007, pp. 89–91) concept of ‘visual rhetoric’ 
proves useful in the context of a political campaign analysis in which images and 
symbols printed on posters and pamphlets are presented in concert with traditional 
speech. According to Cionea, visual symbols such as flags and monuments have a 
rhetorical function and must be considered elements of a broader nationalist discourse 
that covers both speech and symbols. Similarly, in their seminal article on the 
commemorative qualities of the Vietnam War Memorial, Blair et al. (1991) speak of 
the ‘rhetoric of the Memorial’. Here, the term ‘rhetoric’ is to be understood in broad 
sense to encompass a range of symbolic practices. 
I use the above insight to argue that an analysis of the Danish euro debate 
pertaining to the relationship between national currency and national community 
must include a reading of the visual illustrations and symbols that often accompanied 
different campaign texts. The broad definition of rhetoric sketched above allows for 
such an analysis – one that is sensitive to the meanings of visual symbols as well as 
ordinary text. The analysis is performed as a close reading of the different campaign 
publications in order to identify the different narratives about the national community 
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that were evoked in the debate. I focus on how these narratives are used as 
inventional resources that provide backing for claims made about the Danish 
currency and the euro. This is done in order to understand the currency–identity 
relationship and to suggest its implications on the possibilities of reconfiguring 
national monetary organisation. I do not pretend that the rhetorical strategies 
identified can be formally generalised into a well-defined model of monetary-identity 
cultivation. The analysis describes how they were expressed in the Danish context, 
formed by distinct historical developments. However, although the analysis reveals 
insights into Danish attitudes towards the euro, the ultimate goal is to understand how 
transnational currency organisation relates to ideas of national monies. 
Also, by ‘rhetorical’, I do not just mean the analysis of intentional speech. 
Even though the analyses focus on how the political actors tried to persuade the 
Danish electorate, I also aim to highlight the unintentional variety of rhetoric 
articulated in the Danish euro debate. By using the phrase ‘unintentional’, I stress that 
rhetorical actors are always bound up in existing identity constructions that set the 
frame for what can be considered legitimate statements about the national 
community. Such a view on subjects being interpellated by discourse is inspired by 
the works of Althusser (1971), Charland (1987) and Hall (1985). To be sure, not 
anything goes, when it comes to rhetorical strategies about nationhood. Instead, 
prevailing discourses constitute subjects and define limits of possible statements 
(Bruner, 2000, p. 162). Existing narratives of citizenship tend to constrain the public 
articulations of national identity, as public speakers are potentially punished if they 
transgress these boundaries (Bruner, 2005, p. 314). Instead, identity entrepreneurs 
pursuing policies that seek to reshape identities beyond the nation, must assemble 
these new political identities out of an existing pool of cultural resources (McGee, 
1975; Smith, 1991, p. 171). 
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3.1. Campaign material 
The empirical material consists primarily of campaign material from the various 
political parties and groups that engaged in public debate prior to the 2000 
referendum. I obtained the material from a number of sources. First, I gathered 
materials directly from the eight national political parties and from the archive of the 
eurosceptic umbrella organisation, PMAEU, which sought to collect all printed 
materials used in the campaign. Furthermore, I made a query to the Danish Ministry 
of Economic Affairs to obtain all relevant campaign material produced by the 
ministry prior to the referendum. Unlike the political parties, the ministry was subject 
to the Access to Public Administration Files Act of 1985, which afforded access to a 
15-page internal strategy paper from the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Finally, I 
used the website of the eurosceptic Danish People's Party (DPP), which was designed 
as part of their campaign to preserve the Danish currency. Taken together, these 
different sources cover the full spectrum of opinion in Denmark, at least as expressed 
within the mainstream. 
Altogether, I collected 36 pieces of campaign material (folders, 
pamphlets, brochures and the internal strategy paper) ranging from 1 to 15 pages. 
This might, at a first glance, seem a surprisingly limited number of publications, 
considering that the campaign lasted several months (from June until late September 
2000) with a broad range of participants. However, while the yes-parties primarily 
produced their own material, most of the no-parties and organisations delegated this 
task to the umbrella organisation, PMAEU, which produced the bulk of the 
eurosceptic campaign material. I read this material alongside the newspaper coverage 
published during the campaign period in the major national dailies across the political 
spectrum. I searched specifically for articles that pertained directly to the campaign 
materials collected. Most likely, my material does not include every single piece of 
campaign material produced prior to the referendum, as no central archive exists that 
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contains the complete data. Some publications may have eluded me, either because 
the parties failed to hand over all of their material, or because some materials were 
simply not preserved. However, as the aim of the article is to investigate the national 
identity–currency relationship in a Danish context, I contend that the 2000 euro 
debate, indeed, is the place to direct such an inquiry. A debate over abandoning 
national money is, for lack of a better word, the empirical ‘ground zero’ for 
articulations on currency and identity. Thus, even if my collection of campaign 
material should prove incomplete, it is still sufficiently comprehensive to identify 
different rhetorical trends and pattern, and it constitutes, in any case, a most 
promising empirical entry to the study of Danish attitudes towards the euro. 
 
4. Contextualising the Danish euro debate 
During the past 20 years, the Danish public has repeatedly debated the issue of 
joining the EMU. However, Danish opposition to the euro has been significant since 
the idea was originally introduced in the beginning of the 1990s and has grown in 
recent years as a consequence of the increasing monetary turbulence in the Eurozone 
(Ritzau, 2011). In the 1992 referendum, 50.7 per cent of Danish voters rejected the 
Maastricht Treaty, whose goal was to strengthen further European integration. As a 
consequence, the Danish parliament agreed on a national compromise, which 
included a number of conditions for Danish support of the Maastricht Treaty. The 
conditions were presented at a summit in Edinburgh at the end of 1992, and were 
codified in four Danish opt outs to the Edinburgh Agreement, including Denmark's 
right to refuse participation in a common EU currency (Abildgren, 2010, p. 210). In a 
second referendum held in May 1993, a majority of voters accepted the new 
conditions of the Edinburgh Agreement. The Danish government was now able to 
ratify the Maastricht Treaty. Still, along with Britain, Denmark refused to join the 
third phase of the EMU and to introduce the common European currency. Despite the 
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Danish opt outs of 1993 and considerable popular euroscepticism, Danish Prime 
Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen announced another referendum to be held in 2000. 
Simultaneously, the government presented a bill in parliament which meant that 
Denmark – in case the outcome of the referendum was positive – could join the 
Eurozone and adopt the euro as legal tender in 2004 (Abildgren, 2010, p. 214). 
 
4.1. The reluctant Europeans 
At the time of the 2000 referendum, the pro-EMU parties controlled a total of 140 of 
the 179 seats in Danish Parliament. Only five smaller parties actively campaigned for 
a negative vote. The official no-parties included the right-wing DPP (13 seats) and 
Progress Party (5 seats); the left-wing Socialist People's Party (13 seats) and Red-
Green Alliance (4 seats); and the centre-right Christian People's Party (4 seats). The 
DPP and its outspoken leader Pia Kjærsgaard turned to arguments of Danish 
sovereignty, history and traditions in an attempt to preserve the national currency. 
However, the party was considered, at the time, very nationalistic and had been quite 
marginalised by the established parties who rejected its nationalist ideology and 
immigration-critical attitude as being ‘unethical’ (Ritzau, 1999).117 The two left-wing 
parties, the socialists and the red-green alliance used more economically based 
arguments pointing to the potential risks facing the Danish welfare system if the euro 
was implemented. All the other parties (except for the small Christian People's Party), 
including the Social Democratic Party and the Social Liberal Party, which together 
formed the Danish government, publicly campaigned for the euro. Though an 
overwhelming majority of the political establishment was very much in favour of the 
common currency, the voters who supported these parties did not agree with their 
pro-euro stance. 
                                                                
117 One year earlier, in 1999, Danish social democratic Prime Minister Poul Nyrup had excluded the DPP from budget 
negotiations, arguing that they would “never become housebroken” and that the party's “ethical principals” would never 
be accepted in a Danish context (Ritzau, 1999). 
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The EMU opposition, comprised of nine different official organisations, 
was characterised by a remarkable political pluralism, ranging from classical socialist 
to more national-conservative Eurosceptics. In addition to the parties in support of the 
Danish government, proponents of the euro included a range of different public 
figures. The government drew heavily on its ministerial resources in the production 
of EU-friendly campaign materials. Both campaigns used well-known and revered 
popular figures to present their arguments, wrote opinion pieces and feature articles, 
distributed campaign materials, organised public meetings and arranged various 
happenings. 
Even though a large political majority backed the introduction of the euro, 
Danes, as a whole, were not seduced by the promised blessings of the new monetary 
union. Variables such as gender, employment, and education-defined public attitudes 
towards the euro: people with lower education and employment status were the ones 
most opposed to the common currency (see Figure 1). The political groups 
participating in the debate had to take this popular euroscepticism into account and 
develop suitable strategies to convince the electorate. Obviously, popular attitudes 
towards the euro posed the biggest challenge to the euro positive parties. These 
parties somehow needed to convince the reluctant electorate that the euro was 
preferable, whereas the no side could seek to nurture an already prevalent popular 
scepticism. 
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Figure 1. Occupation/gender and no vote percentage. 
Source: Derived from data in Storgaard Jacobsen, Reinert, and Risbjerg Thomsen (2001). 
 
Figure 2. Education/gender and no vote percentage. 
Source: Derived from data in Storgaard Jacobsen, Reinert, and Risbjerg Thomsen (2001). 
 
 
5. The campaign strategies 
In the analysis, I start by identifying the three themes most often articulated by the 
Eurosceptics. These themes were issues of national community and belonging, 
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sovereignty, and the preservation of the Danish welfare model. All three themes 
made a strong connection between the Danish currency and the Danish nation. 
Having highlighted the rhetoric of the no side, I contrast these themes with the 
strategy of the Danish government, and show how the political establishment sought 
to overcome popular euroscepticism. As the analysis shows, the strategy developed 
by the Ministry of Trade and Commerce did not substantially differ from the 
arguments of Eurosceptics, as it also sought to make a connection between the euro 
and the Danish nation. In both rhetorical strategies, currency was articulated as 
something that belonged to the nation. 
 
Source: Folketingets Oplysning (2012, the information service of the Danish parliament). The four MPs of Greenland 
and the Faroe Islands are not included in this table. 
 
5.1. National community and belonging 
The no side often used historical references to underline the long-standing and 
intimate relationship between the Danish people and their currency. The articulation 
of the krone as a symbol of national belonging and shared history was especially 
apparent in the campaign material of the DPP. As part of their campaigning efforts, 
DPP created a web site (www.kronen.dk) with the following opening statement: 
 
What for more than a thousand years was a thundering success, Prime 
Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen and his accomplices have now decided 
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to strangle. […] It is Denmark's own currency, a magical success that 
began around 850 when the first Danish coins were minted in Hedeby118 
(Danish People's Party, 2000). 
 
The text was illustrated by a timeline depicting various Danish coins dating back to 
the year 1560. The visitor was invited to scroll down the page to trace the 
development of the different coins, and the timeline culminated with the display of a 
contemporary krone coin, portrayed as the acme of Danish monetary development. 
Echoing Helleiner's (1998, p. 1427) description that money plays to the ‘deep 
mystical and emotional faith in one's nation as an eternal community with a common 
descent and shared destiny’, the website articulated the Danish currency as something 
unique: a magical object, with its own special history of stability and gradual 
evolution. 
The website's reference to Hedeby evoked a collective narrative about the 
Viking Age and claimed a history of kinship symbolised through the krone. The 
evolutionary Danish monetary history was, to use Hobsbawm's (1983) term, 
‘invented’ by DPP, which created an image of Danish currency as transcending 
historical epochs. The party website stressed the historic continuity and uniqueness of 
the Danish currency, creating a symbol through which the population could maintain 
a collective memory of Danish heritage. For example, the website stated: 
 
We know it. We are comfortable with it – and it has served us well for 
more than a thousand years. And there is much more at stake than just the 
coin's design: If we abolish the krone, we also abolish the independence 
and freedom of Denmark. (Danish People's Party, 2000) 
 
                                                                
118 All quotes from Danish sources are translated by the author. 
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Here, an explicit reference was made to the commemorative qualities of the currency. 
The phrase ‘We know it and are comfortable with it’ alludes directly to the activity of 
collective remembering which is fundamental to identity creation (Gillis, 1994). 
Notably, the specific design of the coins seemed to be less important than the 
familiarity of the Danes with their currency. As these statements highlight, the krone 
was invested with certain interpretations and meanings; that of ancient national 
kinship. 
DPP took advantage of the commemorative qualities of the currency and 
actively claimed Danish money as material evidence of collective origin. On the 
website, the party staged a competition urging voters to identify five errors in a line 
of six coins, with five of the coins being one-euro coins and the last being a Danish 
one-krone coin. The winners were awarded a commemorative 200-krone coin issued 
by the Danish central bank in honour of the Queen's 60th birthday. Moreover, prior to 
the referendum, DPP distributed hundreds of posters depicting a one-krone coin with 
the contours of a Danish flag at the centre. The poster urged Danish voters to 
preserve the fatherland by keeping the currency. The very name of the DPP campaign 
– ‘For the Krone and the Fatherland’ –further underlined this point. The word 
‘fatherland’ alone refers to a myth of collective origin and implies a history of 
continuity. 
 
5.2. My currency, right or wrong 
Another recurring theme in the no-campaign had to do with the potential loss of 
sovereignty. The possibility of conducting an independent monetary policy was 
articulated as a sign of independence. The majority of campaign material stressed this 
point, or at least touched on variations on this overall theme. In a PMAEU 
publication, for example, under the headline ‘Greetings from Britain’, one British 
member of the parliament, Austin Mitchell, was quoted at length: 
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The nation-state: the framework for democracy and accountability. All in 
all, the nation-state stands as the best and most effective guarantee of 
democracy and accountability. National governments can use tools such 
as taxes, interest, and exchange rates with various successes. They can 
create growth or unemployment. Their voters will reward and punish 
them accordingly. When we are controlled and managed from Frankfurt, 
national governments and their constituents who elect them are made 
powerless. The krone is tied to the Deutschmark. This is a voluntary 
decision, which – if necessary can be revoked; the euro is forever.  
(Mitchell, 2000, p. 2) 
 
According to Mitchell, it was the ability to function as a discrete entity and to make 
decisions, right or wrong, that defined an independent state and its sovereign 
population. Similar arguments recurred in a range of publications during the run-up to 
the referendum. Such claims were not confined to any specific political group or 
faction. On its anti-euro website, DPP made a similar argument with respect to 
popular sovereignty: 
 
Self-determination means that Denmark and the Danish central bank are 
not bound by any outside influence. Self-determination means that 
Denmark must live with both the advantages and the disadvantages of its 
own policies (Danish People's Party, 2000). 
 
In a public speech on June 5th, celebrating the Danish constitution, the argument was 
elaborated by DPP party leader Pia Kjærsgaard (2000): ‘A country having its own 
currency is one of the most visible signs of sovereignty. If Danes abandon the krone 
it would be a giant step toward the eradication of our independent nation’. Here, 
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Kjærsgaard drew a direct parallel between currency, sovereignty and nation. Without 
the ability to conduct independent monetary policies, she argued, Denmark would 
gradually disappear. Similarly, a splinter group of the Social Liberal Party put forth 
the same argument on the cover of a small pamphlet that was published prior to the 
referendum: 
 
No to the euro. Yes to the krone. Yes to popular democracy and welfare. 
The referendum on the krone or the euro is about whether we should limit 
Denmark's democracy, abolish our own monetary policy, abolish the 
krone, limit our own fiscal and tax policy, and get a representative to sit at 
the table in Frankfurt (Radikalt EU-kritisk Netværk, 2000). 
 
In yet another publication, the theme of monetary policy sovereignty was defined in 
almost warlike terms. In their short pamphlet with the headline ‘Farewell to Arms’, 
Danish trade unionists warned that a positive outcome of the referendum would have 
‘the immediate consequence that we hand over a pair of economic weapons that 
otherwise resides with the Central Bank’ (Fagbevægelsen mod Unionen, 2000). A 
publication printed in 1997, but circulating during the debate, by the PMAEU was 
tellingly named ‘The EMU: a Contrast to Sovereignty’ (Folkebevægelsen mod EU 
[PMAEU], 1997) and was dedicated exclusively to arguments about diminishing 
popular sovereignty. The connection between an independent national currency and 
the Danish ability to conduct its own monetary policy – no matter how limited this 
ability was, given that the Danish currency had in fact been tied to the Deutschmark 
for the last decade – constituted a recurring theme that sustained the currency–
identity relationship. 
Not only Eurosceptics, however, stressed the importance of sovereignty. 
Europhiles sought to use the potential for increased popular sovereignty as an 
argument for replacing the krone with the euro. Most notably, the Danish Minister of 
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Finance, Mogens Lykketoft, argued that joining the European currency would 
substantially strengthen Danish sovereignty. Lykketoft argued that the euro actually 
posed a unique opportunity to influence the decisions and policies of the great 
European powers, rather than flowing with the economic tides, as Denmark had been 
doing for the past 300 years (Termansen & Thobo-Carlsen, 2000, p. 7). 
 
5.3. The welfare state 
The third theme around which the debate revolved was similar to the question of 
sovereignty, but with some clear distinctions. In the discourse of the no-campaign, 
the imposing euro was portrayed as a threat against the welfare state. Among 
Eurosceptics, the debate reflected a widespread mistrust of the effects that the euro 
would have on the specific Danish societal organisation. The krone was invested with 
meaning and connotations that framed the welfare state as a national symbol. In the 
logic of such arguments, the national currency became a proxy, so to speak, for an 
even more potent national symbol: the welfare state, that is, the Danish way of life. 
This connection was clearly expressed in a campaign pamphlet ‘Goodbye to the 
Krone and Welfare’: 
 
The construction of the Danish welfare system can be regarded as an 
expression of a political compromise. It was created as part of a long-term 
historical movement away from the unregulated market and market 
failures that result in unemployment, social tensions and poverty (Nielsen, 
2000, p. 2). 
 
In this short paragraph, Nicolai Leth Nielsen, on behalf of European Parliament 
member Ole Krarup (PMAEU), described the Danish welfare system as part of a long 
history and a unique political compromise, which would be fundamentally threatened 
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by the supranational structures of the common currency. In the same euro critical 
publication another commentator, Kit Aastrup (2000, pp. 1–2) (PMAEU) voiced her 
concerns and anxieties on behalf of the welfare state: ‘Not only is it a massive 
intervention in the national right to determine tax policy, it will mean an erosion of 
the way we have chosen to organize the Danish welfare state’. Here, the national 
currency stood for the pivotal right of a people to organize its own society. A similar 
argument about the welfare state is found in DPP's campaign material which states 
that ‘Danish welfare is in danger when the floodgates between the countries are 
opened’ (Danish People's Party, 2000). The welfare argument was used by both right- 
and left-wing parties. The anti-euro Socialist People's Party stressed this point 
repeatedly in their campaign: ‘No – for Welfare's Sake’ read a publication header 
(Socialistisk Folkeparti, 2000). In a pamphlet from September 2000, the Party warned 
that the economic restraints of the EMU were an ill fit for the Danish welfare model 
and that the common currency would constitute ‘an attack on the welfare state’ which 
was founded on solidarity, community and unity (Socialistisk Folkeparti, 2000). 
The welfare state and its social safety net did not only refer to the actual 
societal organisation. According to Feldbæk (1992, p. 130), the Danish welfare state 
has become a symbol of the ‘struggle of the working people’. Danish identity was not 
primarily built upon ‘God, King and Country’, but on a story of the common 
attachment to the ‘new Danish society which the working class had built with their 
own hands’ (Feldbæk, 1996, p. 130). Today the conceptual framework of the welfare 
state seems difficult to obviate, even for conservative and liberal parties with an a 
priori resistance to state interventionism. In the words of Hansen and Wæver (2002, 
p. 60), no Danish party ‘fundamentally questions the social democratic vision of the 
state’. The welfare state turns into a national symbol when faced by challenging 
systems and threatened by substantial changes (Eriksen, 1997, p. 59). 
Of course, it is somewhat difficult to separate the effect of the welfare 
state as an integrating national symbol from the more mundane material interest of 
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the Danish electorate. Both economic considerations and questions of identity might 
simultaneously have affected public attitudes towards the reconfigurations of the 
welfare state potentially ushered by the euro. This point is underscored by McLaren 
(2004), who shows how other factors, more material rather than identity issues, play 
an equal or even greater role in explaining individual attitudes towards the euro. 
However, the shared and nationwide material interest in preserving the Danish 
welfare model may alone have contributed to a sense of shared economic fate and 
may have contributed the construction of national identity (Ardent, 1975; Helleiner, 
1998, 2003). 
 
6. The Danish euro – creating an oxymoron 
Leading up to the referendum, the pro-euro Danish government faced a substantial 
challenge to convince the public that the common currency was indeed preferable. 
The concerns of the eurosceptic segments of the population had to be addressed 
whether the euro was to be accepted. How then, did the government seek to convince 
these voters that the euro was a good idea? First of all, Europhiles continuously 
highlighted the future economic benefits of joining the euro (Ugebrevet Mandag 
Morgen, 2000). However, by purely resorting to claims about the euro's positive 
economic consequences, the pro-euro parties were left with a somewhat narrower 
range of arguments than their euro critical opponents. This meant, as we shall see, 
that Europhiles eventually sought to promote the euro as a phenomenon closely 
linked to the nation.To develop an effective campaign strategy, the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs asked the marketing company Advice A/S to come up with a range 
of strategies for convincing the less-educated, lower-income segment. Advice A/S 
(2000) made their recommendations to the ministry in a 15-page report: in order to 
connect with the lifeworld of this segment, communications had to be anti-elitist and 
plainly worded, while campaign pamphlets and folders were to be richly illustrated. 
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According to Advice A/S, it was imperative to stress that euro proponents did not 
reject the importance of national community. National symbols such as the Danish 
flag and the portrait of the Queen had to be put to use in various sorts of campaign 
material. Beloved and authentic personalities should be brought in to endorse the euro 
and the electorate had to be convinced that the common currency ‘in reality did not 
signify a break with, but merely a continuation of, existing traditions’ (Advice A/S, 
2000, p. 12). Advice A/S explicitly proposed that the euro be articulated as a project 
of the nation rather than a project for the state, since ‘many people fundamentally 
considered the euro as a threat to the nation and the nation-state’ (2000, p. 13). Here, 
the conceptual divide between ‘state’ and ‘nation’ was deliberately brought forth as 
key element in the strategic efforts of the yes-campaign. 
The Ministry of Economic Affairs acted promptly on these 
recommendations. The minister, Marianne Jelved, asked the Central Bank to produce 
a replica of the new Danish euro with the portrait of the Queen. Although the Danish 
Central Bank had full discretion over the issuing of banknotes, the right to mint coins 
officially lay with the Minister of Economic Affairs in the Minister's capacity of 
Royal Mint Controller. This separation between the printing and minting of money 
explains why Jelved could ask the central bank to make such a sketch drawing, even 
though the bank, in principal, was governed independently from political influence. 
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 Moreover, Jelved asked popular author 
and scriptwriter Lise Nørgaard to endorse 
the euro in campaign pamphlets. At the 
age of 83, Nørgaard had an aura of 
integrity and trustworthiness; she had 
become something of a public icon after 
co-writing one of the most popular 
Danish television shows that showcased, 
among other things, a romantic narrative 
of Danish resistance during the Second 
World War. Additionally, the ministry 
produced a range of plainly worded 
folders and pamphlets, abundantly 
illustrated with national symbols. Among 
these publications was a small folder 
entitled ‘What is the Big Difference?’ of 
which more than 200,000 copies were 
printed and distributed through official 
institutions. This folder was highly 
contested and sparked a lawsuit from the 
PMAEU, who claimed that it had cost the ministry a substantial amount of money 
and was nothing short of state-sponsored propaganda on behalf of the euro 
(Steensbeck, 2000). 
The pamphlet reached out to voters who valued the national symbolism of 
the currency and the familiarity of using it in everyday economic transactions. The 
cover, in the colours of the national flag, featured Lise Nørgaard displaying a euro 
coin and a Danish coin while posing the seemingly innocent question ‘What's the big 
difference?’ On 22 August, Marianne Jelved hosted a press meeting, presenting a 
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sketch of the new euro coins and releasing the controversial pamphlet. The 
publication text was organised around a large picture of the Danish euro coin, 
featuring, as recommended, a portrait of the Danish Queen, Margrethe II. 
The various subtitles informed the reader of the consequences of a yes-
vote: ‘The Euro Coins Remain Danish’, ‘Your Everyday Life Remains the Same’, 
‘Tough Times for Speculators’, ‘The Danish Euro Coins Can Be Used in Many 
Countries’, and ‘You Will Have Plenty of Time to Adjust to the Changes’. These 
subtitles were supplemented with small everyday tableaus: children at the beach, 
children in the historic theme park Tivoli, people at the pharmacy and an entire 
family outdoors on a sunny day waving the Danish flag. The pictures and paragraphs 
addressed, in different ways, issues such as political belonging, sovereignty and 
social welfare rights. In the upper-right corner, children were waving the Danish flag 
while one of the paragraphs informed the reader, in rather plain terms, that his or her 
‘salary or pension will be paid in euro. The numbers will be smaller, but your salary 
or pension will not decrease in value’ (Økonomiministeriet, 2000). By stressing that 
pensions, in particular, would remain the same, the ministry actively addressed the 
theme of social welfare rights. According to Gilbert (2007), this must be considered a 
key element in the connection between monetary organisation and community. 
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Exactly as Advice A/S had recommended, the primary function of the 
images was not to explain technical details about the euro, but to establish a mental 
connection between these scenarios and the euro coin in the centre. As such, the 
illustrations claimed the euro as a Danish concept and sought to tie it to activities and 
symbols that were considered to be typically Danish. Most conspicuous, of course, 
was the picture of flag-waving children. To use Billig's (1995, pp. 39–46) metaphor, 
it is clear that the nationalistic qualities of Danish currency in this particular 
publication exceeded their banal expression and became very explicit, becoming 
‘flagged’ in every sense of the word. The Ministry of Economic Affairs went to great 
lengths to emphasise that the new euro coins were, in fact, Danish and not a European 
construct, creating the entirely new concept of a Danish euro coin: 
 
The new Danish euro coins will be minted by the Royal Mint. Queen 
Margrethe II is on the front of the five biggest coins. The three smaller 
coins will feature the crown on the front. The majority of the coins in 
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circulation in Denmark will be the Danish euro coins 
(Økonomiministeriet, 2000). 
 
The conceptual existence of such an oxymoron, a Danish euro coin, highlights the 
perceived challenges faced by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Moreover, it 
underlines the point about understanding the Danish euro debate within the 
framework of the sovereign nation-state. This was illustrated by Central Bank senior 
manager Bjarne Skafte, who was interviewed about the Queen's portrait on the euro 
coin: ‘We have chosen to preserve something from the Danish minting tradition’, 
Skafte noted (Bonde, 2000). Again, the currency was articulated as a national symbol 
that highlights the Danish ambivalence towards the European currency. In its very 
essence, the euro was an innovation in Danish monetary history. Nonetheless, Skafte 
claimed that the euro constituted a continuation of historical currency practice – a 
practice that the Central Bank and the ministry actively sought to preserve. Both 
Europhiles and Eurosceptics articulated the EU as an organisation of independent 
states. As such, the ministry decided to promote the intrinsically non-Danish 
European currency as a mere continuation of Danish monetary history, seeking to 
please the somewhat anxious voters. 
The debate shows how political elites seek to ‘reconcile their discursive 
frames in referendum campaigns with those of the mass public’ (Marcussen & 
Zølner, 2003, p. 102). The strategy paper used by the Ministry of Trade and 
Commerce also underlines Bruner's (2005, p. 314) point about the limits of legitimate 
rhetoric. Existing ideas of the schism between the political elite and the people 
seemed to have restricted the rhetorical possibilities of the Ministry. Instead of 
framing the euro as an idea of the political elite, it had to be reconciled as a ‘project 
for the people’. Yet in this case, the discursive reconciliation might have actually 
worked, contrary to the aspirations of the Danish government, as its emphasis on 
Danish symbols and the currency–nation relationship was very much aligned with the 
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arguments of the no side. This paradoxical discursive strategy results not only from 
the fundamental assumptions that framed the Danish debate; the dilemma was also 
closely related to the conceptual connection between the national currency and 
questions of belonging, sovereignty and social welfare rights. 
 
Conclusions 
Using the Danish euro referendum as an exemplary case and by examining the 
different rhetorical strategies of the debate, this article has demonstrated how a 
national currency interrelates to key elements of national identity and community. 
Even though questions of image content were a central element in the debate – 
especially to the government-controlled Danish Europhile ministries who had come 
to consider the continued use of the Queen's portrait pivotal in its efforts to advertise 
the euro – three central non-iconographic themes were evoked during the debate. 
First, the national currency was established as a symbol of shared historical 
experiences and an expression of a collective origin. In particular, the DPP staged the 
currency as a symbol from which a narrative about national coherency could be 
established. Second, Eurosceptics claimed the currency to be a guarantee of the 
independence and sovereignty of the nation and articulated the national currency as a 
precondition for conducting monetary policy – hence, for the very existence of 
Denmark as an independent state. Third, the national currency was framed as a 
crucial precondition to the future existence of the Danish welfare model. The 
Eurosceptics argued that there was a connection between the currency and the Danish 
societal design. In successfully establishing this link, the national currency came to 
represent not only popular sovereignty but something even more valued: the way 
Danes have chosen to organise their society. This exemplifies the idea that a 
currency's capacity to configure national identity might, sometimes, be connected to 
its iconography. However, this capacity is not connected solely to image content. It 
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also depends on pre-existing perceptions of national belonging, popular sovereignty 
and social rights. All three themes underscore Gilbert's points about the way 
monetary unions potentially reconfigure the central elements of citizenship and 
community. The euro, as it was, posed a looming threat to these elements. 
Even Europhile parties and especially the Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
being embedded in a ‘one-nation-one-money’ logic, were unable to transcend the 
conceptual constraint surrounding the currency that kept it well within the framework 
of the independent and sovereign nation-state. The ministry pursued the strategy of 
framing the euro as closely related to the nation; not as a state project. I argue that the 
conscious framing of the European currency as a national concept stems from the 
Danish interpretation of ‘state’ and ‘nation’. The perceived distance between the 
elites and their constituents, ‘the people’, made it difficult for the Europhile 
government but to articulate the euro as something national, that is, something that 
would not conflict with existing identity constructs. 
Through the eager display of national symbols in their campaign, 
Europhiles reinforced the narrative of a national-supranational dichotomy offered by 
many Eurosceptics, and by insisting that the new European coins would be nothing 
but a continuation of national minting history, the Ministry followed a paradoxical 
strategy by attempting to promote an argument of continuity. This was, in fact, 
incompatible with the radical novelty that the common currency represented. The 
political proponents of the euro were forced to balance very delicately between 
promoting monetary change and redefining the meaning of the national currency. The 
findings of this article have implications that go beyond this particular case study. 
The analysis elaborates on Gilbert's suggestion to the relationship between citizenship 
and monetary organisation. Elites who find themselves tinkering with established 
monetary institutions, as was the case with the EMU, must be attentive to and 
understand the intimate relationship between national currencies and feelings of 
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national community. Also, the article illustrates the peculiar dilemma facing Danish 
policy-makers when it comes to further European integration. 
 
References 
Aastrup, K. (2000). Arbejdsmarkedspensioner skal erstatte folkepensioner 
[Occupational pensions will replace public pensions]. In Folkebevægelsen mod EU 
(Ed.), Farvel til krone og velfærd. Folk i bevægelse nr. 3 (pp. 1–2). Copenhagen: 
Folkebevægelsen mod EU.  
Abildgren, K. (2010). Dansk pengehistorie 1990–2005 [Danish Monetary History 
1990–2005]. København: Rosendahls-Schultz Grafisk A/S.  
Adriansen, I. (2003). Nationale symboler i Det Danske Rige 1830–2000 [National 
symbols in the Danish realm 1830–2000]. København: Museum Tusculanums 
Forlag.  
Advice A/S. (2000). Fakta om euroen – strategioplæg [Facts about the euro – a 
strategy proposal] (Unpublished strategy paper).  
Althusser, L. (1971). Ideology and ideological state apparatuses (notes towards an 
investigation). In L. Althusser (Ed.), Lenin and philosophy and other essays (pp. 
127–186). New York, NY: Monthly Review Press.  
Anderson, J. (2006). Consent and consensus. The contours of public opinion toward 
the euro. In R. M. Fishman & A. M. Messina (Eds.), The year of the euro: The 
cultural, social, and political import of Europe's common currency (pp. 111–130). 
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.  
 130 
 
Ardent, G. (1975). Financial policy and economic infrastructure of modern states and 
nations. In C. Tilly (Ed.), The formation of national states in Western Europe (pp. 
164–242). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
Berezin, M. (2006). Great Expectations. Reflections on Identity and European 
Monetary Union. In R. M. Fishman & A. M. Messina (Eds.), The Year of the Euro: 
The Cultural, Social, and Political Import of Europe's Common Currency (pp. 97–
107). Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.  
 Billig, M. (1995). Banal nationalism. London: Sage.  
Blair, C., Jeppeson, M. S., & Pucci, E. (1991). Public memorializing in 
postmodernity: The Vietnam Veterans Memorial as prototype. Quarterly Journal 
of Speech, 77, 263–288. 
Bonde, A. (2000, August 23). Kronet hoved på euro [A crowned head on the euro]. 
Politiken, p. 13. 
Brincker, B. (2003). A small great national state? An analysis of the cultural and 
political factors that shaped Danish nationalism 1760–1870. Journal of Historical 
Sociology, 16, 407–431. 
Brincker, B. (2009). When did the Danish nation emerge? A review of Danish 
historians’ attempts to date the Danish nation. National Identities, 11, 353–365.  
Bruner, M. L. (2000). Rhetorics of the state: The public negotiation of political 
character in Germany, Russia, and Quebec. National Identities, 2, 159–174. 
Bruner, M. L. (2005). Rhetorical theory and the critique of national identity 
construction. National Identities, 7, 209–327. 
 131 
 
Bruner, M. L. (2011). Rhetorical studies and national identity construction. National 
Identities, 13, 403–414. 
Carey, S. (2002). Undivided loyalties. European Union Politics, 3, 387–413.  
 Carrier, P. (2000). ‘National reconciliation?’ Mitterrand, Chirac and the 
commemorations of Vichy 1992–95. National Identities, 2, 127–144. 
Carruthers, B. G., & Babb, S. (1996). The color of money and the nature of value: 
Greenbacks and gold in postbellum America. American Journal of Sociology, 101, 
1556–1591. 
Charland, M. (1987). Constitutive rhetoric: The case of the peuple Québécois. 
Quarterly Journal of Speech, 73, 133–150. 
Christin, T., & Trechsel, A. H. (2002). Joining the EU? European Union Politics, 3, 
415–443. 
Cionea, I. A. (2007). The banality of nationhood: Visual rhetoric and ethnic 
nationalism in post communist Romania. Controversia, 5, 77–92. 
Cohen, B. J. (1998). The geography of money. New York: Cornell University Press. 
Damsholt, T. (2003). Fædreland og borgerdyd [Fatherland and citizens' virtue]. 
København: Museum Tusculanums Forlag.  
Danish People's Party. (2000). Skal vi danskere bestemme i Danmark? [Should Danes 
decide in Denmark?]. Retrieved March 7, 2011, from 
http://kronen.dk/htm/default2.htm  
Davies, G. (2002). A history of money: From ancient times to the present day. 
Cardiff: University of Wales Press.  
 132 
 
Eriksen, T. H. (1997). Flerkulturell forståelse [Multicultural understanding]. Oslo: 
Tano Aschehoug. 
Fagbevægelsen mod Unionen. (2000). Den ser da meget uskyldig ud – men der er 
noget nedenunder. Hvad med vores velfærd? [It looks innocent – but there is 
something underneath. What about our welfare?] (Unpublished campaign 
publication).  
Feldbæk, O. (1991). Fædreland og indfødsret [Fatherland and citizenship]. In O. 
Feldbæk (Ed.), Dansk identitetshistorie. 1 fædreland og modersmål, 1536–1789 
[Danish identity history 1. Fatherland and mother tongue] (pp. 111–231). 
København: C.A. Reitzel. 
Feldbæk, O. (1992). Dansk identitetshistorie. 3 Folkets Danmark, 1848–1940 
[Danish identity history 3 The people's Denmark 1848–1940]. København: C.A. 
Reitzels Forlag.  
Feldbæk, O. (1996). Is there such a thing as a medieval Danish identity? In B. P. 
McGuire (Ed.), The birth of identities: Denmark and Europe in the Middle ages 
(pp. 127–134). Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzels Forlag.  
Folkebevægelsen mod EU. (1997). ØMU'en – en modsætning til suverænitet [The 
EMU – contradicting sovereignty]. In Tematillæg Til Det Ny NOTAT Nr. 837 
(Unpublished campaign publication).  
Folketingets Oplysning. (2012). Folketingsvalgene [General elections]. Retrieved 
from the website of the Danish Parliament: 
http://www.ft.dk/Folketinget/Oplysningen/Valg/~/media/Pdf_materiale/Pdf_downl
oad_direkte/ olketingets%20Oplysning/Folketingsvalgene%201953-2011.pdf.ashx  
 133 
 
Gilbert, E. (1998). Ornamenting the facade of hell: Iconographies of 19th-century 
Canadian paper money. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 16, 57–
80. 
Gilbert, E. (1999). Forging a national currency: Money, state-building and nation-
making in Canada. In E. Gilbert, & E. Helleiner (Eds.), Nation states and money: 
The past, present and future of national currencies (pp. 25–46). London: 
Routledge. 
Gilbert, E. (2005). Common cents: Situating money in time and place. Economy and 
Society, 34, 357–388. 
Gilbert, E. (2007). Money, citizenship, territoriality and the proposals for North 
American Monetary Union. Political Geography, 26, 141–158. 
Gillis, J. R. (Ed.). (1994). Commemorations: The politics of national identity. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Hall, S. (1985). Signification, representation, ideology: Althusser and the post-
structuralist debates. Critical Studies in Mass Communication, 2, 91–114. 
Hansen, L. (2001). Historie, identitet og det danske europadilemma [History, identity 
and the Danish Europe-dilemma]. Den Jyske Historiker 93 – Mødet Med Den 
Europæiske Jungle, 93, 113–131.  
Hansen, L., & Wæver, O. (Eds.). (2002). European integration and national identity: 
The challenge of the Nordic states. London: Taylor & Francis Books Ltd.  
Hawkins, S. (2010). National symbols and national identity: Currency and 
constructing cosmopolitans in Tunisia. Identities, 17, 228–254. 
 134 
 
Helleiner, E. (1998). National currencies and national identities. American 
Behavioural Scientist, 41, 1409–1436. 
Helleiner, E. (2003). The making of national money: Territorial currencies in 
historical perspective. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
Helleiner, E. (2006). Towards North American monetary union?: The politics and 
history of Canada's exchange rate regime. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University 
Press.  
Hewitt, V. (1999). A distant view: Imagery and imagination in the paper currency of 
the British empire, 1800–1960. In E. Gilbert & E. Helleiner (Eds.), Nation-States 
and Money: The past, present and future of national currencies (pp. 97–117). New 
York: Routledge.  
Hobsbawm, E. (1983). Mass-producing traditions: Europe, 1870–1914. In E. 
Hobsbawm & T. Ranger (Eds.), The invention of tradition (pp. 263–308). New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press.  
Hymans, J. E. C. (2006). Money for mars? The euro banknotes and European 
identity. In R. M. Fishman & A. M. Messina (Eds.), The year of the euro: The 
cultural, social, and political import of Europe's common currency (pp. 15–36). 
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 
Ingham, G. (2004). The nature of money. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Jupille, J., & Leblang, D. (2007). Voting for change: Calculation, community, and 
euro referendums. International Organization, 61, 763–782. 
Kaelberer, M. (2004). The euro and European identity: Symbols, power and the 
politics of European Monetary Union. Review of International Studies, 2, 161–178.  
 135 
 
Kaltenthaler, K. C., & Anderson, C. J. (2001). Europeans and their money: 
Explaining public support for the common European currency. European Journal 
of Political Research, 40, 139–- 170. 
Kjærsgaard, P. (2000). Grundlovstale ved Aastrup Mølle [Constitution Day speech at 
Aastrup Mølle]. Retrieved from Danish People's Party's website: 
http://www.kronen.dk/htm/default2.htm 
Lauer, J. (2008). Money as mass communication: U.S. paper currency and the 
iconography of nationalism. Communication Review, 11, 109–132. 
Lyngby, T. (2001). Den sentimentale patriotisme: Slaget på Reden og H.C. Knudsens 
patriotiske handlinger [Sentimental patriotism: The battle on Reden and the 
patriotic deeds of H. C. Knudsen]. København: Museum Tusculanum. 
Marcussen, M. (2005). Denmark and European monetary integration: Out but far 
from over. Journal of European Integration, 27(1), 43–63. 
Marcussen, M., & Zølner, M. (2001). The Danish EMU referendum 2000: Business 
as usual. Government and Opposition, 36, 379–402. 
Marcussen, M., & Zølner, M. (2003). Monetarism and the masses Denmark and 
economic integration in Europe. Cooperation and Conflict, 38, 101–122. 
McGee, M. C. (1975). In search of ‘the people’: A rhetorical alternative. Quarterly 
Journal of Speech, 61, 235–249. 
McLaren, L. M. (2004). Opposition to European integration and fear of loss of 
national identity: Debunking a basic assumption regarding hostility to the 
integration project. European Journal of Political Research, 43, 895–912. 
 136 
 
Mitchell, A. (2000). Hilsen fra England [Greetings from Britain]. In PMAEU (Ed.), 
Husk 28. Sept. Folkebevægelsen Mod EU. Tillæg Til Folk i Bevægelse 5 
[Remember September 28. PMAEU. Appendix to moving people No. 5]. 
Copenhagen: Folkebevægelsen mod EU.  
Mwangi, W. (2002). The lion, the native and the coffee plant: Political imagery and 
the ambiguous art of currency design in colonial Kenya. Geopolitics, 7, 31–62. 
Nielsen, N. L. (2000). Den danske velfærdsmodel: Solidarisk sikring af velfærd og 
alderdom for hele befolkningen [The Danish welfare model: Solidaric assurance of 
welfare and old age for the entire population]. In Folkebevægelsen mod EU (Ed.), 
Farvel til krone og velfærd. Folk I bevægelse nr. 3 (pp. 2–3) [Farewell to the krone 
and welfare. Moving people No. 3]. Copenhagen: Folkebevægelsen mod EU.  
Økonomiministeriet. (2000). Hvad er den store forskel [What's the big difference]. 
Copenhagen: Author.  
Penrose, J. (2011). Designing the nation. Banknotes, banal nationalism and 
alternative conceptions of the state. Political Geography, 30, 429–440. 
Phillips, K. R. (2004). Introduction. In K. R. Phillips (Ed.), Framing public memory 
(pp. 1–14). Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press.  
Pointon, M. (1998). Money and nationalism. In G. Cubitt (Ed.), Imagining nations 
(pp. 229–254). Manchester: Manchester University Press.  
Polanyi, K. (1957). The great transformation. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Radikalt EU-kritisk netværk. (2000). Vil du afskaffe kronen? [Do you want to abolish 
kronen?] (Unpublished campaign material). 
 137 
 
Raento, P., & Brunn, S. D. (2005). Visualizing Finland: Postage stamps as political 
messengers. Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography, 87(2), 145–163. 
Raento, P., & Brunn, S. D. (2008). Picturing a nation: Finland on postage stamps, 
1917–2000. National Identities, 10, 49. 
Raento, P., Hämäläinen, A., Ikonen, H., & Mikkonen, N. (2004). Striking stories: A 
political geography of euro coinage. Political Geography, 23, 929–956. 
Rerup, L. (1991). Fra litterær til politisk nationalisme [From literary to political 
nationalism]. Udvikling og udbredelse fra 1808 til 1845. In O. Feldbæk (Ed.), 
Dansk identitetshistorie. 2 et yndigt land, 1789–1848; dansk identitetshistorie. 2 et 
yndigt land, 1789–1848 (p. 468). København: C.A. Reitzel.  
Risse, T. (2006). The euro between national and European identity. In R. M. 
Fishman, & A. M. Messina (Eds.), The year of the euro: The cultural, social, and 
political import of Europe's common currency (pp. 65–80). Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press.  
Risse, T., Engelmann-Martin, D., Knope, H., & Roscher, K. (1999). To euro or not to 
euro? European Journal of International Relations, 5, 147–187. 
Ritzau, T. (1999, October 12). Nyrup: DF udelukkes fra finanslovsforhandlinger 
[Nyrup: DPP excluded from budget negotiations]. Jyllands Posten. Retrieved from 
http://jyllands posten.dk/indland/ECE3275776/nyrup-udelukker-dansk-folkeparti/.  
Ritzau, T (2011). Danskernes euro-modstand stiger markant [Danish Euro-
skepticism increases significantly]. Politiken. Retrieved from 
http://politiken.dk/politik/ECE1450946/danskernes euro-modstand-stiger-markant/  
Smith, A. D. (1991). National identity. London: Penguin Books. 
 138 
 
Socialistisk Folkeparti. (2000). Nej – for velfærdens skyld [No – for welfare's sake] 
(Unpublished campaign material). 
Steensbeck, B. (2000, June 9). Fogh angriber ja-propaganda [Fogh attacks yes-
propaganda]. Politiken, p. 2. 
Storgaard Jacobsen M., Reinert, R., & Risbjerg Thomsen, S. (2001). Afstemningen 
om den fælles mønt sociale baggrunde og holdninger [Referendum on the common 
currency, social backgrounds and attitudes]. Politica, 33(1), 68–88. 
Termansen, J., & Thobo-Carlsen, J. (2000, August 11). Euroen vil give 
selvstændighed [The Euro will promote sovereignty]. Berlingske Tidende, 7. 
Toulmin, S. E. (2008). The uses of argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Ugebrevet Mandag Morgen (2000, June 19). Mediernes ØMU-dækning handler ikke 
om ØMU'en. MM, pp. 1–6. 
Unwin, T., & Hewitt, V. (2001). Banknotes and national identity in central and 
Eastern Europe. Political Geography, 20, 1005–1028. 
Unwin, T., & Hewitt, V. (2004). Reconstructing national identities: The banknotes of 
central and eastern Europe in the 1990s. In E. Green, J. Lampe, & F. Stiblar (Eds.), 
Crisis and renewal in twentieth century banking: Exploring the history and 
archives of banking at times of political and social stress (pp. 254–276). 
Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Wallach, Y. (2011). Creating a country through currency and stamps: State symbols 
and nation building in British-ruled Palestine. Nations and Nationalism, 17, 129–
147.
 139 
 
“TOO WEIRD FOR BANKNOTES”: LEGITIMACY AND IDENTITY IN THE 
PRODUCTION OF DANISH BANKNOTES 1947-2007 
 
Anders Ravn Sørensen 
This paper has been accepted for publication in Journal of Historical Sociology, April 
2014. 
 
Abstract 
In this article I argue that questions of banknote design are closely related to ideas of 
the national collective. Using the Danish banknote design competitions from 1947 to 
2007 as an exemplary case I show how the Danish central bank, Nationalbanken, 
continuously sought to balance banknote iconography between different and evolving 
perceptions of the national community in an attempt to underpin the legitimacy and 
authority of Danish banknotes. I suggest that concepts from institutional theory can 
explain this equipoise relationship and I argue that banknote designers need to 
somehow reconcile conflicting ideas about the national community. As such, this 
article contributes to a more detailed understanding of the considerations and 
challenges facing banknote-issuing authorities. 
 
1. Introduction 
In august 2012 the Canadian Central Bank decided to remove the image of an Asian-
looking woman from its draft for a new $100 banknote. On the draft, the woman 
scientist was studying samples through a microscope. Following a critical focus 
group review, the woman was replaced by a Caucasian counterpart on the final 
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version of the note. According to the bank’s internal evaluation some focus group 
respondents believed that the banknote presented “a stereotype of Asians excelling in 
technology and/or the sciences. Others feel that an Asian should not be the only 
ethnicity represented on the banknotes. Other ethnicities should also be shown”. 
Some of the focus group respondents even felt that “the yellow-brown colour of the 
$100 banknote reinforced the perception that the woman was Asian, and ‘racialized’ 
the note” (Beeby, 2012). 
Following the respondents’ recommendations the bank immediately 
redrew the banknote, instead pursuing what a spokesman called a “neutral ethnicity” 
for the woman scientist (Beeby, 2012). Former Bank of Canada governor Mark 
Carney eventually had to issue a public apology, asserting that “[o]ur banknotes 
belong to all Canadians, and the work we do at the Bank is for all Canadians” 
(Carney, 2012). But Carney’s banknote controversies were not quite over. After he 
was appointed Governor of the Bank of England in November 2012, Carney once 
again sparked a public upheaval over the proposal to replace the portrait of Elisabeth 
Fry with Winston Churchill on the new British £5 banknote. The decision to remove 
the only female figure (besides the Queen of course) from British banknotes 
provoked a campaign from woman rights groups who suggested that Jane Austen 
should be featured instead of Churchill (Martinson, 2013).  
 
 
The Canadian $100 banknote after the “neutral ethnicity” revision. Used by permission of the Bank of Canada. 
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Carney’s banknote tribulations illustrate the tricky business of designing 
supposedly legitimate banknotes as central banks are faced with mixed and 
ambiguous perceptions of legitimacy. Despite serious efforts to choose the best 
possible motives, the proposals were apparently too controversial for some of the 
central bank’s constituents. How then, can a central bank design suitable banknotes? 
Should banknote designers attempt to align iconography with changing ideas about 
the national collective or should they maintain a certain conservatism and conformity 
in their designs?   
In this article I draw on the archives of the Danish central bank – 
Nationalbanken – to address these question by analysing the creation of three Danish 
banknote series from 1947 to 2007. I advance three interrelated arguments. First, I 
argue that the Danish central bank and its governors historically have favoured 
symbols they believed would most efficiently bolster the trustworthiness of Danish 
banknotes. These symbols were often elements of a traditional national romantic 
narrative. Second, I argue that, in the process of choosing these symbols, 
Nationalbanken engaged in a balancing act between different ideas about the nation. 
Finally, I suggest that such a balancing act became increasingly difficult as different, 
and sometimes conflicting, ideas of the national collective diluted its potency as a 
source of banknote legitimacy. Whereas the symbolic evocation of the nation might 
once have been sufficient to secure the legitimacy of the central bank and its notes, 
however, over time, as notions of Danishness began to multiply, it became necessary 
to define which aspects of Danishness would serve the purpose of legitimizing the 
bank and its notes. To this end, Nationalbanken resorted to an iconography conveying 
stability and reliability rather than attempting to signal the embrace of contemporary 
values and ideas. My findings expand on suggestions by Hymans (2004, 2010) and 
Penrose & Cumming (2011) who argue that issues of perceived legitimacy unlock the 
dynamics of banknote design. However, I suggest that banknote legitimacy is not 
achieved simply by aligning iconography with salient and trendy national symbols. 
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Banknote designers must reconcile different – and often opposing – logics and strike 
the right balance between incorporating “the spirit of the times” and evoking more 
traditional narratives about the nation. At the same time, banknotes must signal 
credibility and trustworthiness. By stressing Nationalbanken’s balancing act, this 
analysis contributes to a more detailed understanding of the considerations and 
challenges facing banknote designers in general. 
I have divided this article in five parts: In section 2 I briefly review the 
existing literature on banknotes and issues of nationalism and national identity. 
Whereas much of the existing literature on banknote design focuses on banknote 
iconography as a question of identity crafting, I argue that note-issuing authorities are 
largely concerned with designing banknotes that are perceived as legitimate as well 
as trustworthy. In section 3, I suggest that concepts from institutional theory can be 
used to explain the considerations that go into banknote design. Section four consists 
of a case study in which I use these concepts to show how the Danish central bank 
faced a heterogeneous constituency with different, and sometimes conflicting, 
expectations of banknote iconography. I argue that Danish banknote design 
competitions reflect this complex context of legitimacy and I suggest that ambiguous 
expectations of what banknotes should look like can explain why Danish central 
bankers eventually resorted to somewhat traditional banknote designs. In the final 
section I conclude on the analysis and suggest proposals for further research. 
 
2. States, nations and currency iconography 
The state-as-pedagogue perspective  
National currencies relate to national identity in different ways. Various scholars 
have pointed to this interrelation as a potential research agenda (See for example 
Billig, 1995:41; Helleiner, 1998; Nakano, 2004). In the Danish case, scholars have 
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closely linked the national currency, the krone (meaning the crown), to public 
perceptions of national community and political sovereignty (Jupille & Leblang, 
2007; Sørensen, 2014). In particular, much work has been done on how national 
elites devise and implement an agenda of nationalism, using the imagery of 
banknotes and coins as instruments to cultivate identity and foster national 
community. Scholars have come to consider money a powerful ideological messenger 
(Berezin, 2006; Gilbert, 1998; Gilbert & Helleiner, 1999; Gilbert, 1999; Hawkins, 
2010; Raento, Hämäläinen, Ikonen, & Mikkonen, 2004), suited to cultivating feelings 
of community and national identity. In the Danish context, scholars have described 
the newest banknotes from 2009 as a series of “circulating national monuments” 
(Leth-Espensen & Kofoed Hansen, 2009: 149) 
Especially in newly formed states, or states going through periods of 
crisis or transition, elitist attempts to foster community through the use of currencies 
have been particularly evident (see for example Mwangi, 2002; Sørensen, 2012; 
Sørensen, 2013; Unwin & Hewitt, 2001; Unwin & Hewitt, 2004; Wallach, 2011). The 
imagery of national money provides states a political tool with which to cultivate 
collective identity and promote imagined communities.  
 
Banking on the nation 
Recent studies, however, have questioned this top-down “state-as-pedagogue” 
perspective that runs through much of the literature on currency iconography. 
Studying the construction of the common European currency, Kaelberer (2004:162) 
argues that the connection between currencies and national identity is reciprocal. 
National money produced by central banks might reinforce collective identity 
amongst the population; but the ability of money to function as credible means of 
payment depends on pre-existing popular conceptions of community, as well as on 
the trust that people have in each other and in the issuing authority. Ultimately we 
accept banknotes as credible means of payment because they represent a promise by 
 144 
 
society to back up their value. This is what Simmel meant when he argued that in 
modern societies trust no longer functions at a personal level but instead depends on 
the legitimacy of abstract systems such as the monetary system (Simmel, 1990). 
Kaelberer builds on this idea to argue that legitimacy is not easily achieved but that 
“monetary institutions have to earn the trust of participants in the market” (Kaelberer, 
2004:171).  
Hymans in turn completely dismisses the state-as-pedagogue perspective 
(Hymans 2004, 2010). Based on a historical comparative study of European banknote 
iconography he identifies a range of different trends in the imagery of European 
banknotes, drawing on a database of more than 1400 different notes from 15 
European countries. Comparing the development of iconography across different 
countries Hymans finds that even though the banknote iconography of the respective 
countries has evolved substantially over time there are remarkable similarities in 
iconographic choices in specific historic periods. Banknotes from different countries 
undergo a very similar iconographic development from late 19th century until today.  
Following such findings Hymans asks whether banknote issuing 
authorities are in fact trying to cultivate national identity as much as they are simply 
tapping into prevailing conceptions of community and whether transnational values 
tend to spill over into the design of national money: “Far from trying to use their 
control of currency to impose statist values on a recalcitrant citizenry, states are more 
likely to try to increase their legitimacy by using the currency to signal their embrace 
of values in tune with ‘the spirit of the times’, he argues (Hymans, 2004:6). This 
analysis, which draws upon the cultural shift theories of Inglehart and Meyer et al, 
has great explanatory force (Inglehart, 1997; Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, 
1997). However, the large dataset analysis cannot account for how central banks in 
practice undergird the legitimacy of their banknotes.  
 This task has been taken up by Penrose (2011) and Penrose & Cumming 
(2011) in their study of Scottish banknote iconography. Penrose and Cumming call 
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for a more nuanced concept of the state and warn us not to accept the assertion that 
banknote imagery is to be exclusively understood as an “aggressive visualization” of 
the nation-state (Penrose & Cumming, 2011:823). Following the work of Jessop 
(2001), Mitchell (1991) and Painter (2006) Penrose suggests we turn our attention to 
actors and practices that reproduce the idea of the state and produce state effects 
(Penrose, 2011:434). As such, the boundaries of the state are not defined by its actors 
and state institutions but by the practices and processes that continuously reify the 
state and make it seem ontologically evident. Thus central bankers are to be viewed 
as actors who reproduce state ideas, which implies that banknotes must be considered 
products of the idea of the state rather than the purposeful instrument of the state as a 
well-defined and discrete entity. This explains, Penrose argues, why anyone attuned 
to the symbolic repertoire of the state “has the capacity to design official state-objects 
that do the work of reifying the state and inspiring loyalty to the attendant nation” 
(Penrose, 2011:434).  
Furthermore, Penrose points to important shortcomings in the existing 
literature, arguing that scholars often evoke ill-defined and rather unspecified notions 
of ‘the state’, ‘the government’ or ‘the national elite’ when they explain the processes 
behind banknote designs (Penrose, 2011:430). In the case of Scotland, for example, 
there really has been no state to orchestrate the design of new Scottish banknotes. 
Instead the production of Scottish banknotes has been in the hands of private or 
commercial banks (Penrose & Cumming, 2011:823). Hence, the national symbolism 
long incorporated in Scottish banknotes cannot be conceived as the state’s attempt to 
promote itself and forge national community. Instead, Penrose and Cumming argue, 
such national motifs must be considered a function of the aspirations of the note-
issuing banks to advertise their own “reliability” (Penrose & Cumming, 2011:821). 119 
                                                                
119 A similar focus on the connection between ideas about the nation and currency legitimacy is also central to the works 
Mihm (2007) and Lauer (2008) that analyze banknotes in postbellum America. 
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In the Scottish case there was no state backing the notes. But what 
happens in a situation where neither state nor nation exists to lend legitimacy to the 
imagery on the banknotes? The newest euro notes can be seen as a case in which 
banknotes are created in a state/nation vacuum. Here, the solution by the European 
Commission has been to emblazon the notes with fictional European architecture, 
which refers neither to state nor nation but which seeks to invoke an archetypal 
Europeanness – which is at a double remove since it is imaginary. Thus the symbols 
on the Euros are deliberately ambiguous and abstract to avoid national bias and so as 
“not to marginalize any non-selected region” (Fornäs, 2012: 215). 
In a very recent study, Tognato (2012) suggests that central banks seek 
legitimacy by aligning themselves with prevailing ideas of the national collective. In 
order to be perceived as legitimate, central banks must successfully apply discursive 
strategies that connect monetary affairs to deep-seated cultural themes and narratives. 
 
[W]henever independent central banks start to speak the languages that define 
the collective identities of their own societies, and when they manage to recast 
their own institutional identity into national identity, their basis for support 
within society becomes much broader, and it gets easier for them to deliver 
monetary stability (Tognato, 2012:9).  
 
Although Tognato is not speaking of banknote design but of monetary policies more 
generally, this idea can also apply to the processes and considerations of banknotes 
designs, but only in part. Central-bank aspirations to align their iconography with 
deep-seated cultural themes and ideas about the nation as a way to assert their 
legitimacy only works if the motifs connect to a relatively stable, homogenous 
narrative about the national collective. As this analysis will show, central bankers 
potentially turn to specific imagery of stability perhaps both to signal the essential 
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stability of currency and the bank, but also in response to the proliferation of ideas 
and symbols of nation. 
 
3. In search of legitimacy   
Theoretical concepts from institutional theory can further our understanding of the 
processes and objectives of banknote design. One of these objectives, legitimacy, is 
defined by Suchman as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 1995:574). Organizations tend to 
align themselves with symbols, practices and templates that are already accepted and 
recognized (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 
1991). The iconographic trends highlighted by Hymans must be understood as a kind 
of symbolic isomorphism in which organizations, such as central banks, seek to 
identify with other actors, symbols and values already deemed legitimate (cf. Glynn 
& Abzug, 2002).  
Monetary institutions prove no exception. As Glynn and Marquis have 
shown, the naming of commercial banks, for example, has been characterized by a 
symbolic isomorphism, where banks favour names that refer to state or civil society 
(Glynn & Marquis, 2006). As Glynn notes, few banks today choose to name 
themselves ‘Fred’s Bank’ or ‘First Federal Pizza’ (Glynn, 2010:423). Even if most 
people agree that pizza indeed does taste delicious, a name like this would not secure 
organizational legitimacy. Instead, names such as Bank of America, First Federal 
Bank and Citizens Bank are more common. Symbolic management is a key to 
organizational identity and legitimacy and can have strategic ramifications (Hansen, 
2012: 704). Thus as Hansen has shown in his analysis of the constraining and 
enabling identity narratives of Danish savings banks (Hansen, 2007), organizational 
identity narratives configure the framework of what can be considered legitimate 
strategic actions.  
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When organizations seek to manage identities “they typically do so with 
components available in their institutional environment, i.e., the industry, 
organizational field, societal culture and/or the nation state” (Glynn, 2010:432). As a 
consequence, we must expect that contemporary central banks rarely attempt to 
invent new national symbols in a Hobsbawmian sense (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 2008). 
Instead they must stay attuned to a pre-existing symbolic repertoire with some degree 
of resonance within society in order to safeguard and expand trust and legitimacy. 
The same goes for banknotes. New ideas and values emblazoned on banknotes must, 
to some extent, resonate with existing identity constructs. As a result, central banks 
often turn to the national symbolic repertoire. 
However, it is by no means an easy task for central banks to select 
banknote motifs that recast their own organizational identity into national identity. 
Legitimizing banknotes is not merely a question of emblazing them with fashionable 
symbols and visually capturing the prevailing zeitgeist. Legitimacy has a double 
edge, and organizations that try too hard also run the risk of being perceived as 
manipulative and lacking in authority. As Ashforth and Gibbs (1990:187) detail in 
their typology of “the clumsy actor”, “the nervous actor” and the “overacting actor”; 
all organizations run the risk of being perceived as either as insensitive, dogmatic or 
self-aggrandizing, respectively.  
Even more importantly, central banks often face a heterogeneous 
constituency with conflicting perceptions of the national community. Not only are 
there various, evolving and sometimes contradictory ideas about the nation within 
public discourse, but banknotes, such as the ones produced by Nationalbanken, also 
have an international audience. National banknotes are evaluated both by other 
central banks as well as by peoples of other nationalities. Central banks are indeed 
compelled to handle institutional complexity and sometimes even incompatible 
prescriptions when they design new banknotes. 
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Organizations can engage in different strategies to cope with institutional 
complexity (Greenwood et. al., 2011). Among these strategies is the 
compartmentalizing of identities (Binder, 2007) in which organizations relate to their 
heterogeneous constituency by ceremonial or symbolic commitment to certain logics. 
Nonetheless, the organization ultimately seeks to retain its core identity (Greenwood 
et al., 2011:350). As we shall see, the design processes of the Danish central bank 
have reflected this salutatory commitment to changing societal values and ideas of 
the Danish nation. At the same time, the board of governors always, in the end, 
decides on a conservative iconography in order to come across as trustworthy.  
Following the theoretical insights above, and using Danish banknote 
design processes as an exemplary case, I suggest that central banks’ attempt to align 
banknotes with deep-seated cultural themes and narratives as a way to attain 
legitimacy. Furthermore, we must anticipate that banknotes reflect continuously 
changing societal norms, as suggested and exemplified by Hymans. These conflicting 
demands pose a challenge for banknote designers. Note-issuing authorities need to 
reconcile and balance between different ideas about the nation when they craft new 
banknotes.  
 
4. Designing Danish banknotes 
In this section I turn to the empirical analysis of the banknote design competitions 
from 1947-2007. The Danish central bank is established as independent from political 
influence. Although officially and deliberately outside government control, it 
oversees Danish monetary policies and is assigned the task of designing and printing 
banknotes. As Penrose (2011) has detailed, competitions, committees or commissions 
are the most commonly used tools in the creation of new banknotes. This has been 
true in the Danish case, where design competitions are an integrated element in the 
selection process; either, competitions are open to the general public, or in most 
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cases, limited to a preselected group of artists. Ultimately, however, it is always 
Nationalbanken’s three governors who decide between the designs, since they govern 
the organization and the banknotes designs reflect their considerations and 
preferences.  
Nationalbanken granted me full access to their archives, so I could 
conduct an empirical investigation into three design competitions from 1947 to 
2007.120  Although I include three competitions in the analyses, I emphasize the 
newest design process from 2006 to 2007 because the material offers direct insights 
into the motivations and considerations that went into the newest Danish banknote 
series “Bridges and landscapes” issued from 2009 to 2011. In my analysis I draw on 
the above theoretical insights about banknote iconography and the ideas about the 
sources of legitimacy to explain the challenges, preferences and consideration of 
Nationalbanken and its governors.  
 
Barrows or beer? 
In the years preceding World War II the Danish central bank planned the introduction 
of a new note series to replace the old notes. To generate design proposals the bank 
invited the broader population to come up with suitable motifs. In a small pamphlet 
the bank asked people to sketch drawings “expressing Danish culture but which 
unmistakably resemble a banknote” (Nationalbanken, 1947). The competition proved 
an overwhelming success and the bank received more than 100 proposals, which 
were subsequently displayed at a mobile exhibition in major Danish cities. The 1947 
proposals can generally be divided into two groups: one type of proposals featured 
the traditional romanticist motives dominated by relics, landscapes and barrows. 
Another type proposed more mundane motives such as industry, piles of charcoal, 
                                                                
120 A fourth design competition was held as early as 1908. The archival material on this competition is very scarce and 
therefore I have excluded this design process from the analysis. Also, between 1947 and 2007 Nationalbanken produced 
series of banknotes that were not the result of design competitions. I have focused my analysis on the three competitions 
because the design evaluations, here, offer direct insight into the different considerations and motivations that informed 
the final design selection.   
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foodstuffs. In one of the drawings a large working-class family crams together in a 
small apartment. Food and beverages were recurring motifs. One proposal suggested 
sausage and beer, which are traditional Danish products, for the 10-kroner note, and a 
broom and vacuum cleaner for the 5-kroner note. 
Instead of accommodating the push to include everyday motifs and more 
mundane values, Nationalbanken eventually chose the conservative proposals of 
artist Ib Andersen. Mirroring the trends in a wider European currency iconography 
the final series featured prominent writers and poets on the front while Danish 
landscapes and buildings were pictured on the verso. The public demand for new 
motifs can be interpreted as the result of changed societal values and norms as 
described by (Hymans, 2004; Hymans, 2010). Nationalbanken could have responded 
to this trend by accommodating the push for innovation. However, the new 
interpretation of Danishness had to compete with the consolidated national canon in 
which elements of national romanticism had long been an important part of the 
Danish master narrative (Brincker, 2003). While many of the contributions embraced 
novelty, another strand favoured more traditional expressions. The thematic division 
between the proposals in 1947 reflected the existence of different, competing 
perceptions of Danishness. Facing different perceptions of Danishness within its 
constituency, the central bank had to choose a strategy that somehow addressed this 
dilemma.  
Ultimately, Nationalbanken’s governors went with the safest bid and 
decided on a series of very traditional motifs. The decisions to stick with the more 
conventional designs sparked critical remarks from Danish media. Most Danish 
newspapers that reviewed the different proposals were aware of the schism between 
traditional motifs and the more popular and every day, and some newspapers 
explicitly favoured the latter. Thus the regional newspaper, Aalborg Amtstidende 
remarked laconically that Nationalbanken apparently did not “interpret Danish 
history in quite the same way as do the general public” (N/A, 1952). 
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Proposals with beer and sausages and the winning proposal by Ib Andersen. Used with the permission of 
Nationalbanken.   
 
Evaluated in light of the works of Hymans, Penrose and Tognato such a statement 
proves problematic for a central bank whose legitimacy is perceived to depend on its 
ability to align its discursive strategies with cultural themes and narratives. However, 
as it turned out, public perceptions of what reflected Danish culture were conflicting 
and ambiguous. Thus, Nationalbanken’s iconographic conservatism, which at first 
glance could be considered counterproductive since it refused to accommodate 
obvious changes in societal norms and values, is to be understood as an attempt not to 
associate the notes with motifs that would only resonate with certain parts of the 
population, or come across as too trendy and controversial.  
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Competitions in 1982 and 2006-2007 
In 1982, when Nationalbanken once again planned to renew the circulating notes, 
various carefully selected artists were invited to present their proposals. None of the 
proposals were used but served as inspirational material in 1997, when the bank 
finally replaced the existing notes with a new series featuring famous Danish scientist 
and writers (following the trends of European currency iconography more generally). 
Prior to the selection of the artists in 1982, there were doubts whether the existing 
generation of Danish artists would be able to produce motifs conveying values that 
resonated within the public. In an internal memo, a banknote working group voiced 
its concerns:  
 
The development of the visual arts has resulted in a focus on individual 
experiences and personal world views, thus hampering the solution of 
tasks that require more broadly comprehensible statements [...] in order to 
meet such requirements, the youngest and newest expressions that do not 
yet correspond to the public perception of reality must be discarded. In 
order to satisfy the demands of one of the few representative art works of 
our time, a certain concurrence between the task and motif is required, as 
well as a clear artistic expression (Nationalbanken, 1982). 
 
In this passage, the working group alludes to a “public perceptions of reality” as if 
there were only one way Danes perceive ‘reality’. As the working group suggested 
excluding the most modern artistic expressions, it is clear that the central bank 
employees assigned the task of designing new notes did not recognize the possibility 
that different perceptions of Danishness could in fact exist simultaneously. Some 
years later, however, banknote designers gradually began to acknowledge that 
different ideas about the nation could be in play.  
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When Nationalbanken’s senior artistic consultant Palle Nielsen retired in 
1994, he commented on the increasing challenges facing banknote designers in a 
world with ever changing values, 
 
In our day and age it is obviously difficult to express visually that which 
characterizes a country. Before it was easier [...] Before, it was God, king 
and the people. Artistic expression was completely fixed and it could not 
be otherwise. Today, anything goes, and there are a myriad of different 
forms of expression. It is difficult to express an entire nation under these 
circumstances. A soccer game, for example, is much better at uniting the 
nation (Nationalbanken, 1994). 
 
Nielsen was acknowledging that certain ideas and values change with the passage of 
time. However, he refrained from elaborating on why these changing values could 
not be conveyed through banknote designs. One could ask, if a soccer game really 
“united the nation” and reflected something Danish, why not put a soccer game on 
the banknotes?  Again, the answer to this question reveals the tension between 
official state values on the one hand, and the popular and mundane on the other, as 
well as to the mixed perception of the nation that Nielsen so aptly described as an 
“anything goes” legitimacy context, expressing an awareness that the bank faces a 
multifaceted constituency with different ideas of what defines the national 
community.  
In 2003 Nationalbanken’s chief designer, Johan Alkjær, was interviewed 
about the 1997 series, which featured famous Danish artists and scientists, and he 
highlighted the same ambiguous attitude as Nielsen: “The banknote series with the 
five prominent Danes is meant to convey something typically Danish. We produce 
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banknotes for the Danish people – not for the Academy of Arts121 or the reviewers – 
but we do not pander to the public either” (Alkjær cited in Adriansen, 2003:269). On 
the one hand the notes had to be aligned with something typically Danish. On the 
other, by insisting that the bank did not “pander”, Alkjær maintained a certain 
distance between the bank and the people using its money. Here we see the contours 
of yet another perception of banknote legitimacy expressed from within the bank 
itself. In order to preserve trustworthiness Alkjær installed a hierarchy between the 
bank and its customers, over aligning the design of the notes with societal trends.  
Former head to the printing division, Niels Holm, elaborated on this point when 
arguing that, 
 
Banknotes should not be history textbooks or convey a particular 
pedagogy. Our banknotes must be Danish, but not nationalist. Preferably 
they must be timeless and reflect a degree of universalism. But first and 
foremost, they need to be authoritative in order to inspire trust (Holm 
cited in Adriansen, 2003:269). 
 
Here, it is worth noting that Holm explicitly rejects the state-as-pedagogue 
perspective. Instead of integrating a specific pedagogic outlook, banknotes must 
signal authority to secure trust. Both Holm and Alkjær articulated what seems to be a 
recurring concern within the bank, that the motifs must be authoritative and reflect 
stability, rather than follow the flow of ephemeral values and ideas about the nation.  
 
Bridges and landscapes 
In 2005 Nationalbanken decided to commence the production of a new series of 
banknotes to replace the 1997 series. The central bank governors formed a special 
                                                                
121 The Academy of Arts (Akademirådet) is an official institution which consults with the state on questions of art and 
design. 
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working group, Seddelgruppen (The Note Group), to undertake this comprehensive 
task. Seddelgruppen consisted of central bank employees from the printing press 
division, administrative staff, and an external artistic consultant.  In its tentative 
timetable for the production process Seddelgruppen noted that the new banknotes had 
to be “unmistakably Danish” to ensure, that they be accepted by the population. As 
Seddelgruppen pointed out “[a] banknote is a little work of art; the face of the country 
internally and externally. It must be Danish, in one way or another” (Nationalbanken, 
2006A). With Seddelgruppen’s insistence that the notes presented the country’s 
international image, the audience was widened not only to include diverging public 
ideas about the nation and Nationalbanken’s own authority, but also the expectations 
of an international audience. 
Now, the question was how to determine what constituted an 
unmistakably Danish theme? To solicit suggestions for suitable themes 
Seddelgruppen assembled a small forum that was to meet in the bank and work out a 
list of possible motives. They were asked to reflect on the question of which image of 
contemporary Danish society the notes ought to convey. The meeting was bluntly 
titled: “What is Danish?” (Nationalbanken, 2005). The discussion group consisted of 
eight different influential personalities, including architects, marketing directors, 
designers, artists and historians, all of whom Seddelgruppen believed could help 
define what “Danish” was all about. The group included, amongst others, such 
colourful personalities as writer and journalist, Søren Ryge, who is famous for his 
slow-paced gardening shows on television, and director of the global marketing 
company BDDO, Niels Erik Folmann, who participates in a popular Danish 
television show on lifestyle and consumer preferences. 
In February 2006 the discussion group convened with members of 
Seddelgruppen at Nationalbanken to discuss potential Danish banknote motifs. 
According to the minutes of the meeting, the group generally agreed on the 
following: 
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It is good if the notes depict people interacting with each other. Danes 
should be able to relate to the motifs in order to remember them. There is 
no need for famous people on the banknotes; people may as well be 
portrayed by virtue of their activity. If a famous person is depicted it 
should be within a relevant environment, and other elements on the note 
should relate to that person’s activity. The motifs need not be 
unmistakably Danish. For example, the motif could be created by a 
foreigner but situated in Denmark - or it could be created by a Dane but 
be located abroad (Nationalbanken, 2006B). 
Apart from these general considerations the discussion group also conceived at list of 
suggestions for suitable themes, including “landscapes and infrastructure”, “gardens”, 
“bridges”, “harbours”, “mills”, “cultural activities” and “outdoor activities”, “Danish 
design”, “science” and “portraits”. A common denominator for many of these themes 
is that they embrace post-material and post-modern values. The landscapes proposed 
are not merely timeless national romantic tableaus. The proposals include empty 
freeways in the northern parts of Jutland and the infrastructure of central 
Copenhagen. Among the cultural activities are people skinny-dipping in the winter, 
children sledding, and a family on picnic or bike riding through a rural landscape. 
However, some of the proposed themes are more conventional in character and 
include historical buildings, bridges and portraits of famous Danes, i.a., the royal 
family. 
Agreeing that the notes need not be unmistakably Danish, the discussion 
group disagreed with the requirement and expectations in Seddelgruppen’s original 
credo. The eight individuals, whom Nationalbanken believed would know what 
Danishness was about, had been asked to come up with suggestions of inherently 
Danish motifs. Instead, they now proposed the opposite. There seemed to be a 
disagreement between the discussion groups and Nationalbanken’s representatives, 
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not only as to what constituted appropriate motifs but also on what being Danish was 
about.  As had been the case in previous design processes, tensions existed between 
the cosmopolitan and contemporary suggestions made by the invitees and the ideas of 
the central bank employees.  
During the next months Seddelgruppen evaluated and worked on the 
proposed themes. The list had to be reduced to three or four themes from which the 
three bank governors could make their choice. The themes were considered from an 
aesthetic perspective, but Seddelgruppen also tried to anticipate potential critics. 
Seddelgruppen voiced considerable concerns about the theme of cultural and outdoor 
activities. On the one hand, the theme was considered to have broad public appeal, 
and since it touched directly on the everyday lives of ordinary Danes Seddelgruppen 
believed that Danes would immediately identify with the casual and mundane 
activities (Nationalbanken, 2006c). On the other hand, Seddelgruppen feared that the 
notes would depict a “laid back” and somewhat relaxed image of the Danish nation 
and its population. According to Seddelgruppen, the theme signalled so-called “soft 
values often associated with Denmark.” These soft values could prove problematic 
since they would “romanticize Denmark and convey a picture of a laid-back nation 
that relies on its surplus and its affluence to relax” (Nationalbanken, 2006c). As such, 
Seddelgruppen feared that more relaxed and everyday motifs would convey the 
wrong message about Denmark and its inhabitants to an international audience.   
The theme of bridges seemed less problematic. The bridges could be seen 
as symbols of national coherence; they were easily recognizable, unmistakably 
Danish and the theme offered the possibility of representing different regions of the 
country. At the end of April 2006 the governors were presented with the following 
suggestions: “bridges and landscapes”, “architecture” and “functionalist Danish 
homes”. While Seddelgruppen had developed and worked on the suggestions from 
the discussion group, however, the central bank governors had simultaneously 
contemplated a theme of their own. Seddelgruppen was asked to evaluate the theme 
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of prominent Danish buildings as a potential alternative, but warned that using 
prominent buildings on the notes might be somewhat problematic since it “would 
appear national romantic and backward” (Nationalbanken, 2006d).  Instead it 
proposed, once again, that the motifs of prominent buildings could perhaps be 
supplemented with some kind of activity or interaction that might also appeal to the 
younger part of the population (Nationalbanken, 2006d). Generally Seddelgruppen 
voiced a concern that the motifs not appear “too elitist” to the general population. 
Eventually, the governors decided to go with “bridges and landscapes” as the new 
theme. Seddelgruppen had selected and evaluated specific bridges that the artist 
chosen for the actual job of designing the motifs had to incorporate. The specific 
artistic interpretation of these landscapes, whether naturalistic, urbane or perhaps 
indoor, was left to the discretion of each individual artist. 
The bridges theme came with a caveat. Seddelgruppen anticipated that 
such a theme could prove problematic due to its obvious similarities with the existing 
euro notes. Eventually, Seddelgruppen dismissed such reservations, reasoning in an 
internal memo that the Danish notes would feature real bridges, while the motifs on 
the euro-banknotes were archetypal depictions of non-existing buildings. Potential 
critics would acknowledge this difference, the memo argued (Nationalbanken, 
2006d). As it turned out, some critics did indeed accuse the bank of creating little 
mini euro notes, and they did not appreciate the distinction between fictional and real 
bridges. Most notably Danish MP, Morten Messerschmidt, from the Eurosceptical 
party The Danish People’s Party, suggested that Nationalbanken was trying to soften 
Danish resistance towards the euro by “using the new notes as a battering ram to 
break down Danish resistance to the euro by making Danish banknotes look like euro 
notes” (Messerschmidt, 2007). Even though the internal memo suggests that 
Nationalbanken, perhaps somewhat naively, considered the theme unproblematic, 
Messerschmidt’s accusations nonetheless highlight the diverging ideas of legitimacy 
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and agendas – political and other – facing the central bank. Bridges, although 
arguably very Danish, were considered a theme too European to some. 
To be sure, Seddelgruppen had to accommodate a range of different 
perceptions of what constituted suitable Danish banknotes. These conflicting ideas 
epitomize the dilemma of banknote design. Underscoring the trend in the 1947 design 
competition, the layman discussion group proposed a range of motifs reflecting 
contemporary and mundane values. Several cosmopolitan, habitual and every day 
activities were proposed. Secondly, Nationalbanken, represented by Seddelgruppen 
and the governors, explicitly sought to balance between different interests. There was 
an acknowledgment that the bank was facing a heterogeneous constituency, but 
Seddelgruppen was unsure of how to reconcile these conflicting demands. The 
iconography needed to reflect different and sometimes conflicting perceptions about 
the Danish nation, still resonate within the population, not seem too elitist, and at the 
same time avoid portraying Danes as overly laid back. The everyday and 
cosmopolitan motifs proposed by the discussion group were not considered 
commensurate with the task. Then again, when the governors independently proposed 
the more traditional theme, Seddelgruppen feared that it might be considered overly 
old-fashioned and therefore less authentic in the eyes of the population. Internally the 
three governors were still the ones most invested in a traditional and conformist 
iconography. To accommodate these different demands, the bank had to come up 
with a Goldilocks strategy of banknote iconography.   
 
Choosing an artist 
Having decided on bridges and landscapes as the overall theme Nationalbanken went 
on to search for artists to draw the actual notes. Assisted by an external artistic 
consultant Seddelgruppen shortlisted and invited eight Danish artists of different ages 
and artistic expressions to sketch potential designs. The artists had to incorporate 
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specific bridges on the front of the notes but on the verso they were free to interpret 
the theme of landscapes in any way they wanted. In January 2007 the eight artists 
were invited to present their designs at Nationalbanken. A professional jury had been 
selected to evaluate the proposals and to come up with the design best suited for 
production. The jury agreed that artist Kasper Bonnén’s modern design and 
contemporary landscapes was the winning proposal. In their evaluation the jury 
remarked that the notes “constituted a good idea for a contemporary note that would 
also remain up-to-date” (Nationalbanken, 2007a). Also, according to the jury, there 
was a certain intimacy in the design and the artistic expression branded Denmark in a 
favourable way (Nationalbanken, 2007a). Once again, we see the preoccupation with 
the international reception of the banknotes. The jury also fancied Karin Birgitte 
Lund’s design and noted that the modern bridges on the front and the archaeological 
findings on the verso seemed to “bridge the past and the present” (Nationalbanken, 
2007a). 
 
 
 
 
 
T 
 
The jury then submitted their decision to the governors, who did not, however, 
immediately designate Bonnén as the winner. Instead, they decided to let both artists 
continue to work on their proposals. During the following months Bonnén and Lund 
laboured to improve their designs. In the beginning of May 2007 the two artists once 
To the left, the proposal from Kasper Bonnén. To right, the proposal by Karin Birgitte Lund. Used with the permission of 
Nationalbanken.  
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again presented their design suggestions to the jury. Again, the jury preferred the 
design of Kaspar Bonnén (Nationalbanken, 2007b). Nonetheless, in the middle of 
May 2007 the governors finally decided that Lund’s design was better suited. 
According to the governors, Lund had been chosen due to her “distinguished 
naturalistic qualities, […] delicate touch and stylish classical expression” 
(Nationalbanken, 2007b).  
The dilemmas of choosing a suitable theme were mirrored in the selection 
of the specific artist and design. Again, we see a push for artistic innovation and 
incorporation of modern motifs and values. However, this trend was effectively 
halted by Nationalbanken’s governors, who valued signalling long-term stability over 
novelty and trendiness. 
 
“Too weird for banknotes” 
Prior to the final selection, the proposals had been subjected to a focus group 
evaluation conducted by an external survey institute. Ten respondents were asked 
what they thought of the different designs, and very much favoured Lund’s proposal. 
Her naturalistic design was described as “beautiful”, “classic”, “traditional”, but also 
“a bit too nice” (Nationalbanken, 2007c). Bonnén’s modernist proposal, which 
interpreted the landscape theme in a very different way, including among other 
elements a sink of dirty dishes and a laptop computer, received mixed reviews. While 
some of the respondents considered the proposal “hip”, “modern”, or “bold”, others 
thought the design was “better suited for a museum of modern art”, “too weird for 
banknotes” and “a bit like monopoly money” that “could not be taken seriously” 
(Nationalbanken, 2007c). While Lund’s traditional design was considered a little dull 
and overly conformist, the respondents simultaneously criticized Bonnén’s innovative 
proposal for being, i.a., “too weird” for Danish banknotes. Thus, some of the focus 
group respondents explicitly demanded that Danish banknotes look a certain way and 
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reflect some degree of stability and moneyness – the antithesis of trend and 
modernity 
Bonnén’s “weird monopoly money”, although very much favoured by the 
jury of professional artists, apparently conflicted with the identity narrative of both 
the central bank governors and parts of the population. Some focus groups 
respondents simply expected Nationalbanken to produce classical notes with 
romanticist references because this story better suited their image of the central bank 
as a “serious” state institution. The notion that the modern proposal “could not be 
taken seriously as Danish money” underlines this point. Innovations in banknote 
design were at odds with existing perceptions of the central bank and its relationship 
with the public.  
 
5. Conclusions 
In this article I have shown how the Danish central bank, historically, has faced a 
complex context of legitimacy when choosing the designs for new banknotes. 
Nationalbanken continuously tried to select the motifs believed to improve banknote 
trustworthiness and legitimacy. Paralleling Tognato and Penrose’s suggestions about 
the sources of central bank legitimacy, Nationalbanken sought to make its banknotes 
resonate with existing perceptions of national community. The banknotes, in the 
words of Seddelgruppen had to be “unmistakably Danish”. However, this strategy of 
alignment proved very difficult because ideas of the national community were 
contingent and diverging. Nationalbanken’s constituency had mixed and sometimes 
conflicting ideas about Danish values and the national community.  
The processes of choosing appropriate designs were continuously 
informed by another internal logic, in which issues of authority and seriousness were 
considered essential to banknote design. This expectation was both expressed 
internally within the central bank but also articulated by some of the focus group 
respondents. Nationalbanken had to find a balance between these diverging 
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inclinations. The design considerations reflect that Nationalbanken did in fact 
acknowledge that it faced a complex legitimacy context. And from the source 
material we get an impression that the Nationalbanken employees were committed to 
making Danish banknotes reflect changing societal values. However, this 
commitment was most pertinent during the design processes; less so in the final 
results, that were captained by the three central-bank governors.  
The governors ultimately pursued a traditional national romanticist master 
narrative. The predominant national romantic iconography has to be considered the 
governors’ attempt to deal with complexity and to secure the legitimacy of their 
notes. To this end the traditional national romantic narrative was seen as the solution. 
These iconographic preferences of the central bank governors should not be 
considered attempts to cultivate a specific national narrative, as many studies dealing 
with banknote iconography from a nationalism study perspective suggest. Surely, 
banknotes contribute to a symbolic repertoire that potentially reifies the idea of the 
nation in a form of banal nationalism, but I have found no such aspirations in the 
sources.  
However, the source material does in fact reveal a continuous 
preoccupation with the international reception of the banknotes. What image of 
Denmark and Danes would the notes convey to an international audience? 
Consequently, Seddelgruppen was reluctant to incorporate motifs that might signal 
values considered too soft and too complacent for the international audience. I argue 
that this concern should not be considered as identity crafting or nation-building in 
the traditional sense. Rather, the concept of nation-branding, as described in the 
Danish context by for example (Mordhorst, 2010) and (Hansen 2010), seems to 
account for such considerations more appropriately.  
While the motifs and symbols on money potentially work to promote a 
sense of banal nationalism, and perhaps even spark a particular sense of national 
identity, evidence from the Danish case calls for a more nuanced view of the 
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banknote design process. Based on the analysis of the three Danish competitions I 
propose that Danish banknote deigns reflect a compromise between different 
perceptions of sources of legitimacy. As perceptions of the national community 
proved evolving and even diverging – as Palle Nielsen put it so remorsefully in 1994 
– the nation as a source of legitimacy seemed to be diluting. The bank thus had come 
up with a symbolic strategy that could respond to these changing ideas. Also, the 
analysis calls for a more nuanced distinction between the concepts of trust and 
legitimacy in the context of banknote iconography. Symbols that capture the spirit of 
the time and are perceived as legitimate banknote motifs by central bank constituents 
might not always be the ones best suited to underpin the banknotes trustworthiness. 
My analysis extends existing research on the sources to and effects of 
banknote design by highlighting the complexity and ambiguity that characterize the 
production of banknotes. Central bankers ultimately choose the motifs they perceive 
most effectively will secure trustworthiness. These symbols might originate from an 
established national canon, but this is not always the case. I suggest that, in other 
cases, the trustworthiness of banknotes might as well be sourced from other types of 
symbols more closely related to either state or transnational norms and values.  
Future research could investigate such a suggestion by comparing 
banknote iconography in different countries with varying degrees of state and nation. 
How does banknote iconography look in settings without state but a strong sense of 
nation? What about countries with vague ideas of national community but a strong 
state? And what happens when neither state nor nation can be evoked as a source of 
legitimacy?  
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BANKING ON THE NATION: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF CENTRAL BANK 
LEGITIMACY AND THE NARRATIVES OF FOUR DANISH CENTRAL BANK 
GOVERNORS. 
 
Anders Ravn Sørensen 
  
Abstract 
In this article I analyze the narratives of four Danish central bank governors from the 
late nineteenth century until the mid 1990s. I show how these central bank governors 
were continuously involved in public debates over the appropriateness and 
desirability of their decisions and policies. In these debates, interpretations and 
reproductions of Danish national identity were central to the governors’ legitimacy 
claims. I argue that past narratives of the Danish central bank and its governors 
enabled and framed future legitimacy claims. Also, whereas the governors’ explicit 
evocation of national identity was most pronounced in the period up to the 1940s, 
Danish central bank governors and the central bank organization gradually became 
embedded in national identity. As such, the article highlights the historical 
development of the co-configuring relationship between Danish national identity and 
the legitimacy of monetary organization.122 
 
1. Introduction 
What legitimates a central bank and its actions? Certainly, central bank independence 
from the control of governments and elected officials has something to do with it. 
Blinder (1997:118) argues that the legal framework of central bank independence 
shields these monetary institutions from the whims and incursions of politicians who 
                                                                
122 The first part of this paper’s title, “Banking on the nation”, is inspired by an identical chapter-title (Chapter seven) in 
Stephen Mihm’s A Nation of Counterfeiters from 2007. 
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want to use monetary policy to please the electorate. Many studies have suggested 
that central bank power and legitimacy derives from the fact that they are positioned 
outside the political sphere of influence (Goodman, 1992; Johnson, 1998). Lebaron 
(2000) proposes that the distinctly apolitical and seemingly neutral position of central 
bankers legitimates and authenticates the office of central bank governor in the eyes 
of the public. This perceived apolitical position has enabled central bankers to make 
authoritative claims about monetary affairs with reference to their undisputed 
economic expertise (Rosenhek, 2013). 
Yet other analysts have suggested that central bank independence is more 
accurately perceived as a symbolic feature that contributes to organizational 
legitimacy (McNamara, 2002:48; Marcussen, 2005). Most recently Tognato (2012) 
argued that monetary affairs interrelate closely with issues of collective identity, 
morality and societal values, and that these interrelations directly affect the perceived 
legitimacy of central banks and their governors. In order to most successfully conduct 
monetary policy and to persuade both politicians and the population (creditors as well 
as debtors) to accept economic losses associated with changing monetary targets, 
Tognato asserts that central banks must align themselves with societal norms, values 
and national identity. This symbolic alignment takes place through a process of 
dramatization in which monetary players seek to improve legitimacy by signalling 
adherence to “fundamental norms and values that organize society” (Tognato, 
2012:36).  
Although academic literature has only recently begun to focus on the 
connection between central banking and national identity, this historical analysis 
demonstrates that central bankers have long been aware that the legitimacy of their 
organization – and indeed their own legitimacy – depended on their ability to align 
the bank with national identity.  At times, Danish central bankers have used national 
identity to legitimate their organization, while at other times various interest groups 
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and politicians have mobilized the concept of the nation against the central bank and 
its governors.  
This article expands on recent research on the cultural and symbolic 
significance of central banks by historicizing the connection between central bank 
legitimacy and national identity. By honing in on the narratives of and about central 
bankers during four episodes in Danish monetary history I demonstrate that, 
historically, central bank legitimacy has depended on the governors’ ability to 
successfully frame the organization as aligned with national values and serving the 
interests of the national community.  
The article is organized as follows: in section 2, I present a select review 
of the literature on the cultural sources of central bank legitimacy. I use this review to 
argue for an analysis sensible to the entwinement of central banking and national 
identity. In this section I also outline my working definitions of the concepts of 
legitimacy and of national identity. In section 3, I describe an analytical strategy that 
focuses on the narratives of and about Danish central bank governors and in section 
4, the main analytical part of this paper, I focus on four different periods in Danish 
central bank history to argue that past narratives of Nationalbanken and its governors 
enabled and framed the bank’s future legitimacy. In section 5, I conclude on the 
analysis. 
 
2. Central banks, legitimacy and national identity 
In the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Kathleen McNamara argues that 
national institutional settings constitute the sources of central bank legitimacy: 
“Central bank independence is offset, in national settings, by a robust and 
representative set of institutions. These include the legislature (a parliament or a 
congress), and executive level bureaucracies (a finance ministry or treasury), whose 
very roots are in the democratic partisan process” (McNamara, 2012:148). 
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However, central banks do not merely rely on these “robust” institutions, 
they also interface with more informal institutional logics. Juliet Johnson thus 
demonstrated how post-communist central bankers in the 1990s readily accepted the 
beliefs and norms of the transnational community of central bankers, including the 
organizational emulation of Western-style independent central banks. While 
conforming to the international value-system of the epistemic community of central 
bankers, however, post-communist central banks lost legitimacy in the eyes of their 
domestic constituents (Johnson, 2006:368). As it turned out, central bank 
independence did not really bolster legitimacy in the Eastern European case. Johnson 
ascribes this problem to “the challenge of embeddedness” arguing that institutional 
change was not internalized and “pulled in” by the social actors (Johnson, 2006:366). 
So, if the social actors’ embeddedness in existing logics led to the rejection of this 
new type of organization – despite central bank independence – we must widen our 
search to find the sources of central bank legitimacy. Ideas about the nation are an 
interesting starting point for such an enquiry.   
The suggestion that monetary affairs are closely related to national 
identity is not new. Most notably Gilbert & Helleiner (1999), Helleiner (1998, 2003) 
and Pointon (1998) have investigated the relationship between money and 
nationalism. In the Danish case, this connection has been demonstrated by Sørensen 
(2014), who argues that monetary organization has been entwined in narratives of a 
shared history, popular sovereignty and fundamental societal values. 
Polanyi was among the first to argue for such an interrelation, proposing 
that “Politically, the nation’s identity was established by the government; 
economically it was vested in the central bank” (Polanyi, 1957:205). Although 
Polanyi was right in pointing to the connection between central banks and national 
identity, the use of the term “vested” indicates that central banks were sources of 
national identity. Polanyi’s intriguing statement potentially obscures an alternative 
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interpretation of this relationship; that central banks also draw on national identity in 
search of legitimacy rather than merely anchoring national identity themselves. 
Such ideas about the sources of central bank legitimacy constitute the key 
arguments of Tognato’s recent work on central banks, cultural codes and symbolic 
performances. Here, Tognato suggests that the legitimacy and the distinctly political–
economic authority of central banks rest on their discursive practices linking 
monetary matters to deep-seated cultural themes and narratives. According to 
Tognato, central banks’ institutional power and legitimacy depend on the symbolic 
connections between monetary affairs and fundamental issues of societal values and 
collective identity (Tognato, 2012:4). 
This is a somewhat different interpretation than that of central bank 
independence and the perceived neutrality of central bankers. In fact, following 
Tognato, the quintessential feature of successful central bankers is not that of 
neutrality, as Lebaron posits, but rather the central bank’s ability to portray itself as 
an organization that integrates and reflects nationality. Also, Lebaron might be right 
that modern central bankers are perceived as apolitical in the context of national party 
politics, but as I will argue, central bankers’ claim to legitimacy have been 
characterized by an inherently political process, as they have found themselves 
whirled into a rhetorical play of authority in which issues of collective identity, 
symbols, metaphors and ideas of morality and the public good contributed to the 
legitimization and questioning of these organizations and their governors.  
A handful of studies have already called attention to the performativity of 
central bank rhetoric and highlighted the way central bankers construct and reproduce 
monetary reality as either “ideational entrepreneurs” (Marcussen, 2000:61), 
authoritative “sense-makers” (Abolafia, 2010; Rosenhek, 2013) or through the 
“performative art” of central banking (Holmes, 2013:12).123 Most of these studies, 
                                                                
123 In past years the notion of central banks’ forward guidance; e.i. the attempts to affect market expectations trough 
different commutative practices, have gained increasing scholarly interest. See for example (den Haan, 2013). 
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however, treat central bankers’ strategic use of language as a recent phenomenon that 
evolved during the past decades.  
Marcussen accentuates this perspective when he presents former Danish 
central bank governor Erik Hoffmeyer as an “ideational entrepreneur” who used the 
media as a platform to change the “consensual knowledge amongst the Danish 
political elites” (Marcussen, 2000:64). “Contrary to his predecessors”, Marcussen 
writes, “Erik Hoffmeyer has participated actively in public debate when he found it 
necessary to promote certain ideas about monetary politics which he, for some reason 
or the other, could not get integrated in mainstream economic policy thinking through 
other channels” (Marcussen, 2000:66-67). In this article, analysing four different 
episodes in Danish monetary history, I argue that Danish central bankers have always 
used various media to address politicians and the general public in their efforts to 
reach monetary policy objectives, often by referring to the nation as a legitimating 
concept. I focus on this rhetorical play and ask how central banks, in practice and 
across time, have activated and referred to such symbols and metaphors? 
 
Bringing the nation back in 
The core thesis of this article is that central bank legitimacy depends on narratives 
associated with the nation and that this interrelation between narratives and 
legitimacy has developed historically. For analytical purposes, a conceptual definition 
of both legitimacy, nation and national identity is in its place.  
Legitimacy has to do with the generalized perception that certain actions 
or entities are desirable and appropriate within a socially constructed system of 
norms, values and beliefs (Suchman, 1995:574). According to Meyer and Scott, 
organizational legitimacy “refers to the degree of cultural support for an organization 
– the extent to which the array of established cultural accounts provide explanation 
for its existence, functioning and jurisdiction” (Meyer & Scott, 1983:201). 
Organizational legitimacy originates in a range of different sources. Depending on 
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the analytical emphasis, legitimacy may either derive from: operating by and 
conforming to legal requirements, alignment with prevailing ideas of morality, or 
from “conforming to a common definition of the situation, frame of reference, or a 
recognizable role or structural template” (Scott, 2008:61). One way to obtain the 
latter is for organizations to invoke other symbols, actors and values that are 
themselves considered legitimate (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Strandgaard Pedersen & 
Dobbin, 2006:898).  
Following Friedland and Alford’s famous call to bring society back in 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991), we cannot conceive of organizations as isolated from 
their institutional and societal contexts. In fact, symbolic systems such as the nation 
guide human activity and infuse it with meaning (Friedland & Alford, 1991:232-238). 
These systems carry with them certain logics that provide social actors with 
vocabularies and a sense of self. Similarly, Jepperson and Meyer (1991) describe 
formal organizations in rationalized society as “dependent upon the modern polity, as 
it is embodied in the nation-state and the wider world systems. Rationalized 
structures, from organizations to actors to technical functions and functionaries, 
derive their resources, meaning and legitimacy from their linkages to modern rules of 
the public good” (Jepperson & Meyer, 1991:205). 
Like all other types of organizations and actors, central banks and their 
governors are deeply embedded in existing cultural patterns and values that define the 
framework of possible and acceptable actions. National identity constitutes such a 
cultural pattern that legitimates and constrains possible actions. For the purpose of 
this article I want to use Smith’s definitions of nation and national identity. The 
nation is understood as a “named and self-defining human community whose 
members cultivate shared memories, symbols, myths, traditions and values, inhabit 
and are attached to historic territories or ‘homelands’, create and disseminate a 
distinctive public culture, and observe shared customs and standardised laws” (Smith, 
2009:29).  
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Smith defines national identity as “the continuous reproduction and 
reinterpretation of the pattern of values, symbols, memories, myths and traditions that 
compose the distinctive heritage of nations, and the identifications of individuals with 
that pattern and heritage and with its cultural elements” (Smith, 2001:18). To be sure, 
national identity is a contingent concept. It changes over time and is found in a 
“profusion of signifiers, objects, practices and spaces” (Edensor, 2002:33). It is 
therefore important to stress that I do not consider national identity a stable analytical 
category. It is understood as a process of continuous production and reproduction of a 
range of cultural elements as well as individual identifications with these elements 
that configure the nation. In this definition the concept both has an individual and 
collective dimension; the latter of which can be empirically studied in the concrete 
reproduction and reinterpretation of the nation’s cultural patterns. 
This idea of national identity as a source of legitimacy constitutes a 
promising framework for analysing central bank legitimacy, as existing analyses tend 
to focus either on central bank independence, the gradual scientization, or democratic 
oversight as the sources of legitimacy. While these features may be significant, they 
are not sufficient to explain central bank legitimacy. Nor do these elements reveal 
anything about the historical development of the narratives of central banking and the 
manner in which such narratives defined the frames for possible and legitimate 
central bank decisions.    
 
3.0 Sketching an analytical framework 
How can these ideas about national identity as a source of central bank legitimacy be 
applied in a historical analysis? My analytical framework is inspired by a narrative 
approach to history. By narrative I understand a symbolic representation of events 
that is framed by a certain theme and linked in time (Mordhorst, 2013:4). Following 
the ideas of (White, 1975; Jenkins & Munslow, 2003; Hansen, 2012) I perceive 
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narratives as formative to the way individuals understand and interpret present 
events. This means that narratives are not just representations of the past, but that 
they shape the way we understand the present, excluding some interpretations and 
enabling or permitting others, while defining our expectations of the future. They 
create order and offer explanations for the phenomena we encounter, and this means 
that by regulating our interpretation of the past, narratives constrain the framework 
for what we consider legitimate actions and statements.  
Consequently, narrative interpretations of the past potentially define the 
perceived legitimacy of organizational actions or decision as demonstrated, for 
instance, by Hansen (2007) and Linde (2009). Thus, this historical analysis of the 
Danish central bank focuses on the ways in which symbolic representations of events 
have evolved and have been working to constrain or promote the legitimacy of the 
central bank organization.   
 
Central bank governors 
Drawing on Tognato’s ideas and focusing on “the language that defines the collective 
identities of their own societies” (Tognato, 2012:9), I will argue that central bank 
governors embody their organizations and that they speak on behalf of the central 
bank and disseminate the kind of statements and ideas that connect the central bank 
and national identity.  
What I am suggesting here is an analysis of the language of central 
bankers by which I aim to elucidate the development of the narratives that link 
national identity and the central bank organization. But analysing the language of 
central bank governors will not be sufficient to assess the potential resonance that 
such statements have had in public discourse. Therefore, I also examine media 
representations and evaluations of these bankers, their decisions and their reputations.  
To demonstrate how Danish central bankers have historically engaged in 
rhetorical quests for legitimacy I focus on four transitional periods in Danish 
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monetary history that posed significant challenges to Danish central bank legitimacy. 
The first period ranges from around 1840 when efforts first began to homogenize the 
Danish monetary system to the construction of the Scandinavian Monetary Union in 
1873. The second period comprises the years during and after WWI, from 1914 to 
1926, when the question of the gold standard was salient. The years from 1933 to 
1947 constitute the third period, where my focal points are currency restriction and 
monetary targets. The fourth and final period is from 1979 to 1982 and is 
characterized by looming stagflation and trade deficit. 
The empirical material of this article consists primarily of newspaper 
coverage of Nationalbanken and its governors from the turn of the last century until 
the mid 1990s. Since its 100th anniversary in 1918 Nationalbanken has preserved 
press clippings from all major Danish newspapers. In the source material I also 
include the personal writings and considerations of the governors as well as memoirs 
and biographies. As the analytical objects of this analysis are the narratives about 
Nationalbanken and its governors, these materials constitute potential outlets for such 
narratives.   
 
4. The narratives of four central bank governors 
Nationalism and central banking 1840-1873 
The first central bank governor to engage in public debate over monetary affairs was 
Moritz Levy who served Nationalbanken from 1857-1892. Prior to his employment at 
Nationalbanken Levy had served as ‘currency-agent’ in the Holstein city of Altona, 
commissioned by the Danish government to prevent the outflow of high-silver 
content Danish Rigsdaler. Prior to 1864, the Danish state was a conglomerate state 
comprised of different national communities. In the German-speaking Duchies of 
Schleswig and Holstein, Nationalbanken and its currency were increasingly framed as 
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symbols of Danish supremacy and imperialism. In fact, monetary organization had 
become a central theme that informed the national conflict between Denmark and the 
Duchies from around 1830 to 1864, when Schleswig-Holstein was finally lost to 
Prussia (Sørensen, 2013). In 1844 Nationalbanken established a regional branch in 
the Schleswigian city of Flensburg, which Schleswig-Holstein nationalists actively 
framed as symbol of Danish supremacy.   
Both as currency-agent and later as Nationalbank governor Levy actively 
engaged in public debates over monetary issues. He frequently wrote articles on the 
newest economic theories in the Copenhagen daily Dagbladet. In 1856 and 1868 he 
published two pamphlets proposing how to restructure the Danish and international 
monetary systems (Levy, 1856; Levy, 1868). Central to these proposals was the 
establishment of a gold-based currency, preferably as part of a wider transnational 
currency union. In the latter pamphlet, Levy suggested that Denmark join the English 
currency area, which traded most directly with Denmark (Levy, 1868:8). Later Levy 
came to favour a Scandinavian union, an idea that gradually evolved during the early 
1870s. In 1872 an agreement between Denmark and Sweden was signed in 
Stockholm (Bergman, Gerlach, & Jonung, 1993:508); Norway joined the union in 
1875. The creation of the Scandinavian Monetary Union was driven by economic 
liberals but also drew support from a pan-Scandinavian ideology that emphasized the 
historic and cultural ties between the countries. 
 
The values, customs and traditions of the people 
The monetary and national conflict between Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein 
highlighted that the legitimacy of both central bank and currency depended on the 
symbolic link between monetary organization and national identity (Sørensen, 2013). 
Levy very explicitly articulated such a connection when attending a meeting in 
Copenhagen in 1872 concerning the establishment of the monetary union. Here 
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representatives from Sweden, Norway and Denmark convened in the Danish 
parliament to discuss the future organization of a Scandinavian union, when a 
Swedish delegate suggested that the three Nordic countries join the German monetary 
union and use the Thaler as common currency.  
Having been at the centre of events in 1854 when the Danish and 
Schleswig-Holsteinian currencies were transformed into national symbols during the 
Duchies’ fight for independence, Levy foresaw obstacles to Denmark implementing a 
German currency. After all, the Danish state had just unsuccessfully spent some 25 
years trying to get the Duchies to accept the Danish currency. Levy therefore rejected 
the proposal to join the German monetary union arguing that a currency reform, such 
as the one proposed, was of the utmost importance at all levels of society – and “to 
change ones currency could be equated to changing ones language or religion” 
(Dessau, 1872:50). When evaluating the benefits of the proposal, it was necessary “to 
take into account the interests and wellbeing of the people, its perceptions and 
education, its values acquired during childhood and its customs and traditions” 
(Dessau, 1872:50). “We cannot afford to forget”, Levy finished, pointing to the fact 
that the debate was physically taking place in the Danish parliament, “that this is an 
issue of general popular interest” (Dessau, 1872:50). Eventually Denmark, Norway 
and Sweden decided to establish the Scandinavian Monetary Union with the gold-
based kroner as common currency.  
Levy – with his doubts about the popular response to the German 
currency – exemplifies a nineteenth century central banker with a clear sense of the 
relationship between the legitimacy of monetary policies and national identity. 
Monetary affairs, according to Levy, had to be aligned with basic popular customs, 
values and perceptions. This episode reveals two significant insights. Firstly, Levy 
established the precedence for Danish central bankers to actively engage in public 
debate over monetary issues, explicitly referring to “language” “customs” and 
“traditions” as the elements that would legitimize the Scandinavian Monetary Union. 
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Secondly, Levy cast himself as a ‘banker of the people’ sensitive to and tuned in to 
the tenets of the national community. This narrative proved resilient.   
When Levy died in 1892 his eulogies substantiated his legacy as a 
‘banker of the people’. Levy was anointed as a person who “by his excellent skill, by 
his personal attention, by his unfailing integrity and truthfulness, in his calm and clear 
overview had exercised extraordinary influence and who had used this influence to 
primarily work for the common good” (Falbe-Hansen, 1892:399). The conservative 
newspaper Berlingske Tidende celebrated his “righteousness” and strong “character” 
as well as his decisive actions against anyone he believed to “threaten his Fatherland, 
the institution in which he resided or the interests he was called to nurture” (n/a, 
1892a:2). Even the social-democratic newspaper Socialdemokraten, on the front 
page, acknowledged Levy’s service to society (n/a, 1892b:1).  
These obituaries were not merely empty eulogizing, but had an important 
function. When Nationalbanken celebrated its 100th anniversary in 1918 the 
newspapers still celebrated Levy as the nation’s banker. “Due to his bold initiatives 
and superior skills” wrote Berlingske Aftenavis, “he will occupy the most prominent 
position in the fatherland’s financial history” (Vestberg, 1918:5). Here, Berlingske 
went beyond reaffirming Levy’s reputation; the newspaper projected the narrative 
about Levy into the future and prophesized that he would remain a key historical 
figure. With this framing, Berlingske Tidende established a narrative about the 
Danish central bank governor as caretaker or gatekeeper of the nation, a narrative that 
could be and was invoked in the future to underpin the legitimacy of the organization.     
 
Monetary morality and the gold standard 1914-1926 
We now jump some 20 years forward to the outbreak of WWI. This was a period 
during which central bankers entered the political scene as never before and when 
central bank activities became politicized and popularized. In the interwar period, as 
Eichengreen puts it,  
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[t]he decisions of central bankers, long regarded as obscure, became grist for 
the political mill. The monetary authorities were attacked from the left for 
upholding out-dated monetary doctrines and from the right for pandering to 
the demands of the masses. They consequently lost much of the insulation 
they once enjoyed (Eichengreen, 1996:9). 
 
Indeed, this observation holds particularly true for Carl Theodor Ussing, who was a 
member of Nationalbanken’s board of governors from 1914 to 1924. To a greater 
extent than any governor before or after him, Ussing engaged fiercely in public 
debates to defend the decisions and policies of the central bank.  
 
The gold standard and World War I 
Immediately following the war declarations of 28 July 1914, Nationalbanken and the 
Danish government decided on a series of monetary and financial measures to 
prevent the collapse of the Danish financial sector and to protect the economy in 
general. 1) On July 29 the Copenhagen stock–exchange was effectively closed for 
trading. 2) On August 2, to avoid bank runs, the Danish government approved 
legislation that put a 300 kroner limit on withdrawals from banks and savings banks. 
3) Due to public hoarding of precious metals and in particular silver-based small 
coins, the government authorized Nationalbanken to issue 1- and 2-kroner notes, even 
though the bank statues stated that 5 kroner was the smallest possible note 
denomination. Finally, and with significant consequences for Nationalbanken’s future 
monetary policies, the Danish government decided to suspend banknote convertibility 
into gold.  
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“The sum of fairness”  
Generally Nationalbanken was applauded for guiding Denmark safely through WWI. 
In 1918 the financial newspaper Finanstidende urged its readers to acknowledge ”the 
exquisite service, the value to society, and the national significance, promoted by the 
men who governed Nationalbanken through calm and storms and through war and 
peace” (n/a, 1918a:1072-1073).  And in conclusion, the newspaper pointed to “[t]he 
sum of fairness, common sense and sober administration that has resided, and to this 
day resides within its walls” (n/a, 1918a:1072-1073). In this short paragraph, the 
newspaper directly connected central bank legitimacy to the governors’ fairness and 
common sense, which would deliver value to society and further the interests of the 
nation. This kind of appraisal was not confined to publications with an economic 
focus. In 1918 the Danish weekly Hjemmet [The Home], primarily for middleclass 
homemakers, recalled the suspension of the gold standard in 1914 as the day when 
people “ignored the calls for calmness and national unity, to instead line up in front 
of Nationalbanken’s building, the supreme symbol of trustworthiness, to claim their 
gold and take it home” (n/a, 1918b:5). According to Hjemmet it was the “savvy 
financiers in Nationalbanken’s board of governors who were the sole reason why the 
ship did not go under” (n/a, 1918b:5).  
 This short account in Hjemmet offers several interesting insights into the 
connection between Nationalbanken and national identity. Firstly, it is worthy of note 
that Nationalbanken’s anniversary made it into the pages of a magazine that was not 
normally dealing with monetary issues. Hjemmet’s interest in Nationalbanken attests 
to the resonance that the bank seemingly had in the popular imagination. Secondly, 
the idea that people who collected their gold from the bank prior to suspension acted 
against the interest of the nation and disregarded “national unity” shows that 
monetary issues, such as managing the gold standard, were closely connected to a 
sense of public good and national coherence. Thirdly, the magazine provided a 
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narrative in which the central bank governors were the key figures whose actions 
would either save the national economy or allow it to go under. Pointing to the 
historical events during WWI, Hjemmet argued that Danish central bankers had 
prevented “the ship” of the nation from foundering. 
 
Morality, nationality and monetary affairs  
Although many contemporaries congratulated Nationalbanken and its governors on 
guiding the nation safely through WWI, the issue of returning to the gold standard 
had not been resolved by 1918. In the following decade Ussing and his co-governors 
fought bitterly with the critics who considered the gold standard essential to monetary 
stability, even to the reputation of Denmark and its citizens. 
The suspension of the gold standard sowed the seed of a decade-long 
dispute between Nationalbanken, on the one hand, and professor Axel Nielsen and 
professor and Member of Parliament Lauritz Vilhelm Birch, on the other. For more 
than a decade these two university professors criticized Nationalbanken’s decision 
not to uphold the value of its notes. The two prominent university professors’ 
criticism revolved around two main issues. Nationalbanken’s governors and the 
professors disagreed fundamentally as to the role of the central bank. Whereas Ussing 
and his co-governor Rubin sought to strengthen Nationalbanken’s influence on the 
Danish economy generally speaking, Nielsen and Birch focused primarily on a stable 
currency and strict rules for the backing of Nationalbanken’ banknotes (Nielsen, 
1923:373; Svendsen, Hansen, Olsen, & Hoffmeyer, 1968:33).  
The professors argued that the bank should use the discount rate to 
counter inflation. Ussing, on the other hand, called for moderate public and private 
consumption and argued that the bank should prioritize production rather than the 
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value of the notes (Hansen, 1996:317).124 Nielsen and Birch’s arguments struck a 
chord with many of their contemporaries; their analysis echoed the conventional 
wisdom that the main monetary goal was the continuous underpinning of banknote 
value. However, in spite of repeated attacks, Nationalbanken continued to command 
a considerable respect and authority (Svendsen et al., 1968:75). According to 
economic historian, Erling Olsen, this high degree of legitimacy must be considered a 
result of the governor’s deliberate and determined efforts to sway public opinion 
using various means. In a slightly anachronistic turn of phrase, Olsen referred to these 
as Nationalbanken’s “public relations efforts” (Svendsen et al., 1968:75).  
 As mentioned, Ussing was an avid writer, public speaker and 
commentator. He engaged eagerly in public debates on a wide range of issues not 
limited to issues of central banking and monetary policy. Some of his publications 
include, for example, a nationalist celebration of the reunification of Southern Jutland 
with the Kingdom of Denmark in 1920 (Ussing, 1920a:515-521) and a controversial 
defence of the Danish King’s attempt to dissolve parliament in what is known as ‘The 
Easter Crisis’ of 1920. However, although Ussing’s nationalist rhetoric might have 
been a genuine expression of his convictions, the key aspect for the purpose of this 
analysis is how Ussing framed his arguments by continuously referring to the nation 
when he defended monetary decisions.  
Among the books and pamphlets he published on monetary issues during 
and after his time in office is a 13-page pamphlet titled Economic ABC for Everyman 
from 1920. Here Ussing shared his perspective on rising prices and the shortages of 
imported goods; in his view, immoral private consumption and reckless import were 
at the core of Demark’s current economic hardship. To get at this problem, Ussing 
introduced a moral imperative into the realm of public consumption: 
                                                                
124  In 1922 Nationalbanken had further contributed to inflation through its lender-of-last-resort assistance to the 
distressed Landmandsbanken. Eventually in March 1924 monetary targets were changed. The bank introduced a credit 
rationing policy and the krone reached parity in 1926. From January 1927 Denmark was back on gold (P. H. Hansen, 
1994:72-73).  
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We cannot talk or bribe ourselves out of shortages and dearth; we need to 
face the facts and endure. In these times, in this country, we should applaud 
one thing in particular; wearing a ragged coat. It is a patriotic act to wear 
mended shoes. Professor Warming tells us that one needs tact to eat 
margarine. No, it is lack of sensitivity to the public good to eat butter, our 
most important export [...] with every penny that evades consumption and is 
put the bank, we ease the internal money shortages and improve the balance 
of payments. This is a patriotic act for the benefit of the future of our 
country. Accept wants; these will be dear to you when you understand the 
good you are doing for the country. What joy do you have in eating 
expensive food, when you can eat cheap food with a clean consciousness? 
(Ussing, 1920b:11-12). 
 
This passage is one the clearest examples of Ussing’s attempts to legitimize monetary 
policy by references to the nation. 
 The articulation of a public moral obligation to refrain from extravagant 
consumption resonates with the recurring theme in Ussing’s work: the fundamental 
entwinement of morality and economic affairs. In 1921 Ussing delivered yet another 
rallying cry to strengthen common solidarity in a lecture on “collective morality” at 
the Danish Educational Association. In the first part of the lecture, which was also 
issued in print, Ussing sketched what he defined as changing patterns in collective 
morality, stemming from the increasing division of labour that arose in the transition 
from traditional to modern society. Having outlined an almost Durkheimian 
interpretation of the changing patterns in public solidarity, Ussing suggested 
promoting the cultivation of a sense of “collective moral obligation” and the 
responsibility of the individual to the wellbeing of society (Ussing, 1921:492-498).  
 As an example, Ussing mentioned that the recent shortage of small coins 
had prompted the central bank governors to issue a public call for small coins, with 
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reference to the “public good”. Only one person showed up at Nationalbanken with 
100 kroner in small change, and demanded to be paid 120 kroner to hand them over. 
Such selfishness, Ussing asserted, was similar to two lovers picnicking in a beautiful 
spot, who only have eyes for one another, failing to clean up their trash. Lacking a 
collective morality, they “soil and tarnish” the place (Ussing, 1921:499).  
Ussing’s interpretation of public unwillingness to hand over their small 
coins might come across as overly sensitive. Nonetheless, the analogy effectively 
dramatized a relatively banal problem and turned it into a moral question. 
Metaphorically speaking, it was of course Denmark itself that was being tarnished by 
the allegedly immoral behaviour, and Danes themselves, as a national collective, who 
paid the price. Thus, Ussing sought to further Nationalbanken’s interest by pointing 
to the illegitimate hoarding of small coins.      
 
The honest krone 
Nationalbanken’s suspension of the gold standard in 1914 paved the way for a new 
monetary regime. These new inconvertible notes forced the public to recognize that 
the value of their money depended on the trustworthiness of the central bank and its 
governors.125 This meant that Ussing had to affirm the central bank’s commitment to 
actually return to the gold standard and that, now that the banknotes were no longer 
anchored by gold, legitimacy had to be sourced somewhere else. After the war, when 
Nationalbanken failed to immediately return to the gold standard, public calls to 
reinstate “the honest krone” were continuously voiced. Both Nielsen and Birch 
expressed their critique in books and newspapers, but ordinary citizens also weighed 
in, such as principal Jens Byskov, who published a pamphlet titled “An honest krone” 
in 1924. The cover depicted a Danish hundred kroner banknote surrounded by gold 
                                                                
125 A point also noted by Carruthers & Babb (1996:1571-1572) and Helleiner (1998:1428).  
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coins while a red arrow pointed to a German Reichbank-note as an indication of what 
could happen if Nationalbanken did not resume gold convertibility.  
Byskov framed Nationalbanken’s return to the gold standard as a moral 
imperative rather than a decision based on monetary considerations. In fact, the moral 
depravation of the inconvertible currency reflected back on Danish society as a 
whole. As Byskov put it, “If we do not bring order back into monetary affairs, we 
cannot be considered a truly honest and sincere people. That is certain” (Byskov, 
1924:18). He also argued that Nationalbanken eroded the concept of “Danish 
honesty”, an ideal nurtured and cherished by the rural Danish population for 
generations. “From our forefathers we have inherited a name, a certain reputation and 
an obligation”, Byskov argued (Byskov, 1924:19-22). Consequently, Nationalbanken 
was about to destroy the honest reputation of the Danes.126 Ussing actively countered 
these attacks on Nationalbanken in the newspapers. He dismissed the concept of the 
“honest krone” as nonsense and argued that there was no such thing as honest or 
dishonest decisions in monetary affairs. Apparently, Using was more concerned with 
the morality of monetary affairs when it served the purpose of legitimating 
Nationalbanken’s policies.    
 
Ussing absolved 
Notwithstanding Ussing’s tumultuous term in office, he was eventually vindicated. 
At Ussing’s 70th birthday in 1927, three years after he had retired from 
Nationalbanken, law professor and permanent secretary of the council of state, Frantz 
Dahl, publically celebrated his impeccable courage and moral. “Ussing received a lot 
of criticism in his handling of Nationalbanken’s economic policies”, Dahl wrote in a 
newspaper article. “But irrespective of how future monetary experts will judge his 
decisions, his righteousness and optima fide remain untainted” (Dahl, 1927). After 
                                                                
126 This kind of argument about currency’s honesty and credibility bears a striking resemblance to the debate between 
bullionists and greenbackers over the resumption of the gold standard in postbellum America (See for instance Garfield 
& Kline, 1879). 
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Ussing’s death in 1934 Berlingske Tidende substantiated this narrative and explicitly 
credited Ussing’s courage and bright thinking for guiding the country safely through 
the perils of World War I (Cohn, 1934:5).  
 
WWII and currency restriction 1940-1949  
Even though Danish gold convertibility had been restored in 1926/1927, the British 
flight from gold in September 1931 prompted foreign creditors to claim their 
receivables, which again led to pressure on Danish gold reserves. On 29 September 
1931, Denmark followed the British example and suspended gold convertibility. Also 
in 1936, following two years of legislative preparations and parliamentary debates, 
the Danish parliament decided to change the statutes of the central bank. Rather than 
being privately owned, the central bank act of 1936 established Nationalbanken as an 
independent organization with the purpose of securing a stable monetary system and 
to regulate credit. From 1940 to 1945 Denmark was occupied by the German 
National-Socialist regime. After the war Nationalbanken only gradually eased its 
currency restrictions, and in the post-war period low inflation and full employment 
became key targets for Danish policymakers.    
Throughout this period, Nationalbanken was headed by governor Carl 
Bramsnæs, appointed in 1933 and elected head of the board of governors in 1936. 
Prior to his appointment he had served as social-democratic Minister of Finance from 
1929 to 1933. He decided to resign from the Ministry of Finance as a consequence of 
the Danish devaluation in 1933, a decision Bramsnæs had staunchly opposed because 
it would benefit the exporting agricultural sector at the expense of real wages 
(Svendsen et al., 1968:156-163).  
Bramsnæs’ political past as a well-known social democrat was a fact that 
defined his period as central bank governor. However, he was by no means a pawn of 
the social democratic government but often ran the central bank without regard for 
the wishes of his former party colleagues. At the time of his appointment to office in 
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1933 he was already a divisive and controversial figure. In 1935, under the headline 
‘Unpopular – why?’ the conservative newspaper Nationaltidende gave the following 
characterization of the governor: “He is inapproachable. He does not share his 
countrymen’s sense for some small talk and occasional relaxation […] he cannot take 
a man by the arm and chat in the informal fashion we Danes appreciate” (n/a, 
1935:2).  The newspaper’s aversion against Bramsnæs was not framed as critique of 
his political orientation, but of his alleged lack of joviality and his supposedly un-
Danish fashion. As such, the newspaper implied that a central bank governor ought to 
reflect traits and values it considered properly Danish.  
 
Speaking of a national economy 
Whereas the transition to an independent central bank did not change the dominant 
popular narrative about the bank, it apparently changed the way that the governors 
positioned themselves vis à vis the public and talked about the national economy. 
Like Ussing, Bramsnæs regularly addressed the public through newspaper articles, 
public speeches and radio addresses. While Ussing’s public addresses were often 
articulated as direct responses to his critics, Bramsnæs established a tradition of 
delivering to the public an overview, evaluation and forecast of the national economy 
and monetary issues.  
In 1935, Bramsnæs pleaded with the public not to consider a devaluation 
of the Danish krone as a solution to improving the balance of trade; instead, he 
suggested moderating import of foreign goods (Bramsnæs, 1935:11). In January 1937 
Bramsnæs delivered a similar public address in Socialdemokraten. The article had a 
very technical focus and Bramsnæs delivered information on problems with inflation, 
warned about speculative trends, analysed devaluations around Europe, and gave 
figures on the performance within the agricultural sector. With this ‘state-of-the-
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nation-like’ address Bramsnæs established a tradition of evaluating and forecasting 
the Danish economy (Bramsnæs, 1937:3). 
The 1935 and 1937 articles must be viewed in the context of the changed 
Nationalbank statutes in 1936 and can be interpreted as Bramsnæs’ acknowledgment 
that, with the new independent status, the role of the central bank had changed. It was 
now, more than ever, a national bank. The tradition of giving the public an overview 
of the national economy can be seen as reflecting this changed status. In fact, the idea 
that the Nationalbank governor could assume the position as disseminator of national 
economics to the ordinary people may have been Ussing’s, but Bramsnæs was not 
slow to seize it and firmly consolidated it into tradition.  
One technological development in particular increased the potency of this 
new tradition, namely radio broadcasting. Bramsnæs used the radio to directly 
address the population as head of the central bank. These public addresses potentially 
contributed to the governors’ image of as custodian of the currency and the national 
economy, as Nationalbanken’s policies were now designated an issue of public 
concern. Back in 1872, when Moritz Levy argued that monetary organization was an 
issue of great concern to “all levels of society” he was addressing a limited audience. 
Although somewhat accurate, it functioned mainly as a rhetorical measure to get his 
point across. With the new technology of the radio Bramsnæs truly positioned central 
banking as an issue of broad popular concern and interest; he was literally able to 
address all levels of society. 
On 8 April 1940, Bramsnæs delivered his first radio address (out of 
many) on the status of the Danish economy. He warned, in particular, about the rising 
inflationary pressure and announced increased restrictions on imports as a measure to 
ease inflation. In addition, he recommended moderate expectations in wage 
developments (n/a, 1940:5). Bramsnæs’ message might have been somewhat 
obscured by the German invasion on the morning of April 9. Nonetheless no Danish 
newspapers fundamentally challenged or questioned the assumption that the central 
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bank governor could position himself as the natural and national head of the economy 
and suggest measures not only directly connected to monetary policy but to the wage- 
and labour market more generally.  
During the German occupation from 1940 to 1945 his position as the 
nation’s banker was gradually consolidated. When the conservative evening paper 
Berlingske Aftenavis in June 1942 featured a large interview with Bramsnæs, he was 
introduced as follows: 
 
When the history of the years prior to and during the current war is to be 
written, the name of C. V. Bramsnæs will hold a prominent position among 
those public officials who guided the fate of Denmark. Already, it is 
common to speak respectfully of Bramsnæs as ‘the country’s reticent but 
influential power’ (Vendt, 1942: 6-7).  
 
Also, as with Levy, the newspaper once again inscribed Bramsnæs’ 
reputation in a larger national history and provided a forecast of how he would be 
judged by history. Thus Berlingske both reproduced the narrative about central 
bankers as deciding the fate of the nation and at the same time passed it on for future 
narratives to build upon.   
 
Restrictions on foreign currencies 
In the years following the German occupation a range of monetary measures were 
introduced to stabilize the Danish economy. Immediately following the liberation in 
1945, Nationalbanken withdrew all circulating notes and replaced them with an 
emergency note series, which unbeknownst to the Germans had been secretly 
prepared by a handful of Nationalbank employees. Bramsnæs received considerable 
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recognition in the Danish press for keeping the new Danish banknotes a secret 
(Hjelm-Hansen, 1945:4).  
In addition, Bramsnæs also introduced strict rationing of foreign currency. 
He had warned about this rationing even before the war was over at a meeting in the 
Danish National Economists Association in 1944 (Bramsnæs, 1944:266). These 
restrictions went into effect not long after the end of the occupation, such that 
Nationalbanken would evaluate the need for selected foreign currency, of private 
citizens and companies who wished to import goods and services. 
 The foreign currency restrictions lead to considerable debate and criticism 
of Nationalbanken and Bramsnæs in the Danish press. Since the liberation in May 
1945 Danish citizens had been allowed to carry and exchange 25 Danish kroner when 
traveling to nearby Sweden. During the occupation, traveling to Sweden had been 
very difficult for ordinary Danes, who now considered these travels a liberty long 
denied by the Germans. From September 15, due to the increased exchange of Danish 
currencies into Swedish and other Scandinavian currencies, Nationalbanken decided 
to suspend the convertibility between Danish and Swedish currencies. Swedish 
currency was only granted to travel deemed “absolutely necessary” (n/a, 1945a: 1-2).  
This decision sparked massive protests from people who had used their 
newly gained freedom to travel. Bramsnæs replied directly to this criticism by 
framing the Danish currency as a tool for serving the common good. “We need to 
make sure that our currency is used in ways that serve society best”, Bramsnæs 
argued in Berlingske Aftenavis. “I am not convinced that the many trips to Malmö 
[Sweden] and back contribute anything to the reconstruction of the country’s 
economy” (n/a, 1945b: 1). Despite Bramsnæs’ insistence that the newly introduced 
restrictions indeed “served the interests of society”, the criticism continued.  
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In a satirical drawing from 11 January the same newspaper visualized the 
problem as Nationalbanken having taken over the role of the German occupation 
forces. Under the headline “The changing of the Guard” the Berlingske played with 
the idea that Nationalbanken now controlled travel to Sweden, in the same fashion as 
had the Germans (n/a, 1945c: 24). In this 
case, both Bramsnæs and Berlingske 
Tidende framed the restrictions concerning 
Swedish currency as a measure pertaining to 
the nation. Bramsnæs, to be sure, tried to 
convince the population that the new 
policies served a higher purpose and a 
common good. In the more mundane and 
satirical public discourse, such as Berlingske 
Tidende’s cartoon section, Nationalbanken 
was cast as an outright anti-national 
organization assuming the role of the 
occupation forces. In both instances, 
however, monetary affairs were entwined in national identity, and central banking 
was firmly embedded in a national setting which neither Bramsnæs nor Berlingske 
Tidende sought to challenge      
When Bramsnæs in his 1946 radio address pointed to the ongoing 
“currency-psychosis”, warned about the rising domestic price-level and firmly argued 
against a potential Danish devaluation, (n/a, 1946a:1), acting Minister of Finance 
Thorkild Kristensen from the centre-right and farmer-friendly party Venstre, 
publically reprimanded the central bank governor. In the newspaper Information, 
Kristensen expressed his concern that a civil servant, like Bramsnæs, would voice his 
own personal view in such a manner (n/a, 1946b:1). Despite such a public argument 
between the central bank governor and the Minister of Finance, most Danish 
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newspapers considered Bramsnæs’ warnings a prudent reminder to the politicians. 
The conservative newspaper Nationaltidende, for example, applauded Bramsnæs for 
living up to the responsibilities of the office and for objectively speaking out against 
“economic wrongdoings” (n/a, 1946c:4).    
  Besides regulating the exchange of Swedish currency, Nationalbanken 
also granted currency for licensing the translation of foreign books. This effectively 
meant that Nationalbanken for a while decided what kind of foreign literature was 
preferable and beneficial to Danish society. Notably, neither classical Russian 
literature nor American westerns were considered important enough for translation. 
Instead Nationalbanken 
favoured the translation of 
American scientific 
publications. This new role 
prompted the owner of a 
Jutland-based publishing 
house to write a comment in 
the newspaper Politiken in 
which he ironically anointed 
Bramsnæs as the new 
Rigskulturleder; meaning “the head of state culture”.  (Schiøttz-Christensen, 1946:6).  
As a comment on Nationalbanken’s role as literary critic Nationaltidende printed a 
cartoon in which Bramsnæs was literally booting an American cowboy from the gates 
of Denmark (n/a, 1946d:6). 
Of course this was meant as a satirical comment, but the cartoon directly 
and explicitly framed the central bank governor as a sort of national gatekeeper or 
chaperone. Again, the connection between central banking and nation was brought to 
the forefront and Nationalbanken’s policies framed as a kind of national bulwark 
against ‘unwanted’ foreign influence.  
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For the well-being of the Fatherland  
Surely Bramsnæs was a controversial figure: a figure who was continuously criticized 
from both the right and the left, for either focusing too much on employment or 
conducting contractionary monetary policies (Jürgensen, 1944:6). In particular, the 
restrictions on foreign currencies in the years after the war raised considerable 
popular criticism of the banker, who was supposedly serving the interests of the 
country. Perhaps this might explain why Bramsnæs accepted the position as treasurer 
for the newly established “Foundation for the well-being of the Fatherland” in 1945. 
In September 1945 Bramsnæs, in his capacity as treasurer, called for contributions to 
this foundation in memory of the liberation; writing in the newspapers Bramsnæs 
urged everyone who is able, to contribute as a “Thank you to the King for his strong 
character throughout those difficult years” (Bramsnæs, 1945).  
 Bramsnæs’ exhortation to honour the Danish King was most likely not a 
deliberate strategy for improving his legitimacy in the eyes of his sceptical 
constituents. However, the very idea that the central bank director would be involved 
in such a foundation and hand over the collected funds at the king’s 75th birthday 
celebration attests to the symbolic significance connected to the office as central bank 
governor. By taking up the position as treasurer Bramsnæs aligned himself and the 
bank with the nationalism that characterized Danish society in the period after 
liberation. The central bank governor had now become a figure, who could and would 
naturally contribute to the “wellbeing of the Fatherland”.  
 
Bramsnæs’ legacy 
At Bramsnæs 60th birthday in 1939, the local newspaper Frederiksberg Avis 
remarked that even conservative newspapers such as Berlingske Tidende had been 
forced to recognize how “parts of his personality reflected onto the bank itself, which 
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improved its authority and made it strong” (n/a, 1939:5). Ten years later when 
Bramsnæs announced his retirement in conjunction with his 70th birthday he was 
effectively absolved.  
The financial newspaper Børsen then described him as “man with great 
personality and financial conscience, which continuously informed his governing of 
the bank. He has been of the utmost importance to the Danish economy throughout 
these troubled years when he occupied this exposed office” (n/a, 1949a:4). The 
mention of “financial conscience” here is particularly interesting because – as with 
Ussing – it introduces the notion of morality into monetary affairs. Apparently the 
contractive monetary policy that Bramsnæs pursued throughout most of his time in 
office had become an issue of personal conscience and morality, rather than pure 
calculating rationality. The pro-Danish Flensborg Avis, based in the Schleswig city of 
Flensburg, applauded Bramsnæs for always “speaking against authority” and his 
social democratic colleagues in government (n/a, 1949b:2). “Surely”, the newspaper 
remarked in conclusion, “best wishes are sent to him from south of the border as we 
greet him as a good Danish man who served his Fatherland well” (n/a, 1949b:2). 
So far this analysis has demonstrated how Danish central bank governors 
have continuously struggled to legitimize their monetary decisions. In this process the 
central bank governors, as well as their critics, have attempted to derive meaning and 
legitimacy from national identity. Also, the analysis has pointed to the relatively 
stable narrative of the central bank governor as ‘banker of the nation’. In spite of 
having to make unpopular monetary decisions that inadvertently favoured some parts 
of the population (debtors, creditors, workers or employers) over others, the 
governors were always vindicated and hailed as a kind of monetary custodians of the 
Danish Fatherland. This narrative became a source of legitimacy for central bankers 
and justified monetary decisions. 
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Deficit and stagflation 1979-1982 
I now turn to the last example of a Danish central bank governor who emphatically 
dramatized monetary affairs. In 1965 Erik Hoffmeyer assumed the position as 
Nationalbank governor; a position he held until 1994, making him one of the world’s 
longest-sitting central bankers. The years from 1959 to 1973 marked the longest 
period of constant growth in Danish history. Simultaneously, due to increased 
investments, Denmark developed a massive deficit on the balance of trade coupled 
with ever-threatening inflation. This period of growth was followed by periods of 
stagflation. From the early 70s, inflation increased dramatically, and unemployment 
and interest rates soared.  
 During his time in office Hoffmeyer continuously clashed with shifting 
governments and Danish prime ministers. In 1967 he fought a particularly hard 
struggle with prime minister Jens Otto Kragh over a planned 14.3 per cent 
devaluation of the Danish currency as a response to the British devaluation. 
Eventually Kragh conceded to Hoffmeyer’s arguments and accepted a more modest 
devaluation of 8 per cent (Schmidt, 1993: 401-410). At one time, Minister of 
Economy Per Hækkerup, who disapproved intensely of Hoffmeyer’s dispositions, 
even tried to fire him. In popular discourse, these tensions contributed to Hoffmeyer’s 
reputation as a principled and moral central banker, who dared to argue with the 
elected politicians. This reputation culminated in 1980 when Hoffmeyer publically 
painted a very bleak picture of the future of the Danish economy.  
 
The abyss 
The biggest problem in the late 70s, seen from Hoffmeyer’s perspective, was the 
ever-increasing national debt: a result of high oil prices and interest rates. Hoffmeyer 
continuously sought to convince the Social Democratic government with Prime 
Minister Anker Jørgensen at the helm, to bring down the debt. In August 1979 
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Hoffmeyer presented the Council of Ministers with a brief in which he pointed to the 
“lethal idea of gradually reducing the deficit” (Hoffmeyer & Aaen Hansen, 1993:75). 
Yet Nationalbanken’s efforts proved futile.  
 Only after former Minister of Finance Knud Heinesen in October 1979 
supported Hoffmeyer’s bleak analysis on live television, and suggested that Denmark 
was indeed “racing towards the abyss” (Andersen, 1994:166), did Hoffmeyer’s view 
start to gain recognition. The image of a looming abyss proved a strong metaphor in 
public discourse and the newspaper Berlingske Tidende invited Hoffmeyer to 
elaborate on his arguments, which were presented in an article on 10 January 1980. 
Inspired by the demise of the main character in Igor Stravinsky’s opera The Rake’s 
Progress, Hoffmeyer outlined six steps toward the abyss. Hoffmeyer described a 
gradual disintegration of Danish society, which would start with modest problems 
such as “lack of international respect” and “loss of credit” and progress towards a 
fundamental upheaval of the social order (Hoffmeyer, 1980:9). Most sinister was the 
sixth step in which Hoffmeyer warned:  
 
Our welfare-society and political stability will erode […] not much 
imagination is needed to picture the colossal social tensions that will 
emerge if we are to roll back our progress […] One cannot predict how 
such a process will evolve, but in later years we have indeed, in other 
countries, witnessed how inflation and disintegration have sharpened 
political fractions” (Hoffmeyer, 1980:9). 
 
In the final passage Hoffmeyer played his trump card as he warned that “if the 
massive deficits continue, we are heading directly towards an abyss of self-
destruction” (Hoffmeyer, 1980:9).  
In Hoffmeyer’s apocalyptic article, monetary affairs very explicitly left 
the economic realm to touch more fundamental issues, such as the basis of societal 
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order. Not only the national economy was at stake, but the very fate of the nation, a 
nation that risked downfall and self-destruction. The following day Berlingske 
Tidende featured a follow-up interview with Hoffmeyer, which opened with the 
question: “Will Denmark survive?” A question which Hoffmeyer could reassure his 
anxious constituents with a brief and distinct “yes” (Schade, 1980:1). Later in the 
article biblical analogies were employed when Hoffmeyer was described as “the man 
who sends us warning after warning, before he closes the gates to Noah’s ark and 
leaves us to our own devices” (Schade, 1980:1). 
In terms of an analysis of the entwinement of central banking and the 
national identity, Schade’s question touches on the heart of things. Taken literally, the 
question is nonsensical since Denmark, disregarding the development in the balance 
of trade, would most certainly survive as an independent nation-state. Symbolically, 
however, the question reveals a great deal about the central bank governor as 
perceived guardian and prophet of the nation. Indeed Hoffmeyer affirmed that ‘the 
ship’ would stay afloat. The expectation that Hoffmeyer could and would actually 
answer such a question underscores the potent symbolic connections made between 
the central bank and the nation. By accepting the basic premise of the question and by 
answering it positively, Hoffmeyer did nothing to amend this interpretation. In fact, 
he readily reaffirmed the existing narrative of the governor being in control of the 
nation’s destiny.  
 Although Hoffmeyer did indeed receive criticism for his harsh analysis, 
most notably from Minister of Taxation Karl Hjortnæs who called his statement “an 
insult to the Danish government” (n/a, 1980:17), most Danish media accepted his 
statements as bleak but nonetheless legitimate perspectives coming from a central 
bank director. The newspaper Weekendavisen announced on its front page that 
Hoffmeyer was a “Prophet of the Fatherland” (Andersen, 1980:1). The newspaper 
then further observed that the conflict between Hoffmeyer and the government only 
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seemed to strengthen the authority of the central bank: “For once, here is a prophet 
who seems to be gaining a foothold in his fatherland” (Andersen, 1980:8).  
 Why was this? Why was Hoffmeyer’s critique so readily accepted even 
though society faced potential economic hardship, were his suggestions 
implemented? I argue that Hoffmeyer’s statements were generally considered 
legitimate due to the existing narrative about the Danish central bank governor; he 
was governor not only of the central bank, but also in a sense of the nation. Whereas 
Marcussen uses Hoffmeyer as the example of an “ideational entrepreneur” 
(Marcussen, 2000:64) who successfully changed the existing institutions, I suggest an 
alternative explanation: Hoffmeyer’s analysis was not accepted in spite of existing 
institutions. It was, in fact, because the existing ideas and narratives about the central 
bank governor and the central bank organization firmly cast the governor as a 
guardian of the nation that Hoffmeyer’s critique was accepted. In formulating his 
critique and painting such a bleak picture he drew on historical ideas about the central 
bank governor as a figure who would guide the nation trough crises.  
 
Banking on the nation or constructing a nation? 
By the time Hoffmeyer retired from office in 1994 he had become more than a central 
banker. He was an icon: a symbol of trustworthiness and integrity, and a caretaker – 
not only of the Danish currency – but also of the Danish people. In a portrait from 
1995 Politiken described how Hoffmeyer, throughout his thirty years as central bank 
governor, had always sought to be “in accordance with the people” (Lisberg, 
1995:12). The resemblance to the description of Moritz Levy and his alleged 
“sensitivity to the public good” is striking: the evaluations of Levy from 1892 and the 
media-driven construction of Hoffmeyer’s legacy bear a remarkable resemblance. 
Both central bank governors, although 100 years apart, were evaluated against the 
same criteria; to what extent they were sensitive to the public good. 
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In 1995 journalist Stig Andersen wrote Hoffmeyer’s biography: a book 
that effectively canonized the now elderly central banker. In Andersen’s account 
Hoffmeyer came across as kind of quasi-deity who held firm over more than three 
decades of monetary dilemmas and shifting governments.  In Andersen’s narrative he 
was “Mr Denmark”, “Lord of the Krone”, “The Godfather” and as Andersen wrote in 
his preface, “no Danish minister dared to quarrel with Hoffmeyer”. “His 
trustworthiness was simply too great. His integrity as governor was unsurpassed and 
the respect he commanded was overwhelming” (Andersen, 1994:9).  
In a farewell interview in Politiken in 1994, journalist Anne Wolden-
Ræthinge saw fit to ask Hoffmeyer what, in his opinion, was the “most typically 
Danish trait; that we should cherish and nurture?” “Something typically Danish?” 
Hoffmeyer responded: 
 
Well, I would be extremely careful trying to define something like that. But I 
could not imagine living in any other country. I could not even imagine 
living in another European country. Not even in another Scandinavian 
country. Here, we care about the environment, we love history. And even 
with all the criticism of our somewhat ambiguous attitude, there is, 
nonetheless, a general character and atmosphere that I very much enjoy. It is 
very difficult to specify, but there is a respect for something that is 
straightforward. A sensible, humane approach. I believe that our historical 
development has made people more liberated, and you get attitudes that go 
in the direction that one can enjoy (Wolden-Ræthinge, 1994).    
 
Just as Hoffmeyer in 1980 had been asked whether Denmark would survive, he was 
now asked to define the Danish national character. Why should the former central 
bank governor of all people be in a position to elaborate on such a matter? Part of the 
answer is that Hoffmeyer had come to be perceived, not only as the nation’s banker, 
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but also as a character who somehow reflected something intrinsically Danish. He 
was a person who would know what defined Danishness. There is an obvious 
difference in the way Nationaltidende back in 1934 scorned Bramsnæs for not 
understanding the jovial ways of his countrymen. Now, in 1994, the press looked 
directly to the central bank governor as an individual who could help define the 
national spirit. In both cases, however, the central bank governors were expected by 
the press to reflect on things typically Danish. 
 With the appeal to Hoffmeyer to define Danishness the associations of 
meaning had come full circle. It was no longer the bank that looked to the nation for 
legitimacy. Now, it was the nation that demanded that the bank, personified in its 
governors, help define the characteristics of the national community.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS  
This analysis argues that Danish central bank governors have historically sought to 
legitimate their monetary decision by symbolically linking monetary affairs to 
national identity. By focusing on the narratives of and about four central bank 
governors from different periods I have demonstrated how, over a period of some 150 
years, central banking gradually became embedded in national identity.  
Although the connection between central banking and the nation has been 
a recurring theme in the narratives identified by the analysis, the relationship has also 
undergone a transformation throughout the period. Gradually, as the central bank 
organization was consolidated, the connection between central banking and the nation 
was institutionalized, and explicit attempts to use national identity to promote central 
bank legitimacy became less frequent. Whereas central bankers of the early modern 
period until WWI actively connected the central bank to national identity, governors 
such as Bramsnæs and Hoffmeyer did not necessarily have to. Hoffmeyer in 
particular came to embody the central bank, but was also perceived to incarnate 
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something essentially Danish. Instead of national identity lending legitimacy to the 
central bank, the central bank came to contribute to the construction of national 
identity.  
Thus it seems that Polanyi’s assertion that national identity as vested in 
the central bank only reveals a part of the story. Indeed, national identity was to some 
extent ingrained in the Danish central bank under Hoffmeyer’s leadership. But it had 
not always been so. This analysis shows that Nationalbanken and its governors, 
historically, sought to align their organization with the national collective and that 
national identity only became “vested” in the Danish central bank a the result of a 
gradual historical development.      
This development can be explained by the continuity in the narratives 
about the purpose and prerogative of Danish central bankers all the way back to 
Moritz Levy. Danish central banks were always – certainly retrospectively – framed 
as “sensitive to the public good” or “protecting the fatherland”. Based on these 
patterns I propose that the narratives of the central bankers, as connected to the nation 
and the public good, have contributed to the creation of future interpretations of the 
central bank and its legitimacy. Levy and Hoffmeyer were evaluated in the same kind 
of language, not necessarily because they were both brilliant central bankers and truly 
sensitive to the common good, but because the narratives that connected central 
banking with the welfare of the national community proved resilient over more than 
150 years. The idea that central bankers served the nation (an idea vested in the very 
name of the Danish central bank) was institutionalized and came to define the frame 
within which Danish central bankers, in general, were evaluated in public discourse.   
This article contributes to the growing literature on the cultural 
embeddedness of central banking by providing an example of how central bank 
governors have sought to improve legitimacy through rhetorical measures. I have 
historicized the narratives about Danish central bank governors as ‘bankers-of-the-
nation’ and pointed to the ways that past interpretations of events have defined the 
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framework for what could be considered legitimate actions and statements by a 
central bank governor. As such the article contributes to Tognato’s analysis of the 
dramatization of monetary affairs and accentuates the historical precedents for such 
dramas.      
To be sure, the connection between central banking and national identity 
is not the sole and only thing that makes banks legitimate. Central banks face a 
multifaceted constituency and they have several different audiences. Central banks 
are also evaluated by the banking industry and by economists who operate with 
different perceptions of legitimacy than the broader population. I also show that 
Danish central bankers were indeed contested figures; figures whose decisions and 
legitimacy were constantly challenged both by the media and by elected politicians, 
due to the exposed nature of their offices. They were by no means loved and 
cherished by contemporary society and they were by not always able to portray 
central bank decisions as aligned with national identity. I argue, however, that in the 
end the narratives about Levy, Ussing, Bramsnæs and Hoffmeyer were always 
reconciled in public discourse as their legacies very effectively (re)connected them to 
the Danish nation and sometimes even hailed them as national saviours.  
The governors’ canonization did more than absolve the individual 
governors from the sins of contractive monetary policy. This canonisation also 
conferred up the office of central bank governor a more substantial type of legitimacy 
connected to the central bank organization and then passed on from one governor to 
the next.  
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CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS 
The aim of this dissertation has been to analyze how Nationalbanken historically has 
used and drawn upon existing perceptions of national identity to become legitimate. 
Also, the dissertation set out to examine how Nationalbanken and the Danish 
currency historically contributed to the construction and reconstruction of Danish 
national identity. Finally, I aimed to investigate how and to what extent Danish 
monetary organization has historically been constrained or enabled by national 
identity. To answer these questions I selected four potential cases from Danish 
monetary history where different kinds of legitimacy challenges highlighted the 
interconnection between monetary organization and national identity. In this final 
section, I summarize the findings in the different articles. I explain the similarities 
and differences, I highlight the commonalities and I synthesize the analytical findings 
in a series of general propositions and suggestions. Finally, I suggest some directions 
for future research.   
NEEDING THE NATION OR MAKING THE NATION? 
Taken together the four articles provide a range of insights that do not necessarily 
point in the same direction. How can these different findings be synthesized into 
some more general ideas that answer the research questions? 
 I will start by out by contrasting the two articles “Monetary 
Romanticism” and “The Danish Euro”. These two articles share a common theme, as 
they both deals with the political attempts to implement alternatives to the existing 
monetary order. At first glance, the two examples share one obvious commonality: in 
both cases, national identity apparently impeded the reconfiguring of existing 
monetary organization. National identity was mobilized politically to delegitimize 
new monetary arrangements. Different ideas about Danish (and Schleswig-
Holsteinian) national identity posed significant challenges to the establishment of a 
regional branch of Nationalbanken in Flensburg. Also, national identity apparently 
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hampered both the homogenization of the Danish monetary system in the mid 
nineteenth century as well as the implementation of the euro some 150 years later.  
However, the cases are more complex than this first comparison indicates. 
Although the two cases display some obvious similarities, the historical and political 
contexts were indeed very different, and national identity did not work in the same 
way in the two cases to obstruct the aims of Danish policymakers. Firstly, in the 
conflict between Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein, there was not just one nation at 
play. The Danish state encompassed two different national communities with distinct 
identities as well as two distinct currencies. Danish policymakers, here, sought to 
create one homogenous territorial currency. The monetary reform was skillfully 
resisted by the economic and social elite, with fundamental financial interests in 
keeping the status quo. To this end, agitators such as Tiedemann mobilized national 
identity as a way to hinder the reform.   
 The agitation against Filialbanken and the rigsdaler transcended the 
realm of financial and economic interests. It became, in effect, a campaign of a very 
hot (to use Billig’s phrase) form of Schleswig-Holsteinian nationalism. The ideology 
of Schleswig-Holstein nationalism was not merely invented anew for economic 
purpose by a contemplating elite. The ethnic and national antecedents of Schleswig-
Holsteinian national identity existed prior to the struggle over monetary issues, and 
was taken advantage of by the political agitators for political purposes. In doing so, 
agitators as Tiedemann simultaneously drew on and reproduced Schleswig-
Holsteinian national identity.  
 In the euro campaign of 2000, national identity was similarly mobilized 
both by opponents and proponents of the euro. Surely, national identity played a role 
in the final popular rejection of the euro. However, I want to suggest a fundamental 
difference between the 1840s and 2000. In the 1840s. monetary organization was, to 
a high degree, used to promote a new nation. Although some euro-skeptics might 
disagree, the referendum in 2000 was not first and foremost about a new European 
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nation: it was about a new European currency.127 In 2000, the embeddedness of 
monetary organization in national identity was more comprehensive than it had been 
in the mid-nineteenth century. Let me elaborate on this idea by returning to two 
quotes from the two articles, respectively. Firstly, we have the Gülich quote from the 
national song-gathering in 1843: 
   
the strength of the people of Schleswig-Holstein […] The determination 
and healthy spirit that lives in our people has been defeated by the Danish 
currency, the Danish bank, the Danish propaganda together with certain 
anti-national trends and inappropriate means (Unverhau, 2000:326).  
 
In contrast, we have the quote from the webpage of the Danish People’s Party (DPP) 
from 2000:  
 
What for more than a thousand years was a thundering success, Prime 
Minister Poul  Nyrup Rasmussen and his accomplices have now decided 
to strangle. [...] It is Denmark's own currency, a magical success that 
began around 850 when the first Danish coins were minted in Hedeby 
(Danish People’s Party, 2000).  
 
First, we must dwell with the striking similarity in the two arguments in which the 
Danish state was envisaged as either the “Danish propaganda” or “The Danish Prime 
Minister” that had defeated or was about to strangle and destroy the object of 
affection. Then, we must think about how the objects of affection differed in the two 
quotes. Gülich articulated national identity as the central concept that Danish 
                                                                
127 This new European currency could, of course, be used in the future to provide the building blocks for further 
European identity crafting.    
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monetary organization was about to destroy. In the campaign of the DPP, the Danish 
currency was threatened. The krone was represented as this ancient “magical 
success” and as a symbol of a shared history and Viking-origin.128  
The quote from DPP indicates how Danish monetary organization had 
become an element of national identity. The Danish currency had become an element 
of the repertoire of symbols that lent meaning to the nation and reinforced national 
identity. In contrast, Gülich used the Danish currency in 1843 as a hot and explicit 
symbol of nationalism to promote a specific national identity. In 2000, the idea of a 
Danish currency, as a teleological success, had been banalized as a part of national 
identity instead of a symbol of hot nationalism.  
 
Of course, the two quotes are articulated in very different historical and political 
contexts—Gülich was even referring to an entirely different nation than was DPP. 
And of course, the relationship between national identity and the legitimacy of 
monetary organization was reciprocal in both cases. Nonetheless, the juxtaposition of 
these two quotes serves to indicate the transition of monetary organization from 
initially depending on and being defined by national identity to a more banal, 
integrated element of national identity.  
This idea is further underlined by the article “Banking on the nation” in 
which I analyze the historical development of the narratives of and about Danish 
central bankers in periods where Nationalbanken’s legitimacy was challenged. 
Whereas central bankers such as Levy and Ussing readily referred to the nation to 
legitimize their preferences and decisions, Bramsnæs and Hoffmeyer resorted less 
frequently to such strategies. Except for one instance where Hoffmeyer very 
explicitly warned about the imminent disintegration of Danish society, lest monetary 
and economic policies be changed, the trend instead seemed to have been reversed. 
                                                                
128 Even though, ironically, the Schleswig-Holstein controversy in particular discredits the account of the Danish 
currency as an undisputed success trough the past 1000 years.  
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When Hoffmeyer disseminated his bleak analysis in 1980, he drew on national 
identity and historical narratives about the prerogative of the Danish central bank 
governor to get his point across and to make that point legitimate. At the same time, 
he also very much reproduced and reinforced national identity.    
This reinforcement resulted from the general acceptance that Hoffmeyer 
was, for example, “prophet of the Fatherland” (Andersen, 1980:1). The most explicit 
contribution to Danish national identity is to be found in Hoffmeyer’s farewell 
interview, in which he without hesitance defined the essence of Danishness. In this 
particular instance as a central bank governor, he did not need the nation; he provided 
its meaning. Hoffmeyer explicitly reproduced and reinterpreted the patterns of values, 
symbols, memories, myth and traditions that comprised the nation—and he invited 
individuals to identify with it. 
The timing of Hoffmeyer’s identity crafting becomes even more 
interesting if we consider the statement’s political context. On 18 May, 1993, a small 
majority of the Danish electorate had voted to ratify the Maastricht Treaty, which 
effectively paved the way for Denmark’s participation in the EMU. Denmark had set 
down a path to further European integration. The reporter’s appeal for Hoffmeyer to 
define the “most typically Danish trait; that we should cherish and nurture?” 
(Wolden-Ræthinge, 1994:4) was articulated 10 months after the Maastrich 
referendum, and must be considered in the context of a potential Europeanization. As 
such, the Danish nation, as well as its monetary organization, faced potential 
restructuring, and Hoffmeyer stepped in to bolster Danish national identity. 
 
NATIONAL IDENTITY AND MONETARY LEGITIMACY AS MUTUALLY 
RECONFIGURING 
Therefore, I suggest a historical development from a situation in the nineteenth 
century, where monetary organization sought to be aligned with national identity, to a 
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situation where monetary organization plays an important role in reproducing 
national identity. This is not to say that nineteenth century monetary organization 
only drew on national identity whereas Hoffmeyer, for example, only contributed to 
national identity. In all of the four cases under investigation, the relationship between 
monetary organization and legitimacy is best described a relationship of co-
configuration.  
This relationship is detailed in the article “Too weird for banknotes”. As 
with the debates over monetary reorganization, the debates and considerations that 
went into the designs of Danish banknotes from 1947-2007 very much epitomize the 
continuous use and production of national identity. Danish banknote designers, 
including the central bank governors, believed that Danish banknotes must reflect the 
nation in some way or another. To recapitulate the words of Seddelgruppen, the notes 
were required “to be unmistakably Danish” (Nationalbanken, 2006). However, as it 
was clear that Nationalbanken faced a complex context of legitimacy in terms of 
appropriate banknote designs, the bank was reluctant to align its iconography with 
more modern ideas of Danishness. Instead, the bank continuously chose a more 
conservative national romantic symbolism to avoid jeopardizing the trustworthiness 
and authority of the notes. 
 But again, the aspirations to maintain legitimacy and trust in the 
banknotes by keeping a conservative design and referring to a shared national history, 
cannot only be considered as an exercise to achieve legitimacy. These aspirations also 
constitute an interpretation and reproduction of national identity. In putting such 
iconography into circulation, Nationalbanken actively provided the nation with 
meaning. Symbols that would have conveyed more contemporary expressions of 
Danish identity, e.g., Denmark’s most expensive and prominent bridge, 
Øresundsbroen, which connects Denmark and Sweden, were deliberately discarded. 
The suggestion of the external discussion group to include cosmopolitan motifs, 
which was so firmly disregarded, was not just a question of legitimacy: it was a 
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question of national identity. Nationalbanken provided the nation with meaning and 
supplied a range of potent symbols that worked as a banal form of Danish 
nationalism.    
“Too Weird for Banknotes” contributes and relates directly to the large 
existing literature on currency iconography and nationalism. The article, in particular, 
expands on the suggestions by Hymans (2004); Penrose & Cumming (2011) and 
Penrose (2011): its conclusions emphasize that the issue of legitimacy, at least in the 
Danish case, was paramount to banknote designers, and the findings call for an 
increased focus on the interplay between identity-crafting and legitimacy-seeking in 
the analyses of banknote designs.  
 
THE BANAL LEGITIMACY OF MONETARY NATIONALISM 
The analyses in this dissertation have demonstrated the political origins of a 
seemingly apolitical organization. Central banking is, without a shred of a doubt, an 
inherently political endeavor. Certain monetary policies and decisions always benefit 
some fractions of society while excluding others fractions. I suggest, however, that 
the gradual historical integration of monetary organization in the cultural patterns that 
make up national identity has worked to suppress, or at least mitigate, the notion of 
fractional interests. With references to the best interests of the national collective, 
Danish central bankers have sought to become legitimate when their actions were 
controversial and potentially burdensome to the population. In many instances, as 
argued in this series of articles, national identity has defined the frame for what could 
be considered legitimate actions and statements about monetary organization. 
Because of the historical development that embedded the central bank governor in 
national identity, Hoffmeyer could speak openly against the government in 1980, 
though the rejection of the euro in 2000 was also influenced by the the embeddedness 
of the Danish currency in national identity.  
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 Following the analyses in the different articles, I want to promote a new 
concept that can explain and encompass the seemingly apolitical position of central 
banks, as well as the continuous reproduction of national identity. I suggest that the 
banal legitimacy of monetary nationalism can be brought forth as a central concept 
that spans the dissertation’s different analyses. By the notion of banal legitimacy, I 
wish to emphasize the ‘taken-for-granted’ quality of national monetary organization. 
Monetary policies, even those connected with economic hardship for a majority of 
the population, are legitimized due to the embeddedness of monetary organization in 
national identity. Central bankers can convince their constituents to accept unpopular 
decisions because such decisions have been historically established ‘in the interests of 
the nation’, or, to use Crane’s phrase, because “economy inheres in nation” (Crane, 
1998:67).  
Of course, there are limits to this banal legitimacy. The embeddednes of 
monetary organization in national identity also constrains the possibilities for 
monetary organization, as I demonstrated in the article on the Danish euro debate. 
Because the idea of a European monetary union was at odds with existing elements of 
Danish national identity, it was inherently difficult for the pro-euro elite to promote 
the idea in a Danish context. As a consequence, Europhiles resorted to a paradoxical 
strategy of nationalism to promote a supranational idea. To be sure, this strategy 
seemed to have backfired in the case of the Danish euro referendum. This example 
illustrates that the legitimacy of monetary organization not merely depends on 
politicians’ or central bankers’ ability, in the words of Tognato, to “speak the 
languages that define the collective identities of their own societies” and to “recast 
their own institutional identity into national identity” (Tognato, 2012:9). Indeed, if 
monetary organization is actually an ingrained element in the language that defines 
collective identities, then it becomes inherently difficult to invoke such language in 
order to promote monetary change.      
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Then there is the nationalism element in the proposed concept of banal 
legitimacy: When banal legitimacy underpins a certain monetary decisions, e.g., the 
increase in the domestic currency supply, there is a feedback on national identity. 
Then, the members of the nation come to “experience monetary phenomena together” 
(Helleiner, 1998:1420) and are, in turn, reinforced by the idea that they do, in fact, 
constitute a distinct national collective. Such shared monetary experiences can be 
understood as the kind of banal monetary nationalism that situates the constituents of 
monetary organization within the nation and reinforces national identity. Such 
monetary nationalism has been a recurring theme in the four articles. In the case of 
Schleswig-Holstein this monetary nationalism was very explicit but it has been 
exemplified in more banal instances in the article on the four central bank governors. 
Levy, Ussing. Bramsnæs and Hoffmeyer may have had the official title of central 
bank governor, but they did all engage in a subtle form of monetary nationalism that 
reinforced the idea of a Danish national collective.  
Even the former head of the central bank printing division Niels Holm 
engaged in this form of monetary nationalism. Niels Holm, as I described in “Too 
Weird for Banknotes”, who so promptly dismissed that Nationalbanken was 
producing “nationalist” money and instead argued that “Our banknotes must be 
Danish, but not nationalist.” (Holm cited in Adriansen, 2003:269). Of course, 
following the idea of the banal legitimacy of monetary nationalism, it is impossible to 
produce Danish banknotes that are not elements of a banal nationalism. Once you 
have taken it upon yourself to define Danishness, you are in effect a contributor to 
national identity; even though the original objective might have been to bolster the 
legitimacy of the circulating banknotes or monetary organization in general.   
.  
To be sure, whether the concept of a banal legitimacy of monetary nationalism can be 
generalized to other instances beyond Danish monetary history remains uncertain. As 
we enter into an epoch of supra-national monetary organizations, we have to redefine 
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the idea of sovereign nation-states having monopoly over money (Cohen, 1998). The 
common European currency and the ECB, for example, are both monetary 
organizations that constitute obvious and real challenges to the idea of the legitimacy 
of banal monetary nationalism. The legitimacy of the euro and the ECB must be 
sourced from somewhere other than national identity.   
 
Suggestions for further research      
Following these four case studies, I suggest that future studies involving the 
connection between monetary organization and national identity seriously consider 
the concept of legitimacy. What kind of actions are considered desirable and 
appropriate, under which situations, and why is this so? I also suggest that the idea of 
a reciprocal relationship between monetary organization and national identity, as 
suggested by (Kaelberer, 2004) is brought to the forefront of future research. In this 
dissertation, I have taken some steps to show empirically how this relationship 
historically affected the possibilities and strategies of Danish monetary authorities. 
Future studies are required to build on these ideas.  
Finally, I suggest one more general theoretical consideration that arises 
from the above ideas. The notion of a mutual configuring relationship between ideas 
and practices as outlined above may not come across as strikingly novel to scholars 
of organizational institutionalism. The idea of a banal legitimacy of monetary 
nationalism very much echoes many of the ideas from this body of literature on how 
concepts and cognitive representations become institutionalized. However, within 
nationalism studies, which often consider the nation as a form of institutionalization 
of symbolic representations, there is a remarkable lack of such insights. 
 I suggest for scholars of nationalism to orient themselves toward some of 
the key insights from organizational institutionalism—in particular the concept of 
legitimacy, which I consider central for understanding the development of modern 
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‘apolitical’ institutions such as currencies and central banks—as well as to understand 
the feedback of these institutions into national identity. 
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